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PREFACE 
This thesis is concerned with developing a procedure 
whereby Source Selection officials in the Department of 
Defense are able to quantitatively assess, within the con-
straints of anticipating unknowns in developmental programs, 
the technological risks associated with contractor proposals. 
Recent changes in the DoD Systems Acquisition Life Cycle are 
investigated to determine what effects these changes may 
have on the Source Selection process. An initial risk 
model, developed and applied to the Source Selection activi-
ties of a major aircraft system, demonstrates the feasibil-
ity of obtaining a cumulative measure of the anticipated 
technological risks associated with a contractor proposal. 
The major findings of the initial risk model and a compre-
hensive Source Selection questionnaire are incorporated in 
the development of an integrated risk assessment and scoring 
model. The procedural methodology developed to implement 
the model provides a systematic approach to incrementally 
establish the proposal score while achieving maximum utili-
zation and benefit from the detailed evaluation effort. The 
output of the model provides a relative measure of the over-
all technological risk associated with each proposal, based 
upon the net value of the expected positive and negative risk 
of potential problem areas of varying importance. 
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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
The Department of Defense (DoD) is responsible for re-
search, development, production, and employment of approved 
systems necessary for the national security. When a new 
operational requirement is defined, validated, and condi-
tionally approved, one branch of the Armed Forces is as-
signed responsibility for acquiring a system which will 
satisfy the specific operational requirement(s). The agency 
of that branch which is responsible for research and devel~ 
opment will be responsible for the system throughout the 
acquisition life cycle. The systems acquisition life cycle 
is generally divided into five major phases -- conceptual, 
validation, full-scale development, production, and deploy-
ment. All projects whose R & D costs are expected to exceed 
$25 million, or whose total projected procurement costs 
exceed $100 million must be contracted to industry through a 
competitive process called the Source Selection Process. 
The Source Selection Process is included in the Validation 
Phase of the Systems Acquisition Life Cycle. 
This study focuses upon the Source Selection Process 
within the PoD Systems Acquisition Life Cycle. Specifically, 
the study focuses upon the process used by the Source 
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Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) to evaluate and score pro-
posals submitted by contractors in accordance with a Request 
for Proposal (RFP) document. The purpose of the study is to 
investigate the problems associated with evaluating and 
scoring proposals in the SSEB and to determine what effects 
current DoD management philosophy may have upon the SSEB 
process. Since the current DoD management philosophy has 
strongly emphasized the need for increased risk assessment 
throughout the systems acquisition life cycle, the primary 
objective of this study is to develop an integrated risk 
assessment and scoring model for use by the SSEB in the 
Source Selection process. 
Methods of Research 
The existing DoD directives and implementing regula-
tions, manuals, and procedures relative to source selection 
were reviewed. In this effort, particular attention was 
given to the applicable docl,Ullents within the United States 
Air Force (USAF). Since early 1969, the DoD has placed 
strong emphasis on increased hardware demonstration and 
proofing prior to a production commitment, with the objec-
tives being greater cost effectiveness and reduction of pro-
gram risks. The DoD directives and USAF responses relative 
to this current systems management philosophy were also 
reviewed. It was this rather intensive review of the cur-
rent DoD management philosophy and the existing Source 
Selection process that prompted the writer to focus on the 
area of risk assessment within the SSEB function. 
.3 
An extensive literature search of the Defense Documen-
tation Center (DDC) was conducted to identify current work 
related to risk analysis and assessment within the Source 
Selection process. While there is an abundance of litera-
ture in the DDC, and elsewhere, covering quantitative tools 
and techniques for handling uncertainty in real world prob-
lems, the writer found nothing that specifically addressed 
the problems of risk identification and quantitative as-
sessment within the SSEB function. Much is understood and 
written about tools and techniques such. as probability 
theory, statistical inference, decision theory, utility 
theory, game theory, simulation, network analysis, and 
queueing theory--all of which involve estimating and/or 
assessing the degree and potential impact of uncertainty in 
real world problems. Yet, those familiar with developmental 
programs for major defense weapon systems know that it is 
extremely difficult to structure or model the problems and 
potential problems associated with major defense systems in 
such a way as to permit meaningful and useful quantitative 
assessments using one, or a combination of the tools and 
techniques mentioned above. This is particularly true when 
a measure of the over-all program risk, or probability of 
success, is desired. As mentioned earlier, the primary ob-
jective of this study is to develop a model and procedural 
methodology which will allow the SSEB to obtain a 
quantitative measure of the over-all program risk associated 
with anticipated unknowns and simultaneously score the con-
tractor proposal being evaluated. 
In order to determine the feasibility of developing an 
integrated risk assessment and scoring model for use by the 
SSEB, the writer was accepted as a member of a recent SSEB 
for a major weapon system of the Air Force. This experience 
resulted in the development of an initial risk model, the 
results of which proved that such an approach was both fea~ 
sible and potentially useful. In addition, the writer pre-
pared and distributed a Source Selection questionnaire for 
the purpose of: 
(1) Assessing the impact of the current DoD 
management philosophy upon the SSEB process. 
(2) Assessing the adequacy of the present scoring 
system used in the SSEB process. 
The questionnaire data was analyzed and evaluated, and the 
major findings were used in conjunction with the initial 
risk model to develop an integrated risk assessment/scoring 
model and the procedural methodology to implement it. This 
entire study is tailored to source selection activities of 
the Air Force, and particularly to the Aeronautical Systems 
Division of the Air Force Systems Command. 
Approach 
Chapter II briefly discusses the defense R & D program 
and the systems acquisition life cycle as it existed for a 
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number of years prior to 1969. Chapter III is a summary of 
the key documents that have resulted in the current DoD man-
agement philosophy for defense R & D. Chapter IV briefly 
describes the Source Selection process and how the process 
has been adapted to the current DoD management philosophy. 
In addition, the scoring system used by the SSEB and the 
Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) is discussed in 
some detail. 
Chapter V presents the initial risk model and methodol-
ogy developed by the writer while serving as a member of a 
recent SSEB. Chapter VI evaluates the results of the Source 
Selection Questionnaire and presents the major findings. 
The questionnaire itself and an analysis of the respondent 
answers are provided in Appendixes A and B, respectively. 
In Chapter VII, three interrelated problems associated 
with the SSEB function are discussed. The major findings of 
the Source Selection Questionnaire and a major Air Force 
study on the Request for Proposal document are compared, and 
major conclusions are presented relative to them. Chapter 
VIII is the most important chapter since it attempts to 
develop an integrated risk assessment/scoring model and pro-
cedural methodology that is consistent with the current DoD 
management philosophy and the major findings and conclusions 
of Chapters V, VI, and VII. In Chapter IX, a brief conclu-
sion to the study is presented along with recommendations 
for further study. 
CHAPTER II 
THE DEFENSE R & D CYCLE 
As briefly discussed in Chapter I, this study attempts 
to develop a methodology and model for integrated risk anal-
ysis and scoring in the Source Selection Evaluation Board 
process within the total Department of Defense (DoD) re-
search and development (R & D) cycle. In order to provide a 
backdrop of the total environment in which this study fits, 
a thumbnail sketch of the structure of defense R & Dis 
given. Those familiar with Defense R & D should proceed to 
Chapter III. 
Defense-wide R & Dis a major program - Program 6 - in 
the DoD Five-Year Defense Program. It encompasses research, 
development, tests, and evaluation (RDT&E), where RDT&E is 
the title under which Congress appropriates funds for these 
activities. The weapons acquisition process can be divided 
into three main phases: concept formulation, contract 
definition, and acquisition. In concept formulation, the 
defense managers are responsible for conducting research, 
exploratory development, and advanced development. It is in 
this phase that the technological bases of developmental 
programs are established. Using the scientific knowledge 
obtained through research, exploratory development attempts 
7 
to demonstrate technical feasibility and conduct very lim-
ited developmental activities to solve specific military 
problems. Advanced development includes all activities 
which develop and test hardware on an experimental basis. 
The advanced development effort must satisfy numerous condi-
tions for a developmental proposal to qualify for the next 
major phase. Briefly, these conditions are: (1) Mission 
must be clearly defined, (2) Performance requirements must 
be identified and defined, (J) The best technical approach 
must be identified and selected, with emphasis on engineer-
ing rather than experimental effort, (4) Trade-off analyses 
must be accomplished on studies of operational effectivenes~ 
cost, cost-effectiveness, and schedule, and (5) Acceptable 
and credible cost and schedule estimates must be determined 
(1, p. 4). When a Service meets these conditions, condi-
tional approval is given for its developmental proposal. 
Before proceeding to the contract definition phase, a 
brief discussion of operational requirements is necessary to 
understand the fundamental basis for developmental propos-
als. The need for defense materials is derived from current 
or anticipated requirements or deficiencies. Once the need 
is validated by the military service and the Director of 
Defense Research and Engineering (DDR&E), the development 
agency (for the Air Force, the Air Force Systems Command) is 
tasked to perform the activities of the concept formulation 
phase. If the conditions of this phase are satisfactorily 
met by the service, its developmental proposal is ready for 
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the contract definition phase. The formal request to pro-
ceed into contract definition is in the form of a Program 
Change Request (PCR) which, if approved, is reflected in the 
Five-Year Defense Plan. The Service also provides a Tech-
nical Development Plan which justifies the PCR by presenting 
the status of the prerequisite conditions and a detailed 
plan for the developmental program. 
The Contract Definition phase begins when the Secretary 
of Defense gives conditional approval to proceed with engi-
neering development. All projects whose R & D costs are 
expected to exceed $25 million, or whose total projected 
procurement costs exceed $100 million must go through a 
Contract Definition phase (1, p. J). In contract definition, 
the DOD selects and pays certain contractors to submit engi-
neering development proposals in accordance with a key docu-
ment, The Request for Proposal (RFP). Engineering 
development encompasses the establishment of firm specifica-
tions and those activities required to develop engineered 
items for use by a Service, but not yet approved for pro-
curement or operation. Systems engineering and system/ 
project management is also included in engineering develop-
ment. One or more contractors are selected to perform the 
engineering development in accordance with current DoD 
policy directives and regulations. It is the Source Selec-
tion process of evaluating and selecting contractor pro-
posals submitted in accordance with the RFP that this study 
is addressed. Therefore, the only R & D projects to which 
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this study is specifically addressed are those that require 
contract definition; that is, R & D costs are expected to 
exceed $25 million or projected procurement costs exceed 
$100 million. 
Upon completion of engineering development,the program 
is reviewed and a decision made as to the acceptability of 
proceeding into the acquisition phase. If approved, the 
program enters the acquisition phase and operational <level-
opment begins. This signifies that the project is approved 
for full production and deployment and is transferred from 
the R & D program to another program category of the Five-
Year Defense Plan. Operational development encompasses the 
development, engineering and testing of components, sub-
systems, and systems approved for production and employment. 
It will be shown later that the DoD has recently directed 
that more prototype hardware be developed. It is, there-
fore, necessary that the Services accomplish more hardware 
testing and evaluation activities in Engineering Develop-
ment, rather than Operational Development. Production and 
issue to field unit follow this testing period. From the 
above, it is seen that the three major phases of the R & D 
cycle - concept formulation, contract definition, and 
acquisition - encompass the five major categories of R & D 
activity - research, exploratory development, advanced 
development, engineering development, and operational devel-
opment. These categories, plus a sixth and final category -
management and support - make up the complete defense R & D 
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program. The management and support category involves sup-
port and operation of test ranges and laboratories, mainte-
nance and operation of ships, aircraft, and land based 
support instrumentation, and all other multiusage and gen-
eral purpose R & D support activities. The support func-
tions of this category apply to all of the other five 
categories. Dickey has portrayed the defense R & D cycle in 
Figure 1 (2, p. 12). This presentation best describes those 
developmental programs which result in a single contractor 
being awarded the engineering development contract as a 
result of contract definition. In practice, the DoD has 
used this general scheme as a guide, departing from it to 
tailor the management approach to each particular develop-
mental program on a best fit basis. 
The overview of the Defense R & D cycle presented above 
drew heavily from the work of Dickey (2, pp. 5-31). In the 
past two years, there have been considerable shifts in em-
phasis by the DoD but fundamentally the R & D cycle remains 
unchanged. 
Contract Definition 
The contract definition phase of Figure 1 consists of 
three subphases; A, B, and C. Phase A is a process which 
results in the selection of two or more competing contrac-
tors for participation in Phase B. The selection is made 
by evaluating two contractor proposals - one which describes 
how he will conduct the contract definition in Phase B, and 
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the other which describes a plan for the Acquisition Phase. 
In Phase B, the contractor prepares and submits a proposal 
which describes the engineering design approach, system per-
formance, implementation plan, and costs. Phase C consists 
of a rigorous evaluation and analysis by the Source Selec-
tion organization and ends with the selection of a contrac-
tor to perform engineering and operational development, and 
production activities. 
CHAPTER III 
CURRENT DOD MANAGEMENT PHILOSOPHY 
As weapons and equipment have grown in size, complexity, 
and cost, the DoD has continually sought ways to improve 
R & D management concepts. Since the end of World War II, 
increasing emphasis has been placed on a total systems ap-
proach. Today, defense managers of large and complex sys-
tems are faced with technical and managerial decisions which 
should take into account factors such as threat, urgency of 
need, methods of employment, systems concepts, technical 
feasibility, alternative trade-offs, cost and cost-
effectiveness, supportability, reliability, vulnerability, 
survivability, flexibility, etc. Since each one of these 
factors can and usually do have a degree of uncertainty 
associated with them, the defense manager is constantly 
faced with situations which require courageous and risky 
decisions. The enormous costs associated with modern de-
fense systems make it essential that maximum utilization and 
effectiveness of limited national resources is achieved. 
Parallel Undocumented Development 
Because it was recognized that among other things, the 
real world does not allow sufficient elimination of 
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technical risk prior to approval for engineering develop-
ment, the Chairman, Senate Subcommittee on the Judiciary in 
October, 1968, requested the General Accounting Office 
(GAO) to evaluate two proposed methods of procurement -
Parallel Undocumented Development and Directed Technology 
Licensing. The Comptroller General presented the GAO report 
to Congress on July 14, 1969 (J, pp. 1-J4). The Parallel 
Undocumented Development (PUD) proposal, authored by Dean 
Ralph C. Nash,of George Washington University, was favored 
by the GAO. The PUD requires that: 
(1) Competitive engagement be sustained through 
further, more substantive stages of development; 
(2) Contractor selection be based upon demon-
strated performance of hardware; and (J) Most 
Government-purposed documentation be deferred 
until the winning contractor is selected (J, p. 14). 
The end products of Contract Definition studies are 
usually a set of performance specification models, technical 
and management plans, and briefings to source selection 
officials. These officials are responsible for deciding 
whether or not to proceed into engineering development, and 
if so, selecting a single contractor for that phase. The 
winning contractor is usually the sole source for the follow-
on production phase of acquisition. This approach to con-
tract definition is frequently referred to as "paper 
competition" or "paper studies". The PUD approach to sus-
tain competition through more substantive development 
introduces a substantial change to the "paper competition" 
process of the Contract Definition. Specifically, it 
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retains at least two competing contractors throughout the 
engineering development activity, and requires a signifi-
cantly different approach than the Phase A, B, C of Contract 
Definition. The concept that the contractor selection for 
production will be based upon demonstratable hardware intro-
duces a new dimension into the initial SSEB evaluation, and 
requires development and testing- of full-scale (not neces-
sarily complete) system prototypes during the engineering 
development. The concept to defer government proposed 
documentation is basically an attempt to require only that 
documentation now that will be used now in the evaluation 
and selection criteria. This so-called minimum documenta-
tion concept argues that to require voluminous data on 
maintainability, reliability, operability, etc. on a system 
that has not been designed is, for the most part, a waste of 
time and dollars. 
While none of the three basic tenets of PUD - competi-
tion in engineering development, full-scale prototype sys-
tems, and deferred documentation - are new concepts to R & D 
management, they are significant departures from the defense 
R & D management principles and practices of the past fif-
teen years relative to the Contract Definition and engineer-
ing development activities. Figure 2 shows the defense item 
acquisition process as modified by the PUD approach. The 
differences can be seen clearly by comparing Figure 1 and 
Figure 2. 
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Recent DoD Directives 
In July, 1969, Mr. Packard, the Deputy Secretary of 
Defense, directed the Service Secretaries to study ways to 
improve the weapon systems acquisition process (4). Cost 
growth in systems acquisition was a major topic of this 
memorandum, and three factors were identified as major 
causes of the unacceptable cost growth during systems acqui-
sition. The first factor is over-optimism in cost estimates 
by both contractors and Military Services. To correct this, 
greater emphasis on reality will be achieved by making it a 
major factor in the Source Selection process. This will 
require improvements in cost estimating and validating capa-
bility and insure these improved capabilities are effec-
tively applied by the Source Selection authority. The 
second factor is the degree of changes made in a system 
during the operational development and production phase. 
More emphasis is required to insure that requirements are 
well established and that "nice" or "desirable" features do 
not creep in later. No changes to the system configuration 
are to be approved without full and accurate knowledge of 
the cost of the change on the total program cost. The 
third major factor for cost growth is inadequate identifica-
tion and assessment of technical risks associated with sys-
terns. Greater emphasis is needed to insure that the 
conditions of advanced development are achieved as prereq-
uisite to Contract Definition and full-scale engineering 
development. In this regard, Deputy Secretary Packard 
required managers to insure that: 
Areas of high technical risk are identified and 
fully considered; formal risk analysis on each 
program is made; and summaries of these are made 
part of the back-up material for the program 
(4, p. 2). 
Deputy Secretary Packard also stressed the need for in-
creased use of competitive prototyping and the amount of 
test and evaluation in the acquisition process. 
The Air Force response to the Packard memorandum was 
contained in Air Force Secretary Seaman's letter, with 
attachment, dated 26 Oct 1969. The attachment, signed by 
the Air Force Vice Chief of Staff, discusses positive ac-
tions the Air Force is taking to improve weapon system 
acquisition relative to the specific points of the DoD 
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memorandum as well as other actions. In discussing the need 
for improvements in coping with the problems of technical 
risk, the Air Force agreed that it must adequately identify 
and assess the risks associated with major programs and meet 
the prerequisites of contract definition. The Air Force 
points out that: 
At the same time, in our efforts to reduce the 
unknowns and uncertainties in our program, we 
must remember that technical advancements essen-
tial to worthwhile improvements in our opera-
tional capabilities must, of necessity, involve 
a degree of technical risk (5, pp. 4-5). 
To eliminate all technical risks in a new system development 
program would result in an obsolescent and inferior product. 
Regarding cost estimating and validation, the Air Force and 
19 
Rand Corporation currently have over eighty separate cost 
research projects underway to develop improved methodologies 
for estimating direct and indirect costs. The Air Force was 
in agreement with the DoD on every major point in the DoD 
memorandum of 31 July 1969. 
In Dec 1969, Deputy Secretary Packard signed a memoran-
dum to the Service Secretaries which outlined responsibili-
ties in the process of acquiring major weapon systems (6). 
Figure 3 is a chart which was presented to the Industry 
Advisory Council meeting on October 10, 1969 and was en-
closed in this memorandum, along with definitions of the 
various activities and decisions. It should be noted that 
while the names of the major phases have been changed there 
is great similarity in the descriptions of these new phases 
to those in Figure 1. The Conceptual Phase is essentially 
the same as the previous concept formulation phase. The 
Validation Phase corresponds to the previous Contract 
Definition Phase, but expands the definition to include pro-
visions for Parallel (Competitive) Prototype Development. 
The Validation Phase may be interpreted by some to be an 
extension of the advanced development activities of the 
Conceptual phase (7). If such were the case, the intent 
would most likely be to develop, fabricate, and test compo-
nent or subsystem prototype hardware to determine if the 
prerequisites for entering engineering development are 
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replace the previous Acquisition Phase. Acq~isition Phase 
previously included Engineering Development, Operational 
Development, and Production. The Full-Scale Development 
Phase appears to include the same activities, but with 
greater emphasis on test and evaluation of the weapon sys-
tem, including all of the items necessary for its support, 
prior to approval for production. In the new Production 
Phase, the weapon system, including training equipment, 
spares, etc., is produced for operational use. In the 
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Deployment Phase, the system is provided to and used by 
operational forces. The decision milestones by DoD are 
essentially the same as in Figure 1. Figure 4 provides 
summarial comparison of the previous and new processes. It 
is clear that the primary change has been increased emphasis 
on the development, testing and evaluation of prototype 
hardware throughout the development activities, including 
parallel (competitive) prototype development. 
In May 1970, Deputy Secretary of Defense Packard sent a 
memorandum to the DoD at-large providing further policy 
guidance on major weapon system acquisition (8). A major 
portion of this directive was addressed to the need for 
reducing technical risks in new programs and ways that risk 
can be minimized. Three approaches for reducing risk in the 
conceptual phase were given: 
(1) Risk Assessment. The first is to make a care-
ful assessment of the technical problems 
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is likely to be necessary in finding a solu-
tion that is practical. A careful look at the 
consequence of failure, even of "low risk" 
program elements, is also critical. 
(2) System and Hardware Proofing. The second and 
only sure way to minimize the technical risk 
is to do enough actual engineering design and 
component testing in the conceptual develop-
ment stage to demonstrate that the technical 
risks have been eliminated or reduced to a 
reasonable level. Component or complete sys~ 
tern prototyping, or backup development, are 
examples of this. 
(J) Trade-offs (risk avoidance). Since program 
risk and cost are dependent on practical trade-
offs between stated operating requirements and 
engineering design, trade-offs must be consid-
ered not only at the beginning of the program 
but continually throughout the developmental 
stages. 
Regarding Full-Scale Development, the memorandum stated 
that: 
Even though risk has been adequately addressed dur-
ing the conceptual development stages, full-scale 
development will uncover technical and engineering 
problems that need to be solved. Procedures shall 
be established in the development program by which 
these problems will be continually addressed in 
view of possible trade-offs with stated operating 
requirements, cost, and operational readiness date. 
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The requirement for "formal risk analysis" tp.at Mr. Packard 
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directed in his 31 July 1969 DoD memorandum and referred to 
in his 28 May 1970 memorandum was the primary factor that 
prompted the initiation of this study effort -- the develop-
ment of a methodology and model for integrated risk analysis 
and scoring in the Source Selection Evaluation Board Process. 
The Air Force Systems Command is currently preparing a 
guide for management in the systems acquisition life cycle. 
This guide reflects the current DoD management philosophy 
and will, when approved, replace Part One of AFSCM 375-4. 
The major emphasis of the guide is on cost effectiveness and 
reduction of risk through demonstration and hardware proof-
ing prior to a production commitment. The five major phases 
of the systems acquisition life cycle, shown in Figure 4, 
are described in detail in this guide so as to" provide 
a frame of reference and management philosophy from which 
system program personnel may select appropriate ideas to 
help achieve program objectives" (9, p. 2). 
Figures 5, 6, 7, and 8 are taken from the draft of the 
above mentioned guide and portray the activities that may be 
applied to a particular developmental program. The main 
purpose of including these figures in this report is to show 
where, in the over-all systems acquisition life cycle, the 
specific activities which are directly related to the proc-
ess developed in this report are accomplished. The specific 
portion of the system acquisition life cycle directly in-
volved in this study are block 21 of Figure 5 and blocks 28 
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logistics considerations, and various plans such as source 
selection, test, procurement, and management are prepared. 
In block 28, the requirements baseline documentation pre-
pared in the Conceptual Phase may be revised or supplemented 
as required for the Validation Phase. Block 29 encompasses 
the majority of actions that are involved in this study. 
The over-all objective of the Validation Phase is to deter-
mine whether to proceed into Full-Scale Development. The 
goal of the Validation Phase is to establish firm and real-
istic performance specifications (allocated baseline), which 
meet operational requirements. The RFP is distributed to 
potential or participating contractors for their response. 
The resulting contractor proposals are then evaluated and a 
contractor source is selected. Quite specifically, it is 
the process of evaluating contractor proposals that is the 
primary subject of this study effort. 
Summary 
In its continuing quest to develop improved and innova-
tive management principles and practices, the DoD has, since 
1968, taken a penetrating and critical look at the weapon 
systems acquisition process. The two documents that appear 
to be most significant relative to current DoD management 
philosophy are: 
(1) The proposal for Parallel Undocumented 
Development 
(2) The 31 July 69 memorandum by Deputy Secretary 
of Defense Packard entitled "Improvement in 
Weapon Systems Acquisition." 
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These and subsequent policy directives have required or 
encouraged several changes to current weapon systems manage-
ment practices. The most notable changes are: 
(1) Competition be extended throughout engineering 
development. 
(2) Increased use of hardware prototyping and con-
tractor selection based upon demonstrated 
hardware performance. 
(J) Selective requirements for government 
documentation. 
(4) Attempts to reduce cost growth through tech-
nical risk analysis and evaluation in every 
stage of development. 
While the R & D regulations and manuals of all military 
services will be appropriately changed to reflect and imple-
ment current DoD management philosophy discussed in this 
chapter, only those of the Air Force relative to the Source 
Selection process will be of interest to this study. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE SOURCE SELECTION PROCESS 
The purpose of this chapter is to briefly describe the 
Source Selection process used in the Department of Defense. 
Primary emphasis will be on that portion of the Source 
Selection process which deals directly with the evaluation 
of contractor proposals submitted on a competitive basis. 
The Air Force regulations, manuals, and procedures will be 
used to describe the process but the reader should under-
stand that each military service has corresponding and simi-
lar documents to implement the Source Selection process. It 
is not the intent of this study to provide an in-depth 
understanding of all the activities involved in the total 
Source Selection process. The following selected references 
will provide the interested reader a rather detailed (though 
Air Force oriented) explanation of the Source Selection 
process in its entirety. (1) (J) (4) (5) (6) (8) (9) (10) 
(11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19). 
There are numerous activities that take place in the 
Conceptual Phase that directly or indirectly affect a Source 
Selection. Broadly speaking, the process may begin with 
when a using command submits a Required Operational Capa-
bility (ROC) and the Headquarters USAF responds with one or 
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more Requirements Action Directive (RAD). Following that, 
more specific guidance is provided in the RAD and directs 
appropriate documentation in the form of a Concept Formula-
tion Package or a Preliminary Technical Development Plan 
(PTDP). This plan, along with the Advanced Procurement Plan 
and other documentation as appropriate, is forwarded to 
Headquarters USAF in support of a request to initiate the 
Contract Definition Phase (referred to as the Validation 
Phase in current documents). Hq. USAF then issues a Systems 
Management Directive (SMD) which, among other things, au-
thorizes the establishment of a System Program Office (SPO) 
and may designate or delegate the Source Selection Authority 
(SSA). The SPO then prepares the Selection Plan and submits 
it to the SSA for approval. It should be noted here that 
upon issuance of the RAD, system management procedures/ 
techniques are normally directed and a System Program Dir-
ector (SPD) and a System Program Office (SPO) cadre are 
established. It is at this point in the Conceptual Phase 
that efforts toward preparing a Selection Plan commence. 
Source Selection Procedures 
The prime objectives of the Source Selection process, 
as outlined in AFR 70-15, are: 
••. impartial, equitable, and comprehensive evalu-
ations of competitors and their proposals to 
insure selection of that source which will provide 
optimum satisfaction of the government's basic ob-
jectives includingtherequired performance and 
schedule at the best cost (13). 
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Source Selection actually begins with the preparation 
of the Selection Plan. This plan relates decisions that 
will dictate the major course of future source selection 
activity. Because of this, the Selection Plan must be con-
sistent with the PTDP and other program documentation. It 
must be completely staffed by Air Force Systems Command 
(AFSC) and coordinated with all major commands which will 
participate in the source selection. Briefly, the Selection 
Plan should include: 
(1) System Performance Criteria 
(2) Source List Screening Criteria 
(J} Evaluation Criteria 
(4) Source Selection Organization 
(5) Evaluation Technique 
(6) Schedule of Events 
(7) Procurement Plan Summary. 
After the Selection Plan is prepared and approved by 
the SSA, the Source Selection Advisory Council (SSAC) is 
established and the Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) 
is organized. At this point, the three organizational ele-
ments unique to and created specifically for a source selec-
tion are established; i.e., the SSA, the SSAC, and the SSEB. 
Figure 9 pictures the Source Selection decision pyramid 
(20, p. 54). The specific responsibilities of each of these 
organizational elements will be summarized later. Normally, 
the director of the System Program office will be the 






Source: Aeronautical Systems Division Manual, 
"The Source Selection Process," 
15 June 1969, p. 54. 
Figure 9. The Decision Pyramid 
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The next major activities are the preparation of the 
Request for Proposal (RFP) document by the SPO and the es-
tablishment of the evaluation criteria by the SSAC. When 
approved by the SSAC, the Request for Proposal document is 
distributed to qualified contractors who then respond with 
their proposals. It is essential that the RFP and the eval-
uation criteria be consistent, for it is upon these that an 
objective and equitable evaluation and ultimate source 
selection depend. 
Upon receipt of proposals from competing contractors, 
the SSEB begins the evaluation process. Evaluation teams 
examine each proposal in detail, evaluate and score them in 
accordance with the evaluation criteria and plan. Reports 
by the evaluation teams are summarized, with sufficient 
narrative to defend the scores given. Although cost data 
submitted by contractors is not scored, the following ac-
tions relative to cost are required by the SSEB: 
(1) Insure the comparability of costs 
(2) Insure that costs relate to the proposed 
items of work 
(J) Assess cost risk 
(4) Assist the SSAC in the analyses of the 
total cost to the government. 
The SSEB evaluation of the costs are the cost basis for SPO 
negotiations with the contractors. 
After completion of the SSEB evaluation report, it is 
presented to the SSAC in writing and by oral briefing. The 
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SSAC prepares a Proposed Analysis Report for the SSA. The 
SSAC analysis includes application of weights to the areas 
and items scored in the SSEB evaluation report. A Proposal 
Analysis Report consists of three parts: 
(1) Summary of the Source Selection authority, 
procedures used in the evaluation and sig-
nificant conclusions. 
(2) Summary of each proposal's major strengths, 
weaknesses, and risks to the government. 
(J) Analysis and advice that includes facts 
considered and the collective judgment of 
the SSAC based upon its experience and 
knowledge in military operations, procure-
ment, technology, logistics, etc. 
During the SSEB evaluation, certain deficiencies in the 
proposals may be found; that is, elements of the proposal 
may not satisfy stated requirements in the RFP. These 
deficiencies if written up by the evaluator as a separate 
Deficiency Report (DR), will be reflected in the evaluation 
report in both a narrative and quantitative score form. The 
evaluator must report in the SSEB evaluation whether he con-
siders the deficiency as an overlooked detail, easily cor-
rectable, or whether the required corrective action will 
create high risks and impact schedules and costs. The 
Deficiency Reports will be provided to the SPO negotiating 
team to use in fact finding with the contractors. 
Negotiations for contract commitments can begin when 
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the SSEB Deficiency Reports, cost and other pre-negotiation 
data are available to the SPO negotiating team. Careful 
attention to and compliance with the Armed Services Procure-
ment Regulations are required throughout negotiations with 
those contractors qualified for consideration. The SSAC 
evaluation and analysis will therefore encompass the summar-
ized Deficiency Reports and the SPO negotiation results 
(evidenced by definitive contracts), along with the SSEB 
evaluation report to evaluate and analyze. The SSAC uses 
these analyses to support its collective judgments and 
advice included in Part 3 of the Proposal Analysis Report 
to the SSA. 
When the SSA is the Air Force Chief of Staff or higher 
(the Secretary of Defense may retain SSA), the Air Force 
Systems Command (AFSC) will submit the original Selection 
Plan to the Headquarters USAF office of primary responsi-
bility for coordination with various Air Staff offices. 
The Selection Plan will then be forwarded to the SSA for 
approval. After the Selection Plan is approved, the process 
described in this chapter takes place, the final briefing by 
the SSAC is given to the commanders of AFSC, AFLC, the using 
command(s), and the Air Force Council. These commanders 
will submit comments and advice on the source selection and 
the Air Force Council may modify the action taken by the 
SSAC, notifying the SSAC of such action. The SSA then has 
complete information upon which to base the selection deci-
sion. This information includes the SSEB evaluation report, 
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SSAC proposal analysis report, contract provisions, cost 
data, Hq USAF and major commanders advice. To this the SSA 
may obtain any advice he deems necessary and appropriate. 
When selection of the contractor(s) is made, the source 
selection ends. 
Figure 10 provides a summary of the key responsibili-
ties of three organizational elements peculiar to the Source 
Selection Process. 
SSEB Evaluation Process 
The Source Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) must de-
velop an Evaluation Plan to conduct a detailed analysis and 
evaluation of each contractor proposal. The Evaluation Plan 
usually encompasses the following functional areas: 




(5) Cost to the Government. 
In addition, the SSEB is required to conduct negotiations 
with each contractor to arrive at mutually agreeable defini-
tive contract. Figure 11 shows a typical SSEB organization 
structure to accomplish the above functions. On some pro-
grams, another area, cost-effectiveness, is added to the 
organizational structure and evaluation process. The tech-
nical, operational, logistics~and management areas are 
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remaining areas receive only qualitative evaluation and 
assessment. Figure 12 shows how the evaluation criteria is 
married to the SSEB organizational structure and evaluation 
process. Each factor member performs a detailed analysis 
and evaluation of each contractor proposal in his factor. 
He then prepares a narrative report to support the rating 
assigned. The item captain then integrates the factor 
write-ups and ratings, summarizes the findings, and assigns 
a numerical score at the item level. The area co-chairman 
then integrates narrative write-ups at the item level and 
prepares an area summary for the SSEB evaluation report, 
which includes the item level scores. 
Evaluation criteria are established to provide the 
details for implementing and exec-uting the evaluation plan. 
Standards are derived from the requirements in the RFP and 
are used to evaluate how well the proposal approaches meet 
or exceed the RFP requirements. Conversely, they can be 
used to determine the difference between what the RFP 
specified as an acceptable minimum and what the proposal 
offers. The primary objective of using standards is to 
allow evaluators to rate or score a company proposal objec-
tively upon its own merits or demerits relative to some 
established norm or minimum acceptable level, rather than 
rating or scoring proposals against each other. Every 
effort is made to establish standards quantitatively to 
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expressed qualitatively, care must be taken to achieve 




The evaluator at the factor level, equipped with the 
knowledge of what he is to evaluate, what the RFP requires, 
and what is minimum acceptable, carefully studies a pro-
posal and compares it with the appropriate standards. The 
factor level evaluator then develops a quantitative assess-
ment of how well the contractor proposal met the minimum 
requirements of the system, prepares an analysis in narra-
tive form which includes significant strengths, weaknesses, 
end risks, and selects one of three symbols which are used 
to rate the proposal in that factor. 
for factor rating are as follows: 
The three symbols used 
+ signifies proposal exceeded minimum requirements 
V signifies proposal met minimum requirements 
signifies proposal failed to meet minimum 
requirements. 
When each factor level evaluator has completed his 
analysis and evaluation for a contractor proposal, the Item 
Captain will determine the numerical designator to be 


















Rare solution of exceptional 
quality 
Exceeds minimum acceptable 
requirements by offering 
some unique device, process, 
etc. 
Meets all minimum acceptable 
requirements but does not 
exceed them 
Fails to meet minimum 
acceptable requirements. 
Evaluator must state degree 
of impact of deficiency and 
corrective action. 
Totally unacceptable 
The numerical score for each item will be supported by a 
narrative write-up which summarizes the factor level write-
ups and includes the significant strengths, weaknesses, and 
risks. It should be noted that proposals which fail to meet 
minimum requirements of the standards for one reason or 
another are, by definition, crinsidered to be deficient. A 
deficiency is defined as"··· an element of the company's 
proposal, which, when compared t6 the standard for that 
element, fails to meet the minimum requirements of the 
standard ••• 11 ( 20, p. 181) • The individual evaluator will 
prepare a Deficiency Report (DR) on all deficiencies found. 
He is required to assess the impact of the uncorrected 
deficiency upon the system and estimate the degree of cor-
rective action required .to correct the deficiency. His 
over-all evaluation of the deficiency will be reflected in 
the narrative and numerical rating of the proposal. When 
the DR 1 s are answered by a company, the DR 1 s will be 
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summarized and given to the Contract Definitization Group 
and the SSAC. The company answers to DR 1 s will not be 
reflected in the basic SSEB evaluation ratings and numerical 
scores. 
'Ibe Area Co-Chairman then prepares a narrative summary 
of all the items in his area. These area summaries along 
with the item level numerical scores where applicable, are 
included in the over-all SSEB evaluation report and pre-
sented to the SSAC. 
It is obvious when reading the RFP and Evaluation 
Criteria that all areas, and items within areas, are not of 
equal importance to the system requirements and effective-
ness. For this reason, some weighting criteria must be 
established to assure that relative importance is considered 
in the evaluation and selection process. The item weighting 
function is restricted to the SSAC and precautions are taken 
to insure that SSEB evaluators are not appraised of the 
weighting criteria to be used. While there is no required 
methodology for establishing the weighting criteria, the 
suggested method is basically to: 
(1) Determine the relative importance of each 
evaluation criteria item to the Source 
Selection action as a whole. 
(2) From a total of 1000 points, assign to each 
item the number of points consistent with 
its relative importance. Care must be 
exercised to account for cumulative or 
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collective impacts of a particular item or items on the sys-
tem as a whole. 
Upon receipt of the SSEB evaluation report, apply the 
following formula to each item to obtain the weighed score. 
Maximum Weighted Score X SSEB Raw Item Score 
10 = 
Weighted Item Score. 
The Sum of the Weighted Item Scores will constitute the 
over-all proposal score. This over-all score, along with 
other information, such as cost data, summary of deficiency 
reports, definitive contract, etc., will be used by the SSAC 
in preparing its report to the SSA. 
CHAPTER V 
INITIAL APPROACH TO RISK ASSESSMENT 
Introduction 
Recently a Source Selection was conducted on a major 
weapon system developmental program to which the current DoD 
management policies and principles discussed in Chapter III 
were appl'ied, including the minimum documentation approach 
and the parallel prototype hardware development and testing 
concept. The Contract Definition/Source Selection process 
used on this program was a modified single phase effort 
tailored to the new DoD management concepts. In order to 
study ways to improve the capability to assess technical 
risks in the SSEB process, and to investigate the effects of 
current DoD management philosophy on the existing source 
selection evaluation process, the writer was accepted as a 
member of the SSEB for this developmental program. The name 
of the developmental program will not be mentioned in this 
study. The specific objectives of participating in the SSEB 
for this particular program were to: 
(1) Develop and implement a model for assessing 
the impact of technical risks associated 
with contractor proposals. 
(2) Obtain data which would permit an objective 
evaluation of the effects of the current DoD 
management philosophy on the SSEB/SSAC 
evaluation process. 
(J) Obtain data which would permit an objective 
evaluation of the current SSEB scoring 
system. 
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The first objective was accomplished by improvising a 
model and method to assess the over-all technical risk asso-
ciated with each proposal. The model was quite limited in 
scope, and the implementation was substantially handicapped 
by the fact that it was not integrated into the SSEB evalua-
tion process. The second and third objectives, discussed in 
Chapter VI, were accomplished primarily by preparing a com-
prehensive questionnaire and distributing it to Aeronautical 
Systems Division personnel experienced in The Source Selec-
tion process. 
Participation as a member of the SSEB afforded a unique 
and valuable opportunity to observe the Source Selection 
process at the working level. Considerable insight was 
afforded through discussions with individual evaluators 
experienced in the SSEB activities. The writer was particu-
larly impressed by the high level of dedication to and 
interest in professional performance by individual evalua-
tors. With few exceptions, the evaluators displayed broad 
understanding of the Source Selection process and were quite 
candid and objective in discussions about the strengths and 
weaknesses of the SSEB evaluation process. 
Current SSEB Risk Identification 
A search of current publications and literature, and 
informal discussions with AFSC and Headquarters USAF per-
sonnel indicated that there is a lack of established meth-
odologies for formal risk analysis Air Force wide. In fact, 
nothing was found in the form of official guidance within 
the DoD relative to what a formal risk analysis on develop-
mental programs should include or provide other than in 
broad qualitative generalities. The Interim AFSC Pamphlet 
XX discusses risk assessment in considerably more detail 
than any of the existing official documents. In this man-
agement guide, risk assessment is defined as 
••• the process of estimating or judgementally 
determining the degree of probability that a 
specific interplay of performance, schedule and 
cost as an objective, will not be attained along 
the planned course of action. • Risk assess-
ment in the Validation Phase should result in 
identifying and ordering the single and combined 
elements of risk which will constitute the 
greatest and most important uncertainties in the 
Full-Scale Development Phase" (9, pp. 37-38). 
In any discussion of new developmental programs, it is 
vital to understand that risk is inherent in the process. 
The very nature of research and development involves uncer-
tainties relative to the probability of success or failure. 
The only way to completely avoid developmental risks is to 
eliminate developmental programs, which would - in the writer's 
opinion - rapidly increase the ·probability of ultimate fail-
ure of the entire society. Those involved in defense R & D 
should clearly recognize that if there are no anticipated 
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uncertainties identifiable, the developmental program should 
be suspected of being unworthy of R & D and national 
resources. In addition, those involved in defense R & D 
should recognize that on developmental programs for complex 
weapon systems, one can expect to encounter completely un-
anticipated problems during full-scale development and inte-
gration of the weapon system hardware. The key to improved 
program management is to recognize that undertainties are 
inherent and to continually identify and assess the antici-
pated and unanticipated unknowns throughout each phase of 
the acquisition life cycle. The primary purpose of risk 
assessment is to systematically identify and evaluate prob-
lems or potential problems involving uncertainty so as to 
reduce the level of risk to an acceptable level. 
Within ASD it has been standard practice that the SSEB 
evaluation report narratively summarize the significant 
strengths, weaknesses, and risks of each contractor proposal. 
This narrative summary is derived basically from the factor 
level write-ups, which are detailed narratives of the analy-
ses in each factor and sub-factor (15, pp. 12, 17). In-
cluded in the factor write-up is a summary of the strengths, 
weaknesses, and risks of that proposal. The major strengths, 
weaknesses, and risks for each proposal are then summarized 
at the item and area levels (20, pp. 196-206). It is the 
individual factor level evaluator who must initially decide 
what problem area should be classified as a weakness, and 
what should be classified as a risk. It is important to 
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recognize that any method of risk identification and assess-
ment in the SSEB will be dependent upon technical expertise 
and measured judgment by the evaluators. However, there 
does appear to be a need for improved guidance and guide-
lines relative to risk assessment criteria, objectives, and 
methodology. 
A problem area identified by factor evaluators as a 
risk is narratively assessed in the same manner as are weak-
nesses. The evaluator uses his specialized knowledge and 
experience to judge the impact of the problem area in his 
factor. Quantitative techniques used by evaluators to meas-
ure the impact of risks vary with the standards available 
and the individual evaluator's knowledge. The risks are 
then categorized according to the degree of impact as high 
risk, moderate risk, or low risk. There is no official 
guidance or criteria established to assist evaluators in 
determining what constitutes a high, moderate, or low risk. 
Current SSEB Rating/Scoring Techniques 
Once the individual factor evaluators identify and 
assess what they consider to be strengths, weaknesses, and 
risks, a symbol is assigned to the proposal for that factor. 
As mentioned earlier, the symbol, which constitutes the fac-
tor rating, consists of one of the following marks: 
+ exceeds minimum requirements 
/ meets minimum requirements 
- fails to meet minimum requirements. 
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Therefore, the over-all evaluation and assessment, which in-
cludes those problem areas identified as risks, is included 
in the narrative analysis and assigned one of the above 
ratings. The method(s) used to reach a decision as to what 
rating to assign is not specified and, therefore, varies 
among individual evaluators. 
When the evaluation and rating of all factors and sub-
factors in an item are completed, the Item Captain summa~ 
rizes the factor narratives, evaluates the ratings based 
upon proposal strengths, weaknesses, and risks, and assigns 
a numerical score to the item. Again, this single numerical 
score reflects an over-all evaluation of all factor narra-
tives, including all strengths, weaknesses, and risks 
combined. As in the case of the Factor evaluators, there is 
no guidance which establishes a method, or methods to go 
about combining the factor ratings, so as to come up with a 
single numerical score for that item. As would be expected, 
there is wide variance in the methods used by Item Captains 
to derive the item score. 
Area Co-Chairmen summarize item level write-ups, with 
primary emphasis on the significant strengths, weaknesses, 
and risks. These narrative highlights, along with the 
scores from the item level evaluations, provide additional 
back-up as necessary to defend the scores and narrative 
analyses of the SSEB report. 
The SSAC then applies predetermined weighting criteria 
to the raw scores presented by the SSEB, as discussed in 
53 
Chapter IV. The significant strengths, weaknesses, and 
risks for each proposal are briefed in a similar manner 
throughout the Source Selection process up to and including 
the SSA. 
Initial Risk Model Terms Explained 
As a member of the SSEB on the developmental program 
discussed in the introduction to this chapter, it was neces-
sary to improvise a procedure and model to evaluate the 
total risk associated with each contractor proposal. The 
terms used in the initial risk model were tailored to the 
Source Selection scope of interest. Specifically, the terms 
used were meant to apply to the primary areas of concern in 
evaluating proposals for hardware prototypes under the cur-
rent DoD management philosophy discussed in Chapter III. 
Risk Element - Any problem or potential problem associ-
ated with a contractor's engineering data (technical 
response to RFP) that creates a substantial degree of uncer-
tainty relative to the proposed weapon system design meeting 
minimum operational requirements. 
Risk Points - A quantitative measure used to represent 
the over-all degree of risk associated with a particular 
risk element. The more risk points a risk element has, the 
greater the over-all risk associated with it. 
Sub-System - A major assembly of parts joined together 
to perform a specific key function necessary to the perform-
ance of the weapon system. For example, the aircraft in 
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total is the weapon system. The aircraft engine, engine 
inlets, accessory drive and exhaust make up the propulsion 
sub-system. The electrical power, distribution, and switch-
ing make up the electrical sub-system, etc. 
Critical Component - A part or particular group of 
parts within a sub-system which, by nature of its materials, 
design and/or fabrication, is essential for minimum accept-
able performance of the sub-system. A critical component 
may directly affect the performance of other sub-systems and 
always, though indirectly, affects the performance of the 
over-all weapon system. 
Minor Component - A part or particular group of parts 
within a sub-system which, by nature of its design and fab-
rication, affects only the performance level of the sub-
system of which it is a part. Minor components are 
generally those.parts which are supportive in nature to the 
primary functions of the sub-system, and for which a number 
of alternative solutions may exist. 
Early Stage Development - Refers to a portion of the 
weapons system hardware that is in the developmental stages 
and has not been proven technically feasible. Use of this 
hardware on the weapon system as proposed depends upon suc-
cessful testing to prove technical feasibility, final design 
configuration, fabrication and qualification testing in time 
and within proposed cost estimates. 
Advanced Stage Development - Refers to a portion of the 
weapon system hardware that is in the developmental stages 
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and has already been proven technically feasible. Use of 
this hardware on the weapon system as proposed depends upon 
final design configuration, fabrication, and qualification 
testing in time and within proposed cost estimates. 
Major Re-Design - Refers to a significant portion of 
the weapon system hardware which must undergo extensive 
re-design in order to meet minimum technical design require-
ments of the weapon system. Major re-design is usually 
applied to situations that may require: 
(1) Complete re-design of sub-system. 
(2) A re-design effort on a particular sub-
system which requires one or more other 
sub-systems to be re-designed. 
(3) Any extensive re-design that may substantially 
change the basic design configuration of the 
proposed weapon system, such as wing and 
fuselage size, contral, surfaces, weights, 
structural integrity, etc~ 
Minor Re-Design - Refers to a portion of the weapon 
system hardware which must undergo re-design in order to 
meet minimum technical design requirements of the weapon 
system. Minor re-design is applicable to situations where 
the re-design is essential,but creates no serious interface 
problems in the basic aircraft design configuration. In 
addition, the re-design effort does not cause extensive re-
design of the sub-system involved, nor does it cause re-
design effort of any other sub-system. 
Ground Rules for Initial Risk Model 
Ground rules were established to purposefully limit the 
scope and depth of the initial risk analysis. This was nee-
essary since the SSEB evaluation plan was geared to the 
evaluation/rating/scoring process described above, and time 
did not permit deviations from that plan by SSEB members 
other than the writer. 
follows: 
The ground rules used were as 
(1) Primary emphasis was focused on technical 
and operations areas since these two areas 
provided the overwhelming majority of 
unique risks by contractor. 
(2) A risk element was used as the basic param-
eter of the model and variable risk points 
were used to represent an over-all measure 
of risk associated with a particular risk 
element. 
(J) Because of a significant lack of standardiza-
tion in identifying risks, each sub-factor, 
factor, and item level narrative write-up was 
studied to determine whether or not a particu-
lar weakness should be included as a risk ele-
ment. In a very few cases, the risks included 
in factors write-ups were not included as risk 
elements. 
(4) When a particular risk was written up in 
several different factors and the effect of 
that particular risk was the same in each 
factor, particular caution was used so as 
not to assess the impact of this risk ele-
ment at double or triple its actual impact. 
For example, if the landing gear design did 
not meet specifications for rough field 
operations, it may be written up in both a 
technical and operations factor as a high 
risk of not being able to meet a particular 
operational requirement. This risk element 
would be included in the technical or opera-
tions factor, but not both. 
(5) Every problem or potential problem (large 
or small) identified as a risk element was 
incorporated into the risk model. This 
insured that small but cummulatively impor-
tant risk elements were not completely over-
looked or overshadowed by the more obvious 
and important big risk elements. 
(6) Risk assessment was limited to evaluating 
the impact of risk elements on the opera-
tional requirements of the system only. 
No attempt was made to assess the impact of 
risk elements on program schedules or cost 
estimates. 
(7) No attempt was made to determine the 
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likelihood (probability) of success or fail-
ure of any particular risk element. 
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Ground rules number 6 and 7 were intentionally very 
restrictive in nature since it was i:nfeasible to attempt 
more in the "first cut" at developing a risk assessment 
methodology and model for use in the SSEB evaluation process. 
Risk Criteria for Initial Model 
It was necessary to establish.some criteria upon which 
to construct a risk model. Three independent characteris-
tics common to any particular risk element were selected as 
the basis for evaluating its impact, or potential impact on 
the weapon system performance requirements: 
(A) The nature of the risk element 
(B) The corrective action upon which the risk 
element is dependent. 
(C) The weapon system performance objective 
affected by the risk element. 
The following paragraphs discuss these characteristics in 
some detail. It will be helpful to refer to Figure 14 in 
following the development of the risk model. In the initial 
risk analysis model discussed later, these characteristics 
will be referred to as characteristic A, B, and C according 
to the Alpha designators used above. 
(A) The nature of the risk element was established by 
determining what specific hardware was involved in the tech-
nical problem area. In other words, since each technical 
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problem identified as a risk element is related to some por-
tion of the weapon system hardware, it is necessary to 
determine the nature of the risk element in terms of the 
extent of hardware affected. This was accomplished by 
dividing the weapon system hardware into three categories 
sub-system, critical component, minor component -- and then 
classifying the nature of the risk element by one of these 
three categories. 
B. The corrective action upon which the risk element 
is dependent was intended as a measure of the degree of un-
certainty, degree of difficulty, and level of effort re-
quired to correct the actual or potential problem. It is 
obvious that to accurately combine uncertainty, difficulty, 
and level of effort into a single parameter would require a 
systematic and rather involved evaluation and manipulation 
of several variables. Since time did not permit this type 
approach in the initial risk model, four categories were 
established to suffice as a broad measure of uncertainty, 
difficulty, and effort required. These four categories were: 
(1) Early stage development; (2) Advanced stage develop-
ment; (J) Major re-design; and (4) Minor re-design. Each 
risk element of a contractor proposal was assigned one of 
the above categories of corrective action. 
C. The weapon system objective affected by the risk 
element was a characteristic designed to measure the degree 
of impact a particular risk element may have on the primary 
objectives of the weapon system as stated in the RFP. This 
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characteristic could not be evaluated by studying factor and 
item level write-ups, therefore another approach was uti-
lized. A survey was conducted to gather data to be used for 
determining the direct impact that each SSEB factor had on 
the primary objectives of the weapon system as stated in the 
RFP. Since the factors are established as evaluation cri-
teria tailored to the specific program being evaluated, this 
appeared to be a meaningful approach for this characteristic. 
The primary objectives of the weapon system were listed 
in the RFP in order of importance, therefore each objective 
was arbitrarily assigned a number as a quantitative measure 
of its relative importance. The procedure used to accom-
plish this is described below. 
If there are n primary objectives of the weapon system, 
X1 would represent the ith objective, where 
i = 1, 2, 3, ... , n-1, n. 
The most important objective would be X1, the second most 
important objective would be X2 , etc. The least important 
primary objective would be Xn. A quantitative measure of 
the relative importance of each primary objective was arbi-
trarily established by assigning numbers to each primary 
objective in the inverse order of their relative importance. 
That is, the most important primary objective, X1, was 
assigned the number n. The second most important primary 
objective, X2 , was assigned the number n- 1, etc., such that 
Primary Objective 
X1 
Measure of Importance 
n 
n-1 
n - (n-2) 
n-(n-1) 
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This scheme would be satisfactory only if every tech-
nical problem identified as a risk element directly af-
fected at least one of the primary objectives of the weapon 
system. In order to take into account those risk elements 
that may not be considered to directly affect at least one 
of the primary objectives of the weapon system, an n + 1 pro-
gram objective called "OTHER" was added. This required that 
the most important primary objective be given a measure of 
importance of n + 1, the second most important primary obj ec-
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n - (n-J) 
n-(n-2) 
n-(n-1) 
In plain English, this simply means that if there are 
five primary objectives, a sixth objective called "OTHER" is 
added to allow the system to account for risk elements that 
do not affect primary objectives, but whose cumulative 
impact should not be ignored. The most important primary 
objective would have six as a measure of importance, and so 
forth, and the "OTHER" objectives affected would have one as 
a measure of importance. The measure of importance numbers 
assigned to the program objectives were, therefore, inversely 
consistent with the priority of importance, and were used as 
a weighting factor in the risk model for this characteristic. 
The survey, a sample of which is presented in Figure 13, 
was completed by 18 individuals highly qualified in the SSEB 
process and members of the SSEB for this particular program. 
There was generally marked similarity in many of the answers 
provided by respondents, but there were some factors where a 
consensus was not clear. To insure objectivity,the survey 
answers were tabulated and individually analyzed by a select 
group of individuals experienced in the SSEB process and 
this particular program. The results of this group's analy-
sis of the answers made it possible to obtain a unanimous 
determination of the level of importance value,for each fac-
tor. Table I shows an example of how the results of this 
survey were tabulated. The Measure of Importance Values 
correspond to the survey answers as analyzed and evaluated 
by the process described above. The Measure of Importance 
Values were used as weighting factors for this 
• 
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Instructions: Beside each Factor below, mark the Measure of 
Importance Value corresponding to the most important primary 
objective affected by that Factor alone. If the Factor af-
fects both x2 and x3, use the Measure of Importance Value 
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Figure 13. Survey for Factor Impact on Primary 
Objectives of Weapon System 
TABLE I 
RESULTS OF FACTOR/OBJECTIVE AFFECTED SURVEY 
Area Technical T.O 
Item T.1 T.2 T.J T.4 T.5 
Factor 1 2 J 4 1 2 J 4 5 1 2 J 1 2 J 4 5 I 1 2 
Measure of i i 
i Importance 1 
Value J5 2 4 1 J J 1 5 4 5 2 i I J 5 5 4 1 2 1 ! 
Operations 0.0 
0.1 0.2 
1 2 1 2 J I 1 










characteristic. The method of relating the weighting factor 
to each individual risk element will be discussed in the 
next section. 
Initial Risk Model Weighting Criteria 
Weighting factors for the three independent character-
istics were established in the following manner: 
A. Nature of the Risk Element -- To each division of 
weapon system hardware which was used to classify the nature 









B. Corrective Action risk element dependent upon -- To 
each of the four categories established to provide a broad 
measure of the degree of uncertainty, degree of difficulty 
and levels of effort involved in correcting the risk ele-
ment, an arbitrary numerical weighting factor was assigned. 
Weight 
Early Stage Development 10 
Advanced Stage Development. 5 
Major Re-design 3 
Minor Re-design 1 
C. Program Objective affected by risk element -- In 
order to use the weighting factors (established by 
66 
evaluation of the survey answers by 18 respondents, dis-
cussed in the preceding section), it was necessary to relate 
them to each risk element. This was accomplished by record-
ing each risk element by factor and using the results of the 
survey to establish the weighting factor. That is, all of 
the risk elements for a particular proposal were recorded 
under the Factor in which it was written up. An example of 
how the weighting factor was determined for each risk ele-
ment is as follows. If the risk element was written up in 
Factor T.1.J, the weighting factor assigned to the "program 
objective affected" characteristic for this risk element was 
determined by referring to Table I. For this risk element, 
the weighting factor for this characteristic would be four. 
Figure 14 shows the process used in developing the 
initial risk model. It is important to note that the key to 
relating risk elements to the specific primary objectives 
affected by them was accomplished by identifying the factor 
in which the risk element occurred. It is the factor that 
has direct impact on the primary program objectives, which 
are operational requirements oriented. 
Methodology for Applying Initial Risk Model 
The evaluation process began by carefully reviewing 
every factor and sub-factor write-up (on a particular con-
tractor proposal) in the technical and operations area to 
determine what should be identified as a risk element in 
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analysis effort. This study effort included a careful 
review of the detailed narrative analysis for each weakness 
and risk itemized by the factor evaluator in his summary. 
In addition, the narrative analysis and summary of each item 
level write-up was reviewed. It was found that the item 
level write-ups only served to condense the factor level 
write-ups and did not add information useful to this risk 
analysis. For this reason, the factor level write-ups were 
used exclusively in this risk analysis effort. 
A systematic procedure was developed to insure a com-
prehensive and objective evaluation of those risk elements 
identified in a particular contractor proposal. Figure 15 
shows a sample of the Risk Analysis Worksheet that was 
developed to assist in this evaluation process. Figure 16 
shows a sequential flow of the process used to develop the 
risk points by applying the initial risk model according to 
the following steps. In the following discussion of the 
procedural steps used, the reader will find it helpful to 
frequently refer to Figures 15 and 16. 
STEP 1. Review a factor write-up. When a risk ele-
ment is identified, record it sequentially by risk element 
number and write a brief narrative on the worksheet. 
STEP 2. By studying the factor narrative, determine 
the proper characteristic code for Characteristics A and B 
relative to the risk element in question and place the 
·selected codes in the appropriate block corresponding to the 
factor involved. The Characteristic A code is placed in the 
R:ISK ANALYSIS WORKSHEET 
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Figure 15. Risk Analysis Worksheet 
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upper left corner and the Characteristic B code in the lower 
right. 
STEP J. -- Repeat Steps 1 and 2 until all the risk 
elements in a factor are entered on the worksheet. 
STEP 4. Repeat Steps 1, 2, and J until all the risk 
elements in each factor are entered on the worksheet. 
STEP 5. Begin with Risk Element Number 1 on the 
worksheet and place the appropriate weight under Column C. 
The appropriate weight is determined by noting the factor in 
which the risk element appears and using Table I. The num-
erical value of the "Level of Importance Value" in Table I 
will be used as the weight value. Using this procedure, 
find the appropriate weight of characteristic C for each 
Risk Element Number (1, 2, ••. , n-1, n). 
STEP 6. -- Review the risk element narratives on the 
worksheet and determine which risk elements may be redun-
dant. This may require additional review of factor narra-
tives. Redundancy occurs when the same identical risk 
element appears in two or more factors. In checking for 
redundancy, the categories (characteristic codes) of charac-
teristics A and B must be compared. If they differ, partic-
ular caution should be exercised in stating redundancy. 
When redundancy exists, eliminate the redundant risk element 
by lining out that entire row, noting the risk element num-
ber that eliminated it. Retain the risk element row that 
contains the highest product of characteristic weights (A, 
B, and C). The risk element to be retained, in case of 
redundancy is usually determined by the Characteristic C 
weight. 
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STEP 7. -- Repeat Steps 1 through 6 for each contrac-
tor proposal. 
STEP 8. -- Starting with Risk Element Number 1 on a 
contractor worksheet place the appropriate characteristic 
weights in columns A and B. This is done by finding the 
weight which corresponds to the characteristic codes for 
that risk element. Repeat for each risk element number on 
the worksheet not lined out. Weights for the Characteristic 
Codes are as follows: 
Codes 
Characteristic A: a 
b 
c 













STEP 9. Risk points for each individual risk ele-
ment are obtained by multiplying the characteristic weights 
associated with a particular risk element. That is, for 
Risk Element Number 1, multiply 
3 X 3 X 5 = 45 Risk Points. 
Accomplish this multiplication on each risk element on each 
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contractor worksheet. 
STEP 10. -- Total risk points for each contractor pro-
posal are found by summing the products obtained in Step 9. 
A very straight forward analysis of the Risk Analysis Work-
sheets will yield risk point summaries at any level desired. 
The worksheets themselves provide a separate look at risk 
points by contractor/by individual risk element. Table II 
shows a sample summary of risk points by Contractor/ by 
Item/by Factor, which can be extracted directly from the 
worksheets. Table III shows a sample summary of risk points 
by Contractor/by Area. 
Summary 
At present, there is no established methodology or pro-
cedure being used in ASD to quantitatively measure and 
assess the total risk associated with contractor proposals 
evaluated in the SSEB process. The method of analysis of a 
particular risk in the current SSEB process varies from one 
evaluator to another and are, for the most part, evaluated 
qualitatively and individually. The strengths, weaknesses, 
and risks of a contractor proposal are combined into one of 
three rating symbols at the factor level, and are combined 
into one numerical score at the item level. SSAC members 
are frequently not aware of the particular techniques used 
by SSEB factor and item evaluators to combine strengths, 
weaknesses, and risks into a single rating/score. They must, 
therefore, rely heavily on the summarized narratives presented 
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TABLE II 
TOTAL RISK POINTS BY CONTRACTOR/BY ITEM/BY FACTOR 
ITEM s A B c D E 
T. l AEROMECHAN ICS 430 225 600 175 800 
I. I AIRCRAFT PERFORMANCE 125 75 300 0 430 
1.2 AERODYNAMICS 215 50 150 80 100 
1.3 STABILITY AND CONTROL 90 100 150 95 270 
T.2 AIRFRAME 275 370 392 292 185 
2.1 WEIGHT AND BALANCE 35 130 22 37 75 
2.2 FLIGHT CONTROLS 125 165 200 150 110 
2.3 LANDI NG GEAR 15 75 172 105 0 
T.3 PROPULSION 8 SECONDARY POWER 
I I I I J I 
I : . I I I I I I ETC. I_ I I I I -- - - -----.... 
TABLE III 
TOTAL RISK POINTS BY CONTRACTOR/BY AREA 
CONTRACTORS A B c D E 
~ 
TECHNICAL AREA 1745 916 1175 537 1376 
OPERATIONS AREA 546 215 492 325 820 
TOTAL RI SK POINTS 2291 1131 1631 862 2196 
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by the SSEB to objectively analyze and evaluate the results of' 
the SSEB evaluation. When satisfied with the item level 
numerical score, which represents a combined figure of' merit 
f'or strengths, weaknesses, and risks, the SSAC applies the 
weighting criteria to these scores. 
The approach used by the writer to assess the over-all 
risk associated with contractor proposals was, of' necessity, 
conducted completely independent of' the normal SSEB scoring 
process. The risk model developed did not utilize any of' 
the current rating/scoring methods, nor did it utilize the 
actual ratings and scores established by the evaluators f'or 
this program. Risk elements, derived from factor narratives 
describing proposal weaknesses and risks, were used as the 
basic input to the risk model. The risk elements were of' a 
technical nature as they related to design and development 
of' weapons system hardware. The output of' the model pro-
vided total risk points associated with each contractor pro-
posal. These risk points se~ved as a quantitative measure 
of' the over-all technological risk to the program relative 
to primary operational objectives. The shortcomings of' this 
initial approach to risk assessment in the SSEB process are 
numerous. On the other hand, the model demonstrated that a 
cumulative measure of' over-all risk associated with a con-
tractor proposal is feasible. The results of' this initial 
risk model showed a spread of' approximately 1000 risk points 
between the least risk and highest risk proposal. The least 
risk proposal had approximately 700 total risk points and 
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highest risk proposal had approximately 1700 total risk 
points. The proposal with the next to least total risk 
points had a total of approximately 950, which was approx-
imately 250 less than the next competitor. The results of 
the model demonstrated that an integrated risk assessment/ 
scoring model could be developed and implemented to assist 
the SSAC in its over-all analysis and evaluation. One major 
advantage of the model and approach was that it provided the 
capability to easily retrace the risk analysis and resultant 
score back to the detailed evaluation at the factor level. 
The strengths and shortcomings of the initial risk model and 
methodology will be discussed in detail in Chapter VIII, in 
which a more comprehensive SSEB risk assessment methodology 
and model is developed. 
CHAPTER VI 
SOURCE SELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction 
While a member of the SSEB for the developmental pro-
gram mentioned in Chapter V, the writer prepared and dis-
tributed a Source Selection questionnaire to 69 individuals 
experienced in the Source Selection process within ASD. To 
insure that those receiving the questionnaire were well 
qualified and represented a good cross-section of experience 
in the Source Selection process, the office of the Deputy 
for Systems Management at ASD provided the names of individ-
uals to receive the questionnaire. In addition, the 
Technical Director for Weapons Systems in the Systems Man-
agement Directorate accomplished the distribution and 
retrieval of the questionnaires. The letter requesting dis-
tribution of the questionnaire, the cover letter for distri-
bution,and the Source Selection questionnaire are included 
in Appendix A. 
to: 
The purpose of the Source Selection questionnaire was 
(1) Obtain data which would permit an objective 
analysis and assessment of the adequacy of the 
present rating/scoring system used in the 
SSEB evaluation process at ASD. 
(2) Obtain data which would permit an objective 
analysis and assessment 0£ the affects that 
two specific aspects of the current DoD 
management philosophy have on the SSEB evalu-
ation process. 
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The two specific aspects 0£ the current DoD management 
philosophy involved are the "minimum documentation" and 
"prototype hardware development" concepts. Forty-four 
respondents completed and returned the questionnaire. A 
detailed analysis 0£ respond:ents' answers to the question-
naire is provided in Appendix B. 
The purpose 0£ this chapter is to evaluate the analyses 
in Appendix Band present the major findings relative to the 
adequacy 0£ the current Source Selection rating/scoring sys-
tem, and the effects of minimum documentation and prototype 
hardware development on the SSEB technical evaluation. The 
chapter is divided into £our major sections. The first sec-
tion includes a discussion 0£ the applicability and suit-
ability 0£ the questionnaire, the adequacy of the sample 
size, and the qualifications 0£ the respondents to provide 
answers upon which conclusions and recommendations could be 
based. In addition, experience weighting £actors are devel-
oped £or use in evaluating respondent answers to the ques-
tionnaire. The second section includes an evaluation and 
discussion 0£ the adequacy 0£ the present rating/scoring 
system. This section also includes an evaluation and dis-
cussion of the interaction between technical and cost per-
sonnel, as related to risk analysis in the SSEB evaluation 
process. The third section evaluates and discusses the 
effects of current DoD management philosophy on the SSEB 
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technical evaluation. The fourth section presents an over-
all summary of the combined effects of the major findings on 
the Source Selection process. 
Question Number 6 of the Source Selection questionnaire 
was designed to obtain information which would permit an 
evaluation of what actually constitutes minimum documenta-
tion on prototype hardware development programs. The 
answers given by respondents were excellent, but they could 
not be analyzed or evaluated in any meaningful way. There-
fore, no discussion on Question Number 6 will be presented 
in this chapter. The interested reader may review the most 
frequent and best substantiated respondent answers to Ques-
tion Number 6 in Appendix B. 
The major sections of this chapter include an evalua-
tion of the analyses of respondent answers to the Source 
Selection questionnaire, contained in Appendix B. As each 
major question is addressed in this chapter, the interested 
reader may refer to the analyses of that specific question 
in Appendix B. 
Validity of Questionnaire and 
Respondent Qualifications 
Bo 
The questionnaire was developed by the writer near the 
end of the SSEB participation mentioned in Chapter V. It 
was coordinated with approximately fifteen members of that 
SSEB effort, including the Chairman, two Co-Chairmen, sev-
eral Item Captains and Factor members. After making several 
changes based upon recommendations from these SSEB members, 
the questionnaire was submitted to the Technical Director 
for Weapons Systems, Directorate of Systems Management, for 
distribution. Prior to making distribution, the Technical 
Director coordinated the questionnaire with several key mem-
bers of the ASD staff to insure that the questionnaire was 
acceptable and useful. Based upon the coordinated approval 
for distribution, it is assumed that the questionnaire is 
satisfactory from the standpoint of design, information 
desired, and applicability and suitability for its intended 
purpose. 
The acceptability and suitability of the respondents as 
being a representative sample of highly qualified individ-
uals experienced in the Source Selection activities at ASD 
was validated by the analysis of Question Number 1 of the 
questionnaire. (See pages 253· to 261, Appendix B). The 
size of the sample of respondents (44) is considered to be 
sufficiently large since it was of primary importance to 
obtain answers from respondents considered by ASD to be most 
qualified. Discussions with key ASD personnel revealed that 
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the number and functional levels of the respondents repre-
sent a very satisfactory cross-section of the personnel best 
qualified in Source Selection activities at ASD. 'Ihe number 
of Item Captains and Factor members, although comparatively 
small, is considered adequate in view of the relatively few 
individuals who have had recent experience with prototype 
hardware development and the minimum documentation concept. 
'Ihe original target for the total number of respondents was 
fifty, six more than actually achieved. Ideally, six addi-
tional respondents would have provided a more balanced sam-
ple only if they had consisted of four more factor level and 
two more item level respondents. However, the total of 44 
respondents, and their functional level distribution provide 
a very satisfactory sample. 
1. Years Experience of Respondents 
Taken as a group, the respondents averaged 10.72 years 
experience in Source Selection related activities. 'Ihirteen 
respondents had five years or less experience, and 15 re-
spondents had from 11 to 31 years experience. In the 11 to 
31 years experience group, eleven respondents had from 16 to 
31 years experience. 
2. Years Experience by Highest Functional Level 
'Ihe respondents were categorized by the highest func-
tional level in which they had served, where functional 
levels are described as SSAC, SSEB Chairman, SSEB Co-
Chairman, SSEB Item Captain, SSEB Factor Member, and Cost to 
the Government. Of the 44 respondents, 13 had served as 
SSAC members, 8 as SSEB Chairman, 12 as SSEB Co-Chairman, 
6 as SSEB Item Captain, 4 as SSEB Factor Member, and 1 as 
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Cost to Government team member. Table IV shows the years 
experience by highest functional levels. The average years 
experience for all respondents would have been considerably 
higher than 10.72 had the average years experience of the 
eight chairmen been equal to any of the other functional 
levels. The reason for the relatively low average years 
experience in Source Selection by SSEB chairman is most 
likely that they are usually senior military officers with 
primarily staff, operational and support experience, and who 
are presently assigned as the SPO Director. 
TABLE IV 
YEARS EXPERIENCE BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Functional Level Number of Respondents Average Years 
SSAC 13 10.85 
Chairman 8 4.o 
Co-Chairman 12 13.41 
Item Captain 6 14.32 
Factor Member 4 10.75 
Cost to Government 1 6.o 
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J. Experience in Source Selection Activities 
Next, the experience level of the respondents was ana-
lyzed relative to the number of times that the respondents 
had actually performed some functional activity on a source 
selection. Taken as an entire group, the respondents had 
performed 235 source selection activities at various func-
tional levels. This does not mean that 235 different source 
selections had been performed by the respondents. Rather, 
that the combined activities of all 44 respondents totaled 
235 separate functional level activities. Table XXXV (in 
Appendix B) provides a comprehensive analysis of these 235 
activities by functional level and by the respondent groups 
which performed them. Tiie respondent groups were determined 
by segregating the respondents by the highest functional 
level in which they had served. In other words, if a re-
spondent had served twice as a factor member, three times 
as a co-chairman, and once as a member of the SSAC, he would 
be included in the SSAC "highest functional level group". 
Using this analysis, a respondent group would be considered 
best qualified if the percentage of the total (235) activi-
ties performed by that group is equal to or greater than any 
other groups. Tiiat is, the group which has performed the 
highest percentage of the total number of activities is con-
sidered to be the most qualified group. The group that has 
performed the least percentage of the total number of activ-
ities is considered to be the least qualified group. Indi-
vidual respondents within a respondent group are considered 
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to be best qualified in any particular functional level if 
the average number of functional level activities per 
respondent exceeds the average number of functional level 
activities performed by individual respondents of other 
groups. 
The 13 SSAC respondents accounted for 42.5% (100) of 
the total 235 Source Selection activities performed by all 
the respondents. Fifty of these 100 activities performed by 
the SSAC respondents were SSAC functional level activities. 
The remaining 50 were distributed across the other func-
tional levels such that the SSAC members were individually 
most qualified in the SSAC and Contract Defini tic::m func-
tional levels, second most qualified in the SSEB Chairman, 
Co-Chairman, Item Captain, and Cost to Government functional 
levels, and third most qualified in the Factor Member func-
tional level. 
The analysis showed that the highest functional level 
groups of respondents were best qualified in each of their 
respective functional levels. That is, the SSAC group was 
best qualified in the SSAC functional level, the SSEB chair-
man group was best qualified in the Chairman Functional 
level, etc. There were two minor exceptions to this. The 
first was a tie between the SSAC and Item Captain groups for 
the highest percentage of total activities performed in the 
Item functional level. The s.econd was in the Cost to 
Government functional level, where the SSEB Co-Chairman 
group performed 67% of the total number of Cost to 
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Government functional activities. 
The analysis also showed that individual respondents 
within highest functional level groups were best qualified 
in their respective functional levels. That is, the 13 in-
dividual respondents in the SSAC group averaged 3.85 SSAC 
functional level activities, the other groups zero. The 
eight individual respondents in the SSEB Chairman group 
averaged 1.75 Chairman functional level activities, while 
the only other group (SSAC) performing in the Chairman func-
tional level averaged .46 activities per respondent. The 12 
individual respondents in the SSEB Co-Chairman group aver-
aged J.O Co-Chairman functional level activities, while the 
next most qualified individuals, by group, was an average of 
.54 by the SSAC members, etc. 
The significance of the above findings is that it is 
possible to establish credible "experience weighting 
factors" by combining these data. An experience weighting 
factor was needed in order to improve the accuracy of and 
confidence in the findings resulting from the evaluation of 
respondent answers to the questionnaire. The experience in 
actual source selection activities is considered by the 
writer to be a more valid measure of respondent qualifica~ 
tion in the Source Selection process than the number of 
years experience in source selection related work. Assuming 
this to be a correct assumption, the following rationale 
should be acceptable to the reader. 
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4. Establishment of Experience Weighting Factors 
The individual respondents in each highest functional 
level group were best qualified in their respective func-
tional level, based upon a higher average number of activi-
ties per respondent. This supports using the procedure 
which categorizes respondents by highest functional level as 
the primary technique for evaluating the questionnaire an-
swers. The logic behind this is that by categorizing re-
spondent answers to questions by highest functional level 
groups, you obtain an analysis of answers provided by re-
spondents in the functional level where they are individually 
best qualified to answer. 
A measure of the over-all experience of each group of 
respondents, by highest functional level, is obtained 
directly from the percentage of the grand total (235) of 
source selection activities performed by each group. This 
measure of over-all experience will be referred to as the 
Over-all Experience Rating. Table V shows the Over-all 
Experience Rating of each highest functional level group, 
expressed in an absolute value corresponding to the per-
centages in the right-hand column of Table XXXV ( in Appendix 
B). 
To determine the experience weighting factors for each 
highest functional level group, the Over-all Experience 
Rating is divided by the actual number of respondents in 
each group. This results in weighting factor which can be 
used for individual respondents within each highest 
functional level group. The results of these calculations 
are shown in Table VI. 
TABLE V 
OVER-ALL EXPERIENCE RATING BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
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EXPERIENCE WEIGHTING FACTORS BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
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The experience weighting factors will be used in the 
following manner. Respondent answers to questions are cate-
gorized by highest functional level group in the analysis in 
Appendix B. The total number of r,espondents in a highest 
functional level group selecting a particular answer will be 
multiplied by the appropriate Experience Weighting Factor 
for that group. The product of these values will be called 
the "Adjusted Score". By using this procedure, the value of 
each respondents answer, relative to a measure of experience, 
will be weighted into the evaluation. The sum of the 
Adjusted Scores for each functional level group will be 
referred to as the Total Adjusted Score for each particular 
answer to the questionnaire. 
Evaluation of Present Rating/Scoring System 
Questions 4 and 7 of the Source Selection questionnaire 
are addressed to the problem of assessing the adequacy of 
the rating/scoring system presently being used in the Source 
Selection process at ASD. Question 5 of the Source Selec-
tion questionnaire addresses the problem of assessing the 
adequacy of the interaction between technical and cost per-
sonnel during the SSEB evaluation process. The emphasis 
here is to assess the need for greater interaction between 
these two disciplines so as to integrate technical consider-
ations into the cost estimates and cost risks of contractor 
proposals. 
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1. Evaluation of Question Number Four 
a. Respondents by'Highest Functional Level 
In Question 4, the respondents were asked if the 
scoring process at the Item/Factor level should be modified, 
and to state the reasons for their answer. Twenty-eight 
(63.7%) of the 44 respondents stated that the scoring system 
should be modified and 13 (29.5%) of the respondents stated 
that the system should not be modified. Table VII shows the 
breakout of respondent answers by highest functional level. 
It is interesting to note that a strong majority of 
respondents in the SSAC, Chairman, Item, and Factor group~ 
stated that the scoring system should be modified. Those 
majorities were 77%, 75%, 83.4%, and 100%, respectively. 
The four factor members were unanimous· in favor of modifica-
tions. Only 25% of the Co-Chairman group stated that the 
system should be modified, while 66.6% stated that the sys-
tem should not be modified. Eight (61.5%) of the 13 re-
spondents stating that the system should not be modified 
were members of the Co-Chairman group. The analysis below 
indicates strong support for modifying the scoring system, 
with the only functional level group opposing modification 
being the Co-Chairman. 
Applying the Experience Weighting Factors in Table VII 
results in Adjusted Scores for each functional group. The 
sum of these Adjusted Scores is called the Total Adjusted 
Score. The results of this exercise is shown in Table VIII. 
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Tiie Total Adjusted Score, which reflects the experience 
level of respondents, shows strong support for modifying the 
present scoring system. 
TABLE VII 
ADEQUACY OF SCORING SYSTEM 
Answer Total Hi2hest Functional Level 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Chairman 
44 13 8 12 6 4 1 
Should be 
Modified 28 10 6 3 5 0 
Should Not 
be Modified 13 3 1 8 1 0 0 
TABLE VIII 
ADEQUACY OF SCORING SYSTEM - WEIGHTING FACTORS APPLIED 
Answer Total Adjusted Scores 
Adjusted SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Score Chairman 
Should be 
Modified 66.1 32.7 7.3 6.2 9.3 10.6 0 
Should Not 
be Modified 29.6 9.8 1.2 16.7 1.9 0 0 
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Twelve of the 13 respondents stating that the present 
system should not be modified also stated that the present 
system is adequate and preferred. None of the respondents 
stated that the present system is absolutely superior. 
Those respondents stating that the present system should be 
modified checked the reasons listed in Table IX. The rea-
sons are listed in the order of relative importance, deter-
m.i:n.edby the frequency that they were cited by respondents. 
Under the "Total Respondents" column, the percentage of the 
total (44) respondents selecting a particular answer is pro-
vided, along with the total adjusted score determined by 
applying the experience weighting factors. Under "Highest 
Functional Level", the percentage of the respondents in each 
functional level group that selected a particular answer is 
provided. The "other reasons" given by the respondents are 
not included in Table IX. 
It is important to note that the order of relative 
importance of the reasons is the same when listed by the 
Total Adjusted Score. Reasons 2, 3, 4, and 5 are, however, 
approximately equal in relative importance. Reason number 8 
is not considered to be significant, primarily since it is 
contradictory to reason number 5. 
Table X shows the order of relative importance of the 
eight reasons in Table IX according to each functional 
level. Based upon incremental steps required to re-order 
the "functional group" reasons to correspond to the order 
established by the total respondents, the SSAC group would 
TABLE IX 
REASONS FOR MODIFYING PRESENT SCORING SYSTEM 
Reasons Total 
Respondents 
Highest Functional Level 
1. Present system tends to force scores to average 
2. Emphasis should be placed upon factor and item 
evaluators to rank proposals against each other 
as well as standards 
3. Scoring and weighting should be accomplished at 
the factor and item level consistent with the 
primary objectives/requirements of the weapon 
system 
4. Technical risk too difficult to integrate into 
score 
5. More definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level 
6. Present system tends to compromise the motiva-
tion for professional excellence in the 
evaluator 
7. Upward flow of evaluation information is 
constrained 
8. Less definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
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require only 2, the Chairman group 8, the Item Captain group 
8, The Factor member group 12, and the Co-Chairman group 14. 
This simply indicates that the SSAC group appears to be most 
representative of the respondent group taken as a whole, 
while the Co-Chairman group appears to be least representa-
tive. It is interesting to note that the Factor Member 
group strongly feels that the system compromises the pro-
fessionalism of the evaluator. This appears to be signifi-
cant since they should be, in reality, best qualified to 
determine that affect. 
TABLE X 
IMPORTANCE OF REASON BY FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Total Respondents SSAC Chairman Co-Chairman Item Factor 
1 1 1 1 2 6 
2 J 4 2 5 J 
J 2 5 4 1 1 
4 4 2 7 J 2 
5 5 J 8 4 4 
6 6 6 J 6 5 
7 7 7 5 7 7 
8 8 8 6 8 8 
When the "other reasons", given by respondents to sup-
port a position to modify the scoring system, are included 
in the evaluation the results are essentially the same. The 
reason this evaluation was conducted separately is because 
it was necessary to use judgment in interpreting the meaning 
and intent of the respondent narratives. The interested 
reader may refer to page 279 of Appendix B to assess the 
validity of the writer's judgment. Table XI shows the 
results on combining the results in Table IX with the "other 
reasons" given in support of modifying the present scoring 
system. The numbers in parenthesis represent the order of 
the reasons established in Table IX. The only significant 
change is that the reason "more definitive ranking/scoring 
needed at factor level" moved from fifth to second place in 
the order of relative importance. Again, the Total Adjusted 
Score did not change the order of relative importance. The 
first seven reasons are considered to be the significant 
factors which support the need to modify the scoring system. 
Reasons 1, 2, and 3 appear to be most important, reasons 4 
and 5 of secondary importance, and reasons 6 and 7 of 
tertiary importance. Strong support for reasons 2, 3, and 4 
exists in the SSAC and SSEB working levels, even though all 
three reasons clearly propose actions that are contrary to 
current procedures and practices. 
Based upon the order of the reasons given by the func-
tional level groups, the SSAC is again most representative 
of the total respondents, while the Co-Chairman group ap-
pears to be least representative. Considering the percent-
age of respondents in each group stating the significant 
TABLE XI 
REASONS FOR MODIFYING PRESENT SCORING SYSTEM- INCLUDING "OTHER REASONS" 
Reasons Total Highest Functional Level 
Respondents 
% Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Adjusted Chairman 
Score 
% % % % % 
(1) 1. Present system tends to force scores to 
average 36.4 35.0 38.5 62.5 25.0 33.3 25.0 
(5) 2. More definitive ranking/scoring of pro-
posals needed at factor level 34.1 34.2 38.5 50.0 8.3 50.0 50.0 
(2) 3. Emphasis should be placed upon factor and 
item evaluators to rank proposals against 
each other as well as standards 29.5 29.8 30.8 25.0 16.7 66.6 25.0 
(3) 4. Scoring and weighting should be accom-
plished at the factor and item level con-
sistent with the primary objectives/ 
requirements of the weapon system 22.8 25.1 30.8 12.5 0 50.0 50.0 
(4) 5. Technical risk too difficult to integrate 
into score 22.8 24.3 30.8 25.0 16.7 16.7 25.0 
(6) 6. Present system tends to compromise the 
motivation for professional excellence in 
the evaluator 13.6 14.4 7.7 12.5 0 16.7 75.0 
(7) 7. Upward flow of evaluation information 
constrained 13.6 12.9 15.4 25.0 8.3 16.7 0 
(8) 8. Less definitive ranking/scoring of pro-
posals needed at factor level 6.8 8.6 15.4 0 8.3 0 0 
9. Cl's and DR's results should be integrated 
into score 6.8 6.4 7.7 12.5 0 16.7 0 \[) 
10. Difficult to establish evaluation criteria 
4.5 4.2 16.7 
\Jl 
so as to achieve meaningful scores 0 0 0 0 
reasons, the Co-Chairman group again appears to be least 
representative of the total respondents. 
b. Respondents by SSAC or SSEB 
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Of the total (44) respondents, 13 were SSAC members and 
31 were SSEB members. A comparison of the respondent an-
swers to question 4 by SSAC and SSEB membership revealed 
that the two groups were very simiiar in every respect, as 
shown in Table XLVI (Appendix B). This finding tends to 
support a conclusion that the SSEB members, when taken as a 
group, evaluate the present scoring system generally the 
same as do SSAC members taken as a group. 
c. Respondents by Years Experience Level 
The respondent answers to question 4 were analyzed by 
the experience level of the respondents, in terms of years, 
in Table XLVII (Appendix B). There was a significant trend 
toward acceptance of the present scoring system as the expe-
rience level of the respondents increased, in terms of 
years. Of the 13 respondents with five years or less expe-
rience, 84.8% stated that the present scoring system should 
be modified. Of the 15 respondents with 11 to 31 years 
experience, 53.3% stated that the scoring system should be 
modified. None of the five years or less group stated that 
the present system was adequate and preferred, while 46.7% 
of the 11-31 year group stated that it was adequate and pre-
ferred. Table XII shows the difference in the adequacy of 
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the present scoring system as judged by groups of different 
"years experience" levels. The numbers under "Experience 
Level" are the percentages of respondents answering in each 
experience group. The number under "Total Respondents 
Answering" is the total number of respondents selecting that 
answer. Of the 28 respondents that stated the system should 
be modified, 39%, 32%, and 29% were from the groups in in-
creasing experience levels, respectively. Of the 13 
respondents that stated the system should not be modified, 
8%, 38%, and 54% were from those groups in increasing expe-
rience levels, respectively. 
TABLE XII 
ADEQUACY OF SCORING SYSTEM BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Answer Experience Level 
5 yrs or less 6 to 10 yrs 11 to 31 yrs Total 
(13 respond..: (16 respond- (15 respond- Respondents 
ents) ents) ents) Answering 
Scoring system 
should be 
modified 84.8 56.2 53.3 28 
Scoring system 
should not be 
modified 7.7 31.2 46.7 13 
Present system 
adequate and 
preferred 0 31.2 46.7 12 
Present system 
is superior 0 0 0 0 
The reasons given by respondents for supporting the 
position to modify the scoring system are given in Table 
XIII, by years experience. The "other reasons" given by 
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respondents are not included, therefore the results of Table 
IX are used for comparison. Only the order of relative im-
portance of reasons given is shown for the three experience 
level groups. 
Based upon incremental steps required to re-order the 
reasons listed by years experience groups to correspond to 
the order of importance of the reasons established by the 
total respondents, the "5 years or less" group would require 
6 steps, the 6 to 10 year group 12 steps, and the 11 to 31 
years group 14 steps. This surprisingly indicates that the 
group with the least experience appears to be most repre-
sentative of the respondent group taken as a whole, while 
the group most experienced is least representative. 
d. Summary of Findings on Question· Number Four 
The following is a discussion of the major findings as 
a result of the analysis and evaluation of respondent an-
swers to question number 4 of the Source Selection 
questionnaire. 
(1) Present scoring system should be modified. 
(2) The major reasons that the scoring system 
should be modified are listed below in the 
order of relative importance: 
TABLE XIII 
REASONS FOR MODIFYING SCORING SYSTEM -
BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Reasons Given by Td.tal Re- Order of Int~ortance 
spondents in the Order of 5 yrs or 'to·10 
Their Relative Importance less years 
1. Present system tends to 
force scores to average 1 1 
2. Emphasis should be placed 
upon factor and item 
evaluators to rank pros-
pects against each other 
as well as standards 4 3 
J. Scoring and weighting 
should be accomplished at 
the factor and item level 
consistent with the pri-
mary objectives/require-
men ts of the weapon system 2 
4. Technical risk too diffi-
cult to integrate into 
score 5 6 
5. More definitive ranking/ 
scoring needed at factor 
level 3 2 
6. Present system tends to 
compromise the motivation 
for professional excel-
lence in the evaluator 6 8 
7. Upward flow of evaluation 
information constrained 7 7 
8. Less definitive ranking/ 
scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level 8 5 
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(a) Present system tends to 
force scores to average 
100 
(b) More definitive ranking/ 
scoring of proposals needed 
at. factor level 
(c) Emphasis should be placed 
upon factor and item evalu-
ators to rank proposals 
against each other as well 
as standards 
(d) Scoring and weighting 
should be accomplished at 
the factor and item level 
consistent with the primary 
objectives/requirements of 
the weapon system 
(e) Technical risk too diffi-
cult to integrate into 
score 
(f) Present system tends to 
compromise the motivation 
for ·professional excellence 
in the evaluator 
(g) Upward flow of evaluation 
information constrained 
(J) SSAC respondents are most representative of the 
respondents taken as a total group. The evalua-
tion shows that the answers by the group of SSAC 
respondents is significantly more representative 
of the total group of respondents than any other 
functional group of respondents. On the other 
hand, the Co-Chairman group appears to be least 
representative. 
(4) Satisfaction with present scoring system generally 
increases as the experience level (in years) of 
respondents increases. The 11 5 years or less" 
experience level group was more representative of 
the total group answers than the groups of 
respondents who were more experienced in terms 
of years service. 
(5) When compared by SSAC and SSEB groups, the re~ 
spondents evaluate the present scoring system 
very similarly. 
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(6) The results of applying the Experience Weighting 
Factors were used to establish the major findings 
in (2) above. While the Total Adjusted Score 
values were relatively close to the raw percentage 
values, the weighted results are considered to be 
more accurate. In addition, the separate analysis 
permitted by the Experience Weighting Factors pro-
vided quantitative support for the technique of 
dividing the respondents by highest functional 
level to assess the data. 
(7) The factor members were strongly inclined to feel 
that the present scoring system tends to compro-
mise the motivation for professional excellence in 
the evaluator. 
2. Evaluation of Question Number Seven 
In question 7 the respondents were asked to discuss the 
influence and impact that the Contractor Inquiry (CI) and 
Deficiency Report (DR) have on the SSEB evaluation process. 
More specifically, they were asked to discuss the impact 
that the CI and DR have on the SSEB technical evaluation, 
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risk assessment, and scoring system. The question was 
rather poorly designed in that it resulted in answers that 
were difficult to systematically analyze and evaluate. The 
significant findings of that analysis are evaluated in this 
section. 
a. Impact on Technical Evaluation 
( 1) CI Impact on Technical Evaluation. Table XIV 
shows the various areas of impact that the CI has on the 
SSEB technical evaluation. The areas of impact are listed 
in the order of relative importance, determined by the fre-
quency they were cited by respondents. The numbers in the 
body of the table are percentages of respondents in that 
column specifying a particular impact. Under the column 
called "Total Respondents" the total adjusted score was 
derived by applying the "Experience Weighting Factors" and 
summing the Adjusted Scores. 
The total Adjusted Score values require re-ordering of 
areas 2 and J and areas 4 and 5. In the second area of 
impact, the respondents were not specific as to why the CI 
is essential to the SSEB evaluation process, but it appears 
reasonable to assume that areas 1 and 2 are essentially the 
same impact area. In any case, it is evident that almost 
one-half of the SSAC respondents and 87.5% of the SSEB 
Chairman respondents consider the CI very helpful and/or 
necessary for technical evaluation. The most frequent 
remark by factor members was that the CI process is too time 
TABLE XIV 
CI IMPACT ON TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
Areas of Impact Total I Highest Functional Level 
Res:eondents 
Total Co-
Adjusted SSAC Chairman Chairman Item Factor 
% Score % % % % % 
1. Better evaluation possible 
through clarification 22.8 27.7 I 46.2 0 25.0 16.7 0 
2. Essential to Evaluation 
process 20.4 14.5 I 7.7 87.5 0 0 25.0 
3. Creates excessive delays, 
process should be improved 18.2 19.6 I 15.4 12.5 8.3 16.7 75.0 
4. Creates inequities in favor 
of contractor in question 11. 4 10.3 7.7 25.0 0 16.7 25.0 
5. CI use should be sharply 
reduced or eliminated 11.4 12.1 I 7.7 0 16.7 16.7 25.0 
I 
6. No effect on evaluation 





consuming, and that the process should be streamlined. Of 
those selecting the fourth area of impact, the SSEB Chairman 
and Factor Member groups were most inclined to believe that 
the CI creates inequities in the technical evaluation in 
favor of the contractor in question. Of those selecting the 
fifth area of impact, the SSEB Co-Chairman and Item Captain 
groups were most inclined to believe that the CI had no 
effect on technical evaluation. However, the percentage is 
relatively low (16.7%) in both groups. 
There is evidence to indicate that the higher levels of 
management feel that the CI is more necessary to the SSEB 
evaluation process than do the lower management and working 
levels. Likewise, the lower management and working levels 
appear to be more inclined to feel that the CI creates ex-
cessive delays which could be reduced by improved proce-
dures, and that the use of the CI should be sharply reduced 
or eliminated. This is interesting since the working levels 
are the ones who actually prepare the CI and perform detailed 
evaluation of the CI response in the SSEB evaluation process. 
The belief that inequities occur as a result of the CI 
appears to be shared primarily by the two highest management 
levels and the Item and Factor working levels. The respond-
ents stating that the CI has no effect on the evaluation 
process, are considered to be a distinct minority of the 
respondents in each functional level group. The logic for 
this conclusion is that all the other areas of impact cited 
by respondents are relatable to some affect that the CI has 
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on the SSEB evaluation process, with perhaps the exception 
of area number 5. 
(2) DR Impact on Technical Evaluation. Table XV shows 
the various areas of impact that the DR has on the SSEB 
technical evaluation. The areas of impact are listed in the 
order of relative importance, determined by the frequency 
they were cited by respondents. 
the same manner as Table XIV. 
Table XV is constructed in 
The Total Adjusted Score values indicate that the first 
and second areas of impact are very close in relative impor-
tance. This is surprising for two reasons. First, they are 
contradictory, and second, they are both substantially 
higher in relative importance than the other areas of 
impact. The only functional level group that appears to 
take a consistent position on these two areas of impact is 
the SSEB Chairman group, where 50% stated that the DR has 
no effect and 0% stated that the DR is essential. The 
Co-Chairman group had more respondents stating "no effect" 
than "essential to", while the SSAC, Item and Factor groups 
had more respondents stating "essential to" than "no 
effect". Since the only other area of impact that could be 
considered supportive to a "no effect" opinion is sixth area 
listed in Table XV, it is concluded that those respondents 
stating "no effect" represent a substantial minority of the 
respondents taken as a total group. 
According to official policy and actual practice, one 
of the primary uses of the DR is to identify major problem 
Areas of Impact 
1. No effect on evaluation 
2. Essential to evaluation 
J. Essential for contract 
definition 
4. Creates inequities in 
favor of contractor in 
question 
5. Creates excessive delays 
6. Should reduce and/or 
restrict use of DR 
TABLE x"'V 
DR IMPACT ON TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
Total I Highest Functional Level 
% 
Res:eondents 
Total Adj. I SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Score Chairman 
% % % % % 
20.4 17.1 I 7.7 50.0 25.0 0 25.0 
15.9 17.9 115. 4 0 16.7 16. 7 50.0 
1J.6 12.9 115. 4 25.0 8.J 16.7 0 
13.6 10.5 0 25.0 25.0 16.7 0 
9.1 9.1 7.7 12.5 0 16.7 25.0 




areas, actual or potential, associated with contractor pro-
posals so they may be satisfactorily considered in contract 
negotiations. This is at least indirectly associated with 
the technical evaluation at the SSEB level. However, the 
respondents stating that the DR is essential to contract 
definition are referring more to its use in contract negoti-
ations than its direct impact on the SSEB technical evalua-
tion and formal report. 
Approximately 14% of the total respondents stated that 
the DR tends to create inequities in favor of the contrac-
tor. These respondents were primarily from the Chairman and 
Co-Chairman groups. As in the case of the CI, the respond-
ents stating that the use of the DR should be reduced or 
eliminated were from the lower functional levels. 
(J) Summary of CI/DR Impact on Technical Evaluation. 
In summary, the higher functional levels were more strongly 
inclined to feel that the CI is necessary for accomplishing 
the technical evaluation. On the other hand, the lower 
functional levels, who actually use the CI, were more in-
clined to feel that the CI process is too time consuming to 
be useful and that it tends to create inequities in favor of 
the contractor in question. In the DR area, there was less 
distinction in respondent answers when compared by func-
tional level. The middle and lower functional levels are 
more inclined to feel the DR has no effect on technical 
evaluation. The middle functional levels, however, were 
also most inclined to feel that the DR creates inequities in 
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favor of the contractor in question and that its use should 
be reduced or eliminated. Additional discussion of these 
findings are discussed later. 
b. Impact on Risk Assessment 
(1) CI Impact on Risk Assessment. Table XVI shows the 
various areas of impact that the CI has on the SSEB risk 
assessment. These areas of impact are listed in the order 
of relative importance, determined by the frequency they 
were cited by respondents. Table XVI is constructed in the 
same manner as Table XIV. 
The majority (52.3%) of all respondents stated that the 
CI assists in identifying and assessing risk associated with 
a contractor proposal. The Co-Chairman group was the only 
functional level group in which less than 50% of the re~ 
spondents cited this as an area of impact by the CI. The 
working level groups were more inclined to state that the CI 
actually tends to reduce risks. It is noteworthy that only 
9.1% of the total respondents stated that the CI has no 
effect on risk assessment. 
Table XVII shows the various areas of impact that the 
DR has on the SSEB risk assessment. Again, the areas of 
impact are listed in the order of relative importance, de-
termined by the frequency they were cited by respondents. 
(2) DR Impact on Risk Asse.ssment. A relatively large 
percentage of the total respondents (41.0%) stated that the 
DR assists in identifying and assessing risks associateq 
Areas of Impact 
1. Assists in identifying and 
assessing risk 
2. Tends to reduce risk 
J. No effect on risk 
assessment 
TABLE XVI 
CI IMPACT ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
Total Highest Functional Level 
% 
Res:eondents 
Total Adj. SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Score Chairman 
% % % % % 
52.J 52.9 53.8 62.5 41.7 50.0 75.0 
11.4 11.5 7.7 0 50.0 50.0 25.0 




Areas of Impact 
1. Assists in identifying and 
assessing risk 
2. Tends to reduce risk 
3. No effect on risk 
assessment 
4. All major items identified 
by DR 1 s 
TABLE XVII 
DR IMPACT ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
Total Highest Functional Level 
07a 
ResEondents 
Total Adj. SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Score Chairman 
% % % % % 
41.0 45.0 52.8 37.5 41.6 0 75.0 
15.0 13.7 7.7 25.0 0 50.0 25.0 
13.6 11.2 7.7 37.5 16. 7 0 0 





with contractor proposals. 1be Item group, with 0%, was the 
only functional level group who varied significantly from 
the other respondents in stating the first area of impact, 
but the Item group had the highest percentage of respondents 
who felt that the DR tends to reduce risks. Another inter-
esting finding is that 37.5% of the Chairman group stated 
that the DR assists in identifying and assessing risk, and 
another 37.5% stated that the DR has no effect on risk 
assessment. 
c. Impact on Scoring 
(1) CI Impact on Scoring. Table XVIII shows the var-
ious areas of impact that the CI has on the SSEB scoring 
process. These areas of impact are listed in the order of 
relative importance, determined by the frequency they were 
cited by respondents. 
Here again the two most important areas of impact iden-
tified by respondents are contradictory. Within the SSAC 
group, 30.8% stated that both impact number 1 and 2 exist, 
and 23.0% stated that scores should reflect the CI response. 
Since impact number 3 is not necessarily related to impact 
number 1or 2, it can only be concluded that the SSAC group 
is about equally split between the conflicting views of 
impact number 1 and 2. The same condition exists for the 
Item Captain group. The Chairman group substantially favors 
the view that the CI improves the accuracy of the scores, 
while the Co-Chairman group favors the view that the CI has 
TABLE XVIII 
CI IMPACT ON SSEB SCORING PROCESS 
Areas of Impact Total Highest Functional Level 
Res:eondents 
% Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Weighted Chairman 
Score 
% % % % % 
1. No effect on scores 22.8 24.5 30.8 12.5 33.3 16. 7 0 
2. Improves accuracy of scores 22.8 23.5 30.8 37.5 8.3 16.7 25.0 
3. Scores should reflect CI 
response 15.9 17.1 23.0 12.5 16.7 16.7 0 
4. Leads to inequities in favor 




no effect on the scores. Within the Factor group, 50% 
stated that the CI has no effect on scoring. It is inter-
esting to note that the Factor group is the only functional 
level group that is consistent in stating that the CI ef-
fects the scoring. Among the other groups, there is consid-
erable division between stating that the CI has "no effect" 
and stating that it has "some" effect. The Factor group was 
more inclined to feel that the CI creates inequities in fav-
or of the contractor in question. This finding is consist-
ent with a similar finding relative to the CI impact on 
technical evaluation. 
Based upon an over-all consideration of the areas of 
impact, there were considerably more respondents that have 
the viewpoint that the CI does have some effect than those 
who consider that the CI has no effect on scoring. 
(2) DR Impact on Scoring. Table XIX shows the various 
areas of impact that the DR has on the SSEB scoring process. 
These areas of impact are again listed in the order of rela-
tive importance, as in previous tables. 
A larger percentage (.36.4%) of the total group felt 
that DR has no effect on the scoring process, however the 
distribution of respondent answers in every group again 
shows a considerable division of opinion as to whether or 
not the DR affects the scoring process. This is particu~ 
larly true in the Chairman group. Over-all, it is con-
eluded that there is generally divided opinion in the group 
as a whole as to whether or not the DR affects the SSEB 
TABLE XIX 
DR IMPACT ON SSEB SCORING PROCESS 
Areas of Impact Total Highest Functional Level 
Res12ondents 
% Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Adjusted Chairman 
Score 
% % % % % 
j 
1. No effect on scores 36.4 36.7 46.2 37.5 50.0 16.7 0 
2. Improves accuracy of scores 15.9 17.8 23.1 12.5 16.7 0 25.0 
3. Leads to inequities in favor 
of contractor in question 13.6 11.0 0 37.5 8.3 0 50.0 
4. Scores should reflect DR 
response 1:j.6 13.8 15.3 12.5 16.7 16. 7 0 
5. Cause higher probability of 





scoring process. These findings are discussed in greater 
detail in the following paragraphs. 
d. Combined Results of Question Number 7 
'Ille two dimensional (CI and DR) and multiple factor 
(technical evaluation, risk assessment, and scoring) nature 
of this question make it very difficult to evaluate and 
assess. First, it is necessary to determine if the CI and 
DR do, or do not have effects on the three factors. In 
order to determine this, it is necessary to divide the "no 
effect" answers from those that constitute "some effect". 
The answers that constitute "some effect" can then be com-
bined in a manner so as to obtain a combined percentage 
measure of the respondents who consider "some effect" to 
exist. This is done by simply summing the percentages of 
respondents stating that "some effect" exists. The follow-
ing is a break-out of numbers of the areas of impact, for 
each of the Tables XIV through XIX, according to "no effect", 
"some effect", and "undetermined effect". 
11 No Effect" "Some effect" "Undetermined Effect" 
Table XIV 6 1, 2, 3, 4 5 
Table xv 1 2, 3, 4, 5 6 
Table XVI 3 1, 2 
Table XVII 3 1, 2, 4 
Table XVIII 1 2, 4 3 
Table XIX 1 2, 3, 5 4 
'Ihese areas of impact in the category "undetermined effect" 
were considered neutral; that is, the percentages of re~ 
spondents stating these areas were not added to "no effect" 
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or "some effect". The results of this exercise are shown in 
Tables XX and XXI for the CI and DR, respectively. 
Table XX cl early shows that the CI has II some effects" on 
the SSEB technical evaluation and the risk assessment. While 
the percentage of "some effects" exceeds that of "no effects" 
for the SSEB scoring process, the results do not provide 
comfortable assurance that the CI consistently effects the 
scoring process. 
Table XXI clearly shows that the DR has "some effects" 
on the SSEB Risk Assessment. There is also substantial evi-
dence that the DR has "some effects" on the SSEB Technical 
Evaluation. As for the DR effect on the SSEB scoring proc-
ess, the results appear to show that the respondents are 
about equally divided on this issue. 
e. Summary of Findings on Question 7 
The following is a discussion of the mjaor findings as 
a result of the analysis and evaluation of the respondent 
answers to question number 7 of the Source Selection 
questionnaire: 
(1) The CI has significant effects on the SSEB tech-
nical evaluation. These effects, in the order, 
of their relative importance are: 
(a) Insures a better evaluation by clarifying 
questionable data in the contractor 
proposals. 
(b) Essential to insure the data is equitable 
TABLE XX 
IMPACT SUMMARY OF CI 
SSAC Chairmanl Co-Chairman 
I 
I 
16. 7 No Effect 7.7 0 Technical Evaluation Some Effects 77.0 125.0 33.3 
No Effect 7.7 12.5 ! 16.7 Risk Assessment Some Effects 61.5 62.5 41. 7 
No Effect J0.81 12.5 33.3 Scoring Some Effects j JO. 8 1 62.5 33.3 I 
I i I 
Item Factor 
16.7 0 
50. 1 : 125. 0 
0 0 
100.0 ' 100.0 
i 
I 
16. 7 . 0 













IMPACT SUMMARY OF DR 
SSAC I Chairman iCo-Chairman . . I 
No Effect 
i 
Technical Evaluation 7.7 50.0 i 25.0 Some Effects 38.5 62.5 50.0 
16. 7 No Effect 7.7 37.5 Risk Assessment Some Effects 60.5 62.5 58.3 







o I o I 
50.0 100.0 
116. 7 0 I 












and accurately evaluated. 
(c) Creates excessive delays in the evalua-
tion process that could be significantly 
reduced by a more efficient and effec-
tive procedure. 
(d) The use of the CI should be significantly 
reduced. 
It should be.noted that the higher levels of 
management strongly supported effects (a) and 
(b), while the working levels were more sup-
portive for effects (c) and (d). 
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(2) The CI has significant effects on the SSEB risk 
assessment. These effects, in the order of their 
relative importance, are: 
(a) Assists in identifying and assessing risks 
associated with contractor proposals. 
(b) Tends to reduce the risk associated with 
contractor proposals. 
(J) The effect of the CI on the SSEB scoring 
process could not be determined with any sub-
··stantial degree of certainty. A slightly 
greater percentage of the respondents feel 
that the CI has some effects than those who 
feel that it has no effect. The Chairman and 
Factor groups appear to be most consistent in 
the view that the CI has effects on the 
scoring process. When the CI does effect 
120 
scoring, the major effects are: 
(a) Improves the accuracy of the scores. 
(b) Leads to inequities in favor of the con-
tractor in question. 
Many of the respondents expressed the opinion 
that the scores should reflect the CI responses. 
It is concluded that the CI effects SSEB scoring 
more often than not. 
(4) The DR has significant effects on the SSEB tech-
nical evaluation. These effects in the order 
of their relative importance are: 
(a) Essential to insure that major problem 
areas, actual or potential, related to 
the proposal data are equitably and 
accurately evaluated. 
(b) Essential to identify major problem areas, 
actual or potential, related to the pro-
posal data are satisfactorily negotiated 
during contract definition. 
(c) Lead to inequities in favor of the con-
tractor in question. 
(d) Create excessive delays in the SSEB tech-
nical evaluation. 
A small number of respondents feel that tqe use 
of the DR should be reduced and/or restricted 
in the scope of application. 
(5) The DR has significant effects on the SSEB 
risk assessment. The effects, in the order of 
their relative importance, are: 
(a) Assist in identifying and assessing risks 
associated with contractor proposals. 
(b) Tend to reduce the risks associated with 
contractor proposals. 
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(6) The effect of the DR on the SSEB scoring process 
could not be determined. Approximately, the 
same percentage of respondents stated that the 
DR has no effect on scoring as those who stated 
that the DR has some effects. When the DR does 
effect scoring, which appears to be about 50% 
of the time, the major effects are: 
(a) Improves accuracy of scores. 
(b) Leads to inequities in favor of contractor 
in question. 
(c) Causes higher probability of a low score. 
It is seen that effects (b) and (c) above are 
also contradictory. The effect of the.DR on 
scoring appears to be an ar~a that merits 
further study and ~ttention by ASD managers 
responsible for source selection. 
·It should be noted here that the uncertainty associated with 
both the CI and DR relative to SSEB scoring was a primary 
factor in providing definitive scoring procedures for the CI 
and DR in the integrated risk assessment/scoring model 
developed in Chapter VIII of this study. 
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J. Evaluation of Question Number Five 
Question number 5 addressed the problem of assessing 
the adequacy of the present interactions between SSEB per-
sonnel in the technical and cost areas relative to inte-
grating technical considerations into cost estimates and 
cost risks. In the present SSEB evaluation process, the 
cost area is not scored, but it is considered appropriate to 
discuss question 5 in this section since there may be some 
relationship between cost risk and an optimum scoring system 
which integrates scoring and risk assessment. 
a. Respondents by Highest Functional Level 
The respondents were asked if the communication and 
interaction between cost and technical design personnel 
should be increased, unchanged, or decreased in order to 
insure adequate technical and risk considerations in the 
cost data. Of the total respondents, 79.5% stated that the 
communication and interaction should be increased; 18.2% 
stated that no change was needed; and 2.J% stated that the 
communication/interaction should be decreased. The Co-
Chairman, Item, and Factor groups appear to represent the 
majority of the respondents who feel that no change is 
needed; however, a substantial majority of every functional 
level group stated that the communication and interaction 
should be increased. Most of the respondents who stated 
that no change is needed also stated that the current system 
of technical/cost interaction is adequate and preferred. 
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A very small percentage of the respondents who voiced a "no 
change" position also stated that the cost data should be 
divorced from technical design. 
Table :XXII shows the reasons given by respondents in 
support of increasing the communication and interaction. 
The reasons are listed in the order of relative importance, 
determined by the frequency that they were cited by respond-
ents. Approximately 70% of the respondents feel that the 
cost data should reflect technical and other risks. Nearly 
50% of the respondents believe that technical design person-
nel could assist in improving the methods used to arrive at 
cost estimates, and approximately 27% feel that the cost 
data should more accurately reflect design, material, and 
manufacturing processes. 
While only one of the 44 respondents had served, at the 
highest functional level, as a working member of an SSEB 
cost team, four of the 44 respondents had experience in the 
area of cost. It is interesting to note that these four re-
spondents answered question 5 in the same manner as the 
majority of the total respondents. While the number of re-
spondents experienced in the cost area was relatively small, 
there is evidence that the cost people support increased 
communication and interaction to the same degree as respond-
ents from other disciplines, and for the same reasons. 
The order of relative importance of the reasons given 
by highest functional level groups was essentially the same 
as the order established by the respondents taken as a total 
TABLE XXII 
REASONS FOR INCREASING COST/TECHNICAL INTERACTION 
Reasons Total Highest Functional Level 
ondents 
Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Adjusted Chairman 
Score 
% % % % % 
1. Cost data should reflect 
technical and other risks 68.2 70.0 84.7 62.6 50.0 66.6 75.0 
2. Technical design people 
could assist in improving 
cost models and programs 47.8 45.2 30.7 62.6 50.0 16.7 100.0 
3. Cost data does not ade-
quately reflect design 
material, and manufac-
turing processes 27.3* 24.9 30.7 50.0 16.7 0 25.0 










group. The "other reasons" given by respondents were not 
included in Table XXII. However, when the "other reasons" 
given by respondents to support the position that 
communication/interaction should be increased are included, 
the results in Table XXII remain essentially the same. The 
reason that the "other reasons" were evaluated separately is 
because it was necessary to use judgment in interpreting the 
meaning and intent of the respondent narratives. The inter-
ested reader may refer to page 291 of Appendix B to assess 
the validity of the writer's judgment. While the "other 
reasons" given were more specific and detailed, the majority 
of them were generally covered under reason number J. 
Therefore, the only significant change to Table XXII result-
ing from the "other reasons" was to increase the percentage 
of total respondents giving reason number 3 to 45.5%. 
b. Respondents by SSAC or SSEB 
As in question number 4, a comparison of the respond-
ents' answers to question number 5 by SSAC and SSEB member-
ship revealed no significant differences. The reader may 
verify this by the review of Table L of Appendix B. How-
ever, when the respondents'answers were analyzed and evalu-
ated relative to the experience level of respondents, in 
terms of years, a noticeable trend was found. As the expe-
rience level of the group increases, there is evidence that 
the respondents increasingly feel that no change is neces-
sary. Table XXIII shows the difference in the respondents' 
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statements when divided into groups by years experience. 
The numbers in Table XXIII are percentages of the respond-
ents in that experience level group. 
c. Respondents by Years Experience Level 
Dividing the respondents into groups by "years 
experience" did not change the order of relative importance 
of the reasons given to support the need for increased 
communication and interaction. That is to say, each expe-
rience level group gave reasons for increased communication/ 
interaction in the same order of relative importance as did 
the group of respondents taken as a whole. The six to 11 
year group appears to be more representative of the total 
group answers than the other two groups. 
TABLE' XXIII 
RESPONDENT ANSWER ON COMMUNICATION/INTERACTION 
BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Respondent Experience Level 
Answer 5 yrs or less ·6 to 10 yrs ·. 11 to 31 yrs 
(11 respondents) (16 respondents) (15 respondents) 
Should be 
increased 91 .. 5 87.5 60.0 
No change 
needed 7 .. 5 12 .. 5 33.3 
Should be 
decreased 0 0 6.7 
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d •. Summary of Findings on Question Number Five 
The following is a discussion of the major findings as 
a result of the analysis and evaluation of respondent an-
swers to question number 5 of the Source Selection 
questionnaire: 
(1) Communication and interaction between SSEB 
technical design and cost personnel should be 
increased so as to better integrate technical 
considerations into cost estimates and cost 
risks. 
(2) The major reasons that communication and inter-
action should be increased are listed below in 
the order of relative importance: 
(a) Cost data should reflect technical and 
other risks. 
(b) Technical design people could assist in 
improving cost models and programs. 
(c) Cost data does not adequately reflect 
design, material, and manufacturing 
processes. 
(J) Satisfaction with the current level of communi-
cation and interaction increases as the experi-
ence level (in years) of respondents increases. 
Evaluation of Minimum Documentation/Prototype 
Hardware Effects 
Question 2 of the Source Selection questionnaire is 
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addressed to the problem of assessing the effect that mini-
mum documentation has on the difficulty level of technical 
evaluation in the SSEB. Question 3 of the questionnaire is 
addressed to the problem of assessing the effect that proto-
type hardware development has on the difficulty level of 
technical evaluation in the SSEB. 
1. Evaluation of Question Number Two 
a. Respondents by Highest Functional Level 
In question number 2, the respondents were asked to 
state whether the PUD concept of minimum documentation 
causes the SSEB technical evaluation to be more, equally, or 
less difficult. Approximately JO% of the respondents did 
not attempt to answer this question, primarily because of 
unfamiliarity and inexperience with PUD and the so-called 
minimum documentation concept. Seventeen (J8.0%) of the 44 
respondents stated that technical evaluation was more diffi-
cult, eight (18.2%) stated that technical evaluation was 
equally difficult, and three (6.8%) stated that technical 
evaluation was less difficult. Table XXIV shows the break-
out of respondent answers by highest functional level. The 
Factor group was unanimous in stating that the technical 
evaluation was more difficult. In the SSAC group, 38.5% 
stated that the technical evaluation was more difficult, 
while another 38.5% stated that it was equally or less dif-
ficult. The Co-Chairman group was the only one in which the 
respondents stating that the technical evaluation was equally 
or less difficult out-numbered those stating that it was 
more difficult. 
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Applying the Experience Weighting Factors to Table XXIV 
strengthens the position that the application of the minimum 
documentation concept causes the SSEB technical evaluation 
to be more difficult. The results of applying The Experi-
ence Weighting Factors are shown in Table XXV. 
The respondents that stated that the technical evalua-
tion is equally or less difficult were essentially the same 
respondents that gave the following reasons to support these 
positions: 
(1) Technical data generally better in all respects. 
(2) Technical data not significantly influenced by 
minimum documentation. 
(J) Standards satisfactory. 
(4) Technical risks easier to identify and assess. 
The percentages of total respondents stating these answers 
are 4.5%, 6.8%, 9.1%, and 6.8%, respectively. 
The respondents who stated that the technical evalua-
tion was more difficult gave the reasons shown in Table XXVI 
to support their position. These reasons are listed in the 
order of their relative importance, determined by the fre-
quency that they were cited by the respondents. The "other 
reasons" given by the respondents are not included in Table 
XXVI. The Total Adjusted Score values do not change the 
order of relative importance of the reasons. Rather, they 
clearly establish the first two reasons as the most 
TABLE XXIV 
EFFECT OF MINIMUM DOCUMENTATION ON DIFFICULTY LEVEL 
Answer Total Highest Functional Level 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
(44) Chairman 
(13) (8) (12) (6) (4) ( 1) 
More difficult 17 5 2 3 2 4 1 
Equally difficult 8 3 1 4 0 0 0 
Less difficult 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 
TABLE XXV 
MINIMUM DOCUMENTATION VERSUS DIFFICULTY LEVEL-WEIGHTING FACTORS APPLIED 
Answer Total Adjusted Scores 
Adjusted SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Score Chairman 
More difficult 40.3 16. 3 2.4 6.3 3.7 10.6 100.0 
Equally difficult 18.1 9.8 1. 2 8.3 0 0 0 
Less difficult 8.4 6.5 0 0 1.9 0 0 ..... w 
0 
TABLE XXVI 
REASONS MINIMUM DOCUMENTATION RESULTS IN GREATER DIFFICULTY 
Reasons - Total Highest Functional Level 
ResEondents 
oz Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Adjusted Chairman 
Score 
1. Variance in the depth of tech-
nical data between proposals 36.4 38.7 38.5 37.5 25.0 16.7 100.0 
2. Technical risks harder to 
identify and assess 25.0 30.6 38.5 0 0 33.3 100.0 
3. Too much latitude allowed in 
Technical data requirements 18.2 19. 4 23.0 25.0 0 16. 7 50.0 
4. Standards too general and hard 
to apply 15.9 18.5 15.4 0 8.3 16.7 75.0 
5. Variance in data submitted 
formats between proposals 15.9 16 .1 15.4 25.0 0 16. 7 50.0 
6. Standards too detailed and 





significant ones, and indicate that reasons number J, 4, and 
5 are approximately equal in importance. 
Comparing the order of the reasons, given by highest 
functional level group, reveals that the SSAC group was 
again most representative of the respondents taken as a 
whole. The Co-Chairman group appears to be least represen-
tative of the total group, since the percentage of respond-
ents stating the reasons were relatively low or zero for all 
six reasons. It is noteworthy that the Factor group, which 
actually performs the detailed technical evaluation, is 
second to the SSAC in being most representative of the total 
respondents in terms of the order of reasons given. Perhaps 
more important, however, is the evidence that the Factor 
group had the highest percentage of respondents stating that 
the first five reasons in Table XXVI are significant in 
causing the technical evaluation to be more difficult. 
The "other reasons" given by respondents for question 2 
are summarized on page 266 of Appendix B. These comments 
were evaluated separately since it was necessary to use 
judgment in interpreting their meaning and intent,.and cate-
gorizing them into general problem areas. The "other 
reasons" that were given in support of stating that the 
technical evaluation is more difficult did not change the 
results of Table XXVI. There were, however, two important 
problem areas identified by this analysis. The first is the 
critical need to tailor the data required by the RFP to the 
desired level of technical evaluation. The second is the 
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need to establish evaluation and scoring criteria and proce-
dures which are tailored to the minimum documentation con-
cept. The majority of the significant "other reasons" given 
by all respondents are considered to fall within these two 
problem areas. The number of respondents who gave "other 
reasons" that could be classified under these problem areas 
are shown in Table XXVII. 
b. Respondents by SSAC or SSEB 
Comparing the answers by SSAC respondents to those by 
SSEB respondents revealed that members of the SSAC were more 
inclined to believe that the technical evaluation was 
equally or less difficult. Consistent with this was the 
finding that SSAC members were more inclined to state the 
reasons which support the position that the technical evalu-
ation is equally or less difficult. Table :X:XVIII shows the 
items associated with question 2 where the SSAC and SSEB 
respondents differed. The numbers are percentages of re-
spondents in each group which stated that answer. 
c. Respondents by Years Experience Level 
The respondent answers to question 2 were analyzed by 
the experience level of the respondents, in terms of years, 
in Table XXXVIII of Appendix B. The percentages of the 
three experience level groups stating that the technical 
evaluation is "more difficult" varied only 15%, with the 
middle group having the lowest percentage. The percentage 
TABLE XXVI:i 
PROBLEM AREAS ASSOCIATED WITH MINIMUM DOCUMENTATION 
Problem Area Total Highest Functional Level 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Chairman 
1. Need to tailor data required by 
RFP to desired level of technical 
evaluation 10 1 3 4 1 1 
2. Need to establish evaluation 
criteria and procedures tailored 
to the minimum documentation 





DIVERGENCE OF SSAC VERSUS SSEB ON QUESTION .1WO 
Answers SSAC 
Equally difficult 2J.O 
Less difficult 15.4 
Technical data not significantly influenced by PUD 15.4 
Standards satisfactory 15.4 











of respondents stating that the evaluation was equally dif-
ficult increased substantially as the experience level 
increased. On the other hand, the percentage of respondents 
stating that the evaluation was less difficult decreased 
noticeably as the experience level increased. As a result 
of the above, no trend was established that would differen-
tiate the pattern of respondent answers relative to years 
experience. With regards to the order of relative impor-
tance of the reasons given by the three groups, the least 
experienced group was least representative and the other two 
groups very representative of the total respondent group. 
Over-all, the answers by the most experienced group were 
most representative of the total respondent group. 
d. Summary of Findings on Question Number Two 
The following is a brief discussion of the major find-
ings resulting from the analysis and evaluation of question 
number 2: 
(1) The SSEB technical evaluation is more difficult 
when the minimum documentation concept of the 
current DoD management philosophy is applied. 
Although 30% of the respondents were not 
familiar with the minimum documentation con-
cept, a large majority of the respondents an-
swering question 2 felt that the technical 
evaluation was more difficult. 
(2) The major reasons that the technical evaluation 
is more difficult are listed below in the order 
of relative importance: 
(a) Variance in the depth of technical data 
between proposals 
(b) Technical risks harder to identify and 
assess 
(c) Too much latitude allowed in technical 
data requirements 
(d) Standards too general and hard to apply 
(e) Variance in data submittal formats be-
tween proposals. 
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(J) Two major needs exist relative to the SSEB tech-
nical evaluation when using the minimum documen-
tation concept: 
(a) The data required by the RFP must be care-
fully tailored to the desired level of 
technical evaluation. 
(b) Evaluation criteria and procedures should 
be tailored to the minimum documentation 
concept. 
(4) SSAC respondents are more representative of the 
total group of respondents than any other func-
tional level group. 
(5) The Factor group was by far the most consistent 
group in stating that the technical evaluation 
was more difficult and in stating the five 
major reasons listed in (2) above. 
(6) When compared by SSAC and SSEB groups, the 
SSAC group tends to be more inclined to feel 
that the technical evaluation is equally or 
less difficult than does the SSEB group. 
(7) The application of Experience Weighting Fac-
tors tends to strengthen the findings in (1) 
and (2) above. 
2. Evaluation of Question Number Three 
a. Respondents by Highest Functional Level 
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In question 3, the respondents were asked if the SSEB 
technical evaluation was more, equally, or less difficult 
when proposals are responsive to a prototype hardware 
developmental program. Only 11% of the total respondents 
gave no response to question J, compared to JO% to question 
2. Approximately 57% of the total respondents stated that 
technical evaluation is more difficult. Approximately 32% 
of the total respondents were equally divided in stating 
that the technical evaluation is equally and less difficult. 
Table XXIX shows the break-out of respondent answers by 
highest functional level. The SSAC group had a substantially 
higher percentage of respondents stating "more difficult", 
than the combined percentages of those stating "equally 
difficult" and "less difficult". At the working level, the 
Factor group respondents were equally divided between "more 










EFFECT OF PROTOTYPE HARDWARE ON DIFFICULTY LEVEL 
Total Highest Functional Level 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Chairman 
44 (13) (8) (12) (6) 
25 9 5 6 J 
7 1 1 2 2 
7 2 2 2 0 
TABLE XXX 
PROTOTYPE HARDWARE VERSUS DIFFICULTY LEVEL -
WEIGHTING FACTORS APPLIED 
Total Adjusted Scores 
Adjusted SSAC Chairman Co-
Score Chairman 
58.8 29.4 6.1 12.5 
15.1 J.J 1. 2 4.2 
















2.7 ... ......., 
_2_._Z '° 
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Applying the experience weighting factors to Table XXIX 
strengthens the position that the SSEB technical evaluation 
is more difficult with prototype hardware. The results of 
applying the experience weighting factors are shown in 
Table XXX. 
The respondents that stated that the technical evalua-
tion is equally or less difficult were essentially the same 
respondents that gave the following reasons to support these 
positions: 
(1) Data requirements and review are the same 
(2) Less data review is required for hardware 
proposals 
(J) Level of evaluation effort less with hardware 
(4) Level of evaluation effort the same 
(5) Emphasis on technical risks the same. 
The percentages of total respondents stating these answers 
are 9.1%, 6.8%, 4.5%, 9.1%, and 4.5%, respectively. 
The respondents that stated that the technical evalua-
tion was more difficult gave the reasons shown in Table XXXI 
to support their position. These reasons are listed in the 
order of their relative importance, determined by the fre-
quency that they were cited by the respondents. The "other 
reasons" given by respondents are not included in Table 
XXXI. While there is a 10 point spread in the Total Ad-
justed score values, all three reasons are considered to be 
factors causing greater difficulty in the technical evalua-
tion. The SSAC, Item, and Factor groups had the highest 
TABLE XXXI 
REASONS PROTOTYPE HARDWARE RESULTS IN GREATER DIFFICULTY 
Reasons Total Highest Functional Level 
ResEondents 
% Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Adjusted Chairman 
Score % % % % % 
1. More emphasis on technical risk 
with hardware 54.5 49.3 53.8 25.0 41.6 66.6 50.0 
2. Level of evaluation effort 
always greater with hardware 43.2 47.7 61. 5 25.0 33.3 50.0 50.0 
3. It is necessary to obtain and 
review more data 31.8 39.8 53.8 12.5 8.4 66.6 25.0 
........ 
i+='" ..... 
percentages of respondents which stated these three reasons. 
The "other reasons" given by respondents for question J 
are summarized on page 276 of Appendix B. These comments 
were evaluated separately since it was necessary to use 
judgment in interpreting their meaning and intent, and cate-
gorizing them into general problem areas. The "other 
reasons" that were given in support of stating that the 
technical evaluation caused the order of reason number 1 and 
2 of Table XXXI to be reversed. Generally, the "other 
reasons" given tended to strengthen the reasons in Table 
XXXI as being the primary factors causing the technical 
evaluation to be more difficult. 
b. Respondents by SSAC or SSEB 
Comparing the answers by SSAC respondents to those by 
SSEB respondents revealed that,the SSAC members were more 
inclined to state that the technical evaluation was more 
difficult and less inclined to state that it was equally 
difficult. Likewise, the SSAC respondents were more in-
clined to specify the three major reasons supporting a "more 
difficult" position. 
c. Respondents by Years Experience Level 
The respondent answers to question J were analyzed by 
the experience level o: the respondents, in terms of years, 
in Table XLII of Appendix B. No significant differences were 
noted in the way the three groups answered question number). 
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d. Summary of Findings on Question Number Three 
The following is a brief discussion of the major find-
ings resulting from the analysis and evaluation of question 
J: 
(1) The SSEB technical evaluation is more difficult 
when prototype hardware development is 
involved. 
(2) The major reasons that the technical evaluation 
is more difficult are listed below. All three 
reasons are considered equally important. 
(a) Level of evaluation effort always greater 
with hardware 
(b) More emphasis on technical risk with 
hardware 
(c) It is necessary to obtain and review 
more data. 
(J) The SSAC, more than any other functional level 
group, was strongly inclined to believe'that 
the technical evaluation was more difficult. 
Combined Effects 
In this section, the combined effects of the major 
findings in this chapter will be discussed. In the SSEB 
process, the technical evaluation, risk assessment, and 
scoring of a contractor proposal are not, and cannot be 
unrelated and independent activities. In performing the 
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detailed technical evaluation, the Factor member carefully 
studies the contractors technical data and compares it with 
the established evaluation criteria. During this process, 
the evaluator may discover several problem areas of a minor 
or major nature, some of which he may classify as risks. 
Since there is no established procedures or methods for 
quanitatively assessing the impact of risks, the evaluator 
must include his assessment of the risks in the narrative of 
his technical evaluation report. Based upon this technical 
evaluation report, the Factor evaluator rates the proposal 
in accordance with the present scoring procedures. 
1. Factor Level 
When the SSEB involves a program to which the current 
DoD management concepts for prototype hardware and minimum 
documentation are applied, the Factor evaluator is con-
fronted with the following situations (the reader will find 
it helpful to refer to Figure 17 while reading the following 
paragraphs). The technical evaluation is more difficult 
with prototype hardware since the level of evaluation ef-
fort is greater, and it is necessary to obtain and review 
more technical data. In addition, there is more emphasis on 
risks with prototype hardware since the consequences of 
failure are greater when hardware is involved. The minimum 
documentation concept compounds the difficulty of the tech-
nical evaluation due to excessive latitude in data require-
ments specified in the RFP. This results in variance in the 
Question 2· -
Minimum Documentation makes SSEB technical evalua-
tion more difficult because: 
1. Variance in depth of technical data between 
proposals 
2. Technical risks harder to identify and 
assess 
J. Too much latitude allowed in technical 
data requirements 
~. Standards too general and hard to apply 
5. Variance in data formats between proposals. 
Data required by RFP must be tailored to desired 
level of technical evaluation. 
Evaluation criteria and procedures should be 
tailored to management concepts. 
SSAC group most representative of total respondents 
Factor group most convinced that technical evaluation 
more difficult. 
Question 3 -
Prototype hardware development makes SSEB technical 
evaluation more difficult because: 
1. Level of evaluation effort always 
greater with hardware 
2. More emphasis on technical risks with 
hardware proposals 
J. It is necessary to obtain and review 
more data. 
SSAC group most convinced that technical evaluation 
more difficult. 
Question~ -
The SSEB scoring process at the factor and item 
level should be modified because: 
1. Present system tends to force scores 
toward average 
2. More definitive ranking/scoring of pro-
posals needed at factor level 
J. F.mphasis should be placed upon factor and 
item evaluators to rarik proposals against 
each other as well as against standards 
~. Scoring and weighting should be accom-
plished at the factor and item levels con-
sistent with the primary objectives/ 
requirements of the weapon system 
5. Technical risks too difficult to integrate 
into score 
6. Present system tends to compromise the 
motivation for professional excellence in 
the evaluator 
7. Upward flow of evaluation information 
constrained 
SSAC group most representative of total respondents. 
Co-Chairman group least representative of total 
respondents. 
Satisfaction with current system increases with 
years experience. 
SSAC and SSEB, as groups, answer similarly. 
Factor group most convinced system compromises 
professionalism in evaluators. 





Communication/interaction between technical and cost 
should be increased because: 
1. Cost data should reflect technical 
and other risks 
2. Technical design people could assist 
in improving cost models and programs 
J. Cost data does not adequately reflect 
design, materials, and manufacturing 
processes 
Satisfaction with present communication/interaction 
increases with years experience level. 
Question 7 -
Influence and effects of CI upon: 
1. Technical Evaluation 
a. Insures better evaluation through 
clarification of data 
b. Essential to insure equitable and 
accurate evaluation 
c. Creates excessive delays 
d. Use should be sharply reduced or 
eliminated 
2. Risk Assessment 
a. Assists in identifying and assessing 
risks 




A slight majority indicated that the CI 
effects scoring by: 
a. Improving accuracy of scores 
b. Leading to inequities in favor 
of contractor in question 
1. Technical Evaluation 
a. Essential to insure equitable and 
accurate evaluation 
b. Essential to assist in contract 
negotiations 
c. Leads to inequities in favor of 
contractor in question 
d. Creates excessive delays 
2. Risk Assessment 
a. Assists in identifying and assessing 
risks 
b. ·Tends to reduce risks 
J. Scoring 
The respondents were approximately equally 
divided between saying the DR has "no. 
effects" and that it has "some effects". 
Those stating the DR has some effects 
stated: 
a. Improves accuracy of scores 
b. Leads to inequities in favor of 
contractor in question 






depth and format of the technical data submitted in con-
tractor proposals. In addition, minimum documentation makes 
risks harder to identify and assess. 
too general and hard to apply. 
Also, standards are 
In order to obtain clarification of the contractor data, 
the Factor evaluator uses the CI and DR to insure an equit-
able and accurate evaluation. 1his creates excessive delays 
in the technical evaluation process, but also assists in 
identifying, assessing, and reducing risks. Next, the Fac-
tor evaluator rates the proposal using the original data 
submitted by the contractor, since existing policy does not 
allow supplemental data provided in the CI/DR responses to 
influence the SSEB proposal rating or scores. The rating 
system used by the factor evaluator tends to force proposal 
scores to an average value. This, in turn, has a tendency, 
according to factor evaluators, to compromise the motivation 
for professional excellence in the evaluator. 
2. Item Level 
When the factor evaluators have completed the rating of 
a proposal, the Item Captain evaluates the narrative write-
ups, reviews the CI 1and DR responses and prepares an Item 
summary report, which includes narrative assessment of the 
risks. Next, the Item Captain scores the proposal using the 
Factor ratings and narrative write-ups. The score should be 
based upon original data as submitted by the contractor; 
therefore, the CI and DR responses should not affect the 
score. However, policy states that, 
••• evaluation report narratives will include, and 
the scores will reflect, whether the evaluator con-
siders the deficiency as an overlooked detail, 
easily correctable, or whether the required correc-
tion involves lengthened schedules, high risks, or 
cost changes (15, p. 12). 
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As best can be determined, the CI and DR are essential 
to insure an accurate and equitable SSEB technical evalua-
tion, assist in identifying, assessing, and reducing risk, 
and actually affect the SSEB scores about 50% of the time. 
When the score is affected by the CI/DR, the result may be 
improved accuracy, inequities in favor of the contractor in 
question, or a higher probability of a low score. '!be un-
certainty related to how the CI/DR affects the score is 
quite significant, as will be discussed later. 
The official scoring system used by Item Captains tends 
to force the proposal scores toward an average value, and it 
is too difficult to integrate technical risks into the 
score. 
J. Contract Negotiations 
The Contract Definition team uses the DR's to identify 
major problem areas, actual or potential, and insures that 
these problems are satisfactorily considered in negotiations 
for a definitive contract. 
4. Cost to the Government 
'!be Cost team evaluates the cost data submitted by the 
contractor and prepares a summary r~port of its findings. 
The cost data does not adequately reflect technical and 
other risks, nor does it adequately reflect the technical 
design, material and manufacturing processes. 
5. SSAC Level 
The SSAC uses the SSEB detailed evaluation report, sum-
mary of DR 1 s, cost report, and definitive contract to ana-
lyze and evaluate each proposal. Weighting factors are 
applied to the raw scores in the SSEB evaluation report to 
obtain converted raw scores, which introduce a measure of 
relative importance to each item. Next, the SSAC is faced 
with the extremely difficult task of determining how the DR 
responses should influence the over-all assessment of the 
converted raw scores. The SSEB raw scores, to which the 
weighting factors are applied, may or may not have been af-
fected by the CI/DR responses. This tends to make the SSEB 
raw scores of limited use to the SSAC in determining the 
influence and effects of the DR responses on the over-all 
evaluation. Furthermore, unless it is assumed that there 
was complete standardization relative to the CI/DR effects 
on the SSEB raw scores of all contractors, the usefulness of 
the "converted raw scores" to compare contractor proposals 
becomes limited. While at first, this may seem to be area-
sonable assumption, there is a wide variance in the way 
Source Selection officials view the effects of the CI/DR on 
the SSEB scoring. The above may, at least in part, explain 
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the reason t hat the selection of a contractor is frequently 
forced into a cost decision. 
CHAPTER VII 
THREE RELATED PROBLEMS 
The major findings of the Source Selection Question-
naire identified three important and related problems asso-
ciated with the Source Selection process. The three problem 
areas are SSEB technical evaluation, risk assessment, and 
scoring of contractor proposals. The purpose of this chap-
ter is to discuss the nature of each problem area and how 
each is related to the others. In addition, the purpose of 
the chapter is to show that effective corrective actions 
for these problem areas are interdependent. The problem 
areas are discussed separately, but the interrelationships 
between the problems and the interdependence of required 
corrective actions are emphasized. 
Technical Evaluation 
The minimum documentation and prototype hardware devel-
opment concepts of the present DoD management philosophy 
appear to have compounding effects on the difficult level of 
the SSEB technical evaluation. For example, prototype hard-
ware makes it necessary to obtain and review more data, 
while minimum documentation tends to allow too much latitude 
in technical data requirements. Prototype hardware 
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development requires a greater level of technical evaluation 
effort, while minimum documentation creates a variance in 
the depth and format of proposal data. Prototype hardware 
development places more emphasis on technical risks, while 
minimum documentation makes technical risks harder to iden-
tify and assess. While these rather contradictory results 
do not create an impasse, they make it very clear that the 
RFP requirements for data must be carefully tailored to the 
level of technical evaluation required and desired. It is 
certainly not the intent of the minimum documentation con-
cept to limit or restrict data that is needed and used in 
the Source Selection decision process. It is the intent of 
minimum documentation to require selectivity in stating re-
quirements for data. While it has been well recognized that 
the quality of source selection actions depend largely upon 
the quality of the RFP, the minimum documentation· and proto-
type hardware concepts make the RFP document more crucial 
than ever before. In large measure, the success of the cur-
rent DoD management philosophy is dependent upon immediate 
recognition of the need to more closely tailor the RFP to 
specific program needs and the management/contract approach 
employed. 
The final report of the Air Force RFP Study Team pro-
vides key recommendations for improving the RFP. While the 
study tends to focus on the three-phase Contract Definition 
approach to Source Selection, its conclusions and recommen-. 
dations are generally consistent with the current DoD 
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management philosophy for minimum documentation and proto-
type hardware development. The impact of the problems asso-
ciated with the SSEB technical evaluation which result from 
minimum documentation and prototype hardware can be sub-
stantially reduced by implementing the following recommenda-
tions paraphrased from this RFP study: 
(1) Develop a Request for Proposal Manual to 
consolidate and clarify the instructions for 
preparing an RFP that are contained in approx-
imately 38 different documents. 
(2) Revise the existing regulatory material to 
eliminate the mandatory requirement for sub-
mission of various 11 ility11 plans, and to 
allow the RFP to require data only in those 
areas which are pertinent to the Source Selec-
tion and definitive contract for a specific 
program. 
(J} Require that the RFP include detailed evalua-
tion criteria organized into areas, items, 
and factors along with a narrative definition 
which will identify matters of major signifi-
cance in the order of relative importance. 
(4) Require that the RFP specify that the use of 
cross-indexing of proposal parts to evalua-
tion criteria. 
(5) Require that technical proposal formats and 
guidance as to their use be included in the 
RFP (22, pp. 7-26). 
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The first two recommendations, if implemented, should 
result in vast improvements in the over-all quality of RFPs. 
Specifically, it could eliminate fragmented, inadequate, and 
duplicated instructions which often result in a "shot gun" 
approach to specifying data requirements in the RFP, which 
in turn causes the generation of considerable proposal data 
which is unnecessary. In addition, it would authorize the 
SPO to be selective in requiring data associated with 
approximately 50 "ilities", such as Reliability, Maintain-
ability, Configuration Management, Maintenance, Supply, etc. 
This could result in meeting the intent of the Minimum 
Documentation Concept, and at the same time focus more 
attention on the specific technical data requirements neces-
sary to satisfy program objectives and accomplish the SSEB 
technical evaluation. This should reduce the problems of 
too much latitude in data requirements, and variance in the 
depth of technical data in proposals. In short, it would 
allow more emphasis on tailoring the data requirements to 
the particular program objectives, and result in proposal 
data more consistent with the level of technical evaluation 
desired and required. 
Implementation of the third recommendation would gen-
erally enhance the effectiveness of the over-all technical 
evaluation. In addition, it would substantially assist the 
SSEB evaluators in identifying and assessing risks related 
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to the most important aspects of the weapon system objec-
tives. The intent of this recommendation appears to require 
that the RFP specifically include a narrative description of 
detailed evaluation criteria down to the factor level, and 
that the relative importance of these factor level evalua-
tion criteria be specified. Implementation of this recom-
mendation would tend to force greater emphasis on 
establishing evaluation criteria and would most likely 
result in more responsive and satisfactory proposal data. 
With detailed evaluation criteria, more responsive proposal 
data, and relative orders of importance, the difficulty of 
identifying and assessing risks should be reduced. Further-
more, the effectiveness of the over-all technical evaluation 
should increase. 
Implementation of the fourth and fifth recommendation 
would significantly reduce or eliminate the variance in pro-
posal data formats and result in more timely and accurate 
technical evaluations. 
The problems of the SSEB technical evaluation relative 
to the minimum documentation and prototype hardware concepts 
make it extremely important that the above recommendation by 
the Air Force RFP Study Team be implemented. It will be 
shown later in this chapter that recommendation number three 
above is also vital to an :improved SSEB scoring system. 
Risk Identification and Assessment 
SSEB risk identification and assessment is perhaps the 
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most difficult and nebulous activity in the Source Selection 
process. 'nlere are no official criteria established to help 
determine what actually constitutes a risk, and what the 
differences are, if any, between a "risk!' and a "weakness". 
Furthermore, there are no established procedures for quanti-
tatively assessing the impact of a risk once it has been 
identified. 'nle layman, in reading the regulatory and pro-
cedural material relating to Source Selection, may be con-
vinced that risk analysis anp assessment in the SSEB/SSAC is 
a separate and perhaps rigorous quantitative process. 'nlose 
familiar with the Source Selection activity know that this 
is not the case. Moreover, they realize that some of the 
complex interactions of multiple program variables, the time 
dependent nature of unanticipated unknowns relative to hard-
ware integration and testing, and the many intangible 
aspects that are simply unquantifiable make it impossible to 
be precise in assessing the total program risks either qual-
itatively or quantitatively, particularly when the source 
selection action occurs. This is not to imply that SSEB and 
SSAC members do not identify and assess the impact of actual 
risks associated with contractor proposals. Nor does it 
imply that evaluators do not recognize the need for identi~ 
fying and assessing the impact of program risks. It simply 
says that while improvem~nts are needed in the Source Selec-
tion process to identify and quantitatively assess techno-
' logical, schedule, and cost risks, it is unrealistic to 
expect that all program risks can be anticipated, identifie~ 
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and precisely quantified. 
The major findings of the Source Selection question-
naire confirm that risk analysis and assessment is a major 
concern of evaluators. Minimum documentation makes the 
technical evaluation more difficult because technical risks 
are harder to identify and assess. Prototype hardware de-
velopment makes the technical evaluation more difficult 
because more emphasis is placed upon technical risks. The 
interaction between cost and technical personnel should be 
increased because cost data should reflect technical and 
other risks. The CI/DR responses assist in identifying and 
assessing risks, and also tend to reduce risk. The present 
rating/scoring system should be modified because technical 
risks are too difficult to integrate into the score. These 
findings indicate that SSEB/SSAC evaluators consider risk 
analysis and assessment to be an integral part of the Source 
Selection evaluation and scoring process (referred to in 
Chapter VI). 
Air Force Manual 70-10 requires that technical areas 
should be initially evaluated without reference to associ-
ated costs, but that high risk areas must be made known to 
the appropriate teams so that cost impact can be properly 
evaluated. Cost risk should be assessed to determine the 
probability of future cost variances on proposals with high 
technical risk. Air Force Manual 70-10 also requires that 
the SSEB narrative and scores reflect whether the evaluator 
considers proposal deficiencies to be easily correctible, or 
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whether the required correction involves lengthened sched-
ules, high risk, or cost changes. The manual further 
requires that the SSEB evaluation will assess the probabil-
ity of success of each proposal (15, pp. 10-16). It is 
interesting to µote that the only mention of risk in the Air 
Force RFP study was the finding that, "··· the greatest risk 
areas should be weighted the heaviest". This was identified 
as an essential factor in the Source Selection process 
through interviews with key source selection officials (22, 
p. II-J). 
The ASD guide for preparing the SSAC and SSA briefings 
recommends that the strengths, weaknesses, and risks for 
each item be presented (20, p. 2J8). Because of the time 
element, the SSEB must be continually pointing toward the 
SSAC briefing as the evaluation proceeds. It is, therefore, 
expedient to tailor the factor, item, and area write-ups to 
be compatible with the SSAC briefing format. Thus, the fac-
tor narratives and summaries attempt to identify and evalu-
ate the proposal strengths, weaknesses, and risks. Since 
the procedural mechanics are simply not geared to permit an 
integrated process of identifying and quantitatively assess-
ing and scoring risks in the SSEB, the SSAC must rely upon 
narrative discussions, value judgments, experience, and 
over-all knowledge to assess the importance of the risks 
identified. There is no question in the writer's mind that 
the SSEB and SSAC do, in fact, identify and assess the great 
majority of high risk problem areas associated with 
159 
contractor proposals. The writer is equally confident that 
a systematic approach to quantify and assess the probabili-
ties of success, impacts on schedule and costs, and impacts 
on performance requirements of high risk problem areas would 
assist the SSAC in its analysis and evaluation. Perhaps the 
greatest value of a quantitative risk assessment capability 
would be a measure of smaller, but cumulatively important, 
problem areas where there is some degree of uncertainty 
involved. 
Effective risk assessment in the SSEB process is de-
pendent upon knowledge and understanding of the critical 
program requirements, proposal data that is responsive to 
critical program requirements, and procedures which define 
the purpose, scope, and approach of the risk assessment 
activity. In addition, the risk assessment activity must be 
integrated into the established evaluation and scoring proc-
ess since risks are an integral part of the technical, 
schedule, and cost problems. 
SSEB Scoring System 
The third major problem area is the inadequacy of the 
present SSEB scoring system. As mentioned above, technical 
risk is too difficult to integrate into the score. In addi-
tion, the present rating/scoring system tends to cause the 
proposal scores to be clustered in a narrow range about the 
average value. The most likely reason for this is the fact 
that the Factor member, who performs the most detailed 
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evaluation, has only three symbols available for rating the 
proposal - one to indicate an above average, average, and 
below average rating. The ASD Source Selection Process 
Manual states that this approach is used because in previous 
SSEB 1 s the quantitative assessments at the Factor level were 
additively reflected as the Item score, and that this proc-
ess tended to obscure serious deficiencies and/or decided 
assets in the proposal (20, p. 176). Air Force Manual 70-10 
explains the same thing by saying that if the 10 points 
normally assigned to each item are prorated among the fac-
tors, the impact of each factor on the item as a whole will 
depend largely upon the number of factors involved - and 
failure of one of these factors to meet the standard may be 
overlooked when the item score is mathematically derived 
(15, p. 17). While the present rating/scoring system may 
solve the previous problem, it creates a new one just as 
serious by prohibiting adequate discrimination in the 
assessment of the proposals. 
Present policy requires the SSAC to establish weighting 
criteria and apply weights to the Areas and Items scored 
(15, p. 12). Since ASD does not score areas, the SSAC es-
tablishes and applies weights to Items, the only functional 
level receiving a score. Special precautions are taken to 
insure that the SSEB members are not made privy to the 
weighting criteria (20, pp. 184-188). The entire scoring 
system is, therefore, designed for a possible 10 point score 
for each SSEB item so as to be compatible with the 
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application of the established weighting criteria by the 
SSAC. Any procedure for quantitative scoring below the item 
level must, therefore, be compatible and consistent with the 
over-all item scoring and SSAC weighting process. Since the 
previous attempts to quantitatively score proposals at the 
factor level were apparently not compatible and consistent 
with the over-all scoring/weighting process, the three-
symbol factor rating system was developed to eliminate fac-
tor scoring. In the following paragraphs, the writer will 
attempt to show that it is primarily the current policy for 
weighting and scoring that constrains the effectiveness of 
the source selection scoring process. 
As mentioned earlier, the Air Force RFP Study Team 
recommended that the RFP include evaluation criteria organ-
ized into areas, items,and factors along with a narrative 
definition which will identify matters of major significance 
in the order of relative importance. In addition, the RFP 
Study Team recommended that: 
(1) Detailed scoring standards be included in 
the RFP. 
(2) Existing directives should be revised to allow 
re-scoring of proposals after correction of 
deficiencies in the absence of technical 
transfusion (22, pp. 17, 41). 
All of the above recommendations are contrary to cur-
rent policy and/or practices. At the same time, they are 
considered by the writer to be the key actions required to 
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develop and implement an improved SSEB scoring system. The 
first two recommendations by the RFP Study Team have at 
least two major effects. The first is that it would tend to 
improve the responsiveness of proposal data to the critical 
needs of the program, thereby enhancing the effectiveness of 
the evaluation and scoring process. The second is that it 
would require greater continuity between the RFP, Evaluation 
Criteria, and Weighting Criteria. This should result in a 
much improved evaluation and scoring plan. Inclusion of 
significant matters of relative importance at the factor 
level should result in the establishment of weighting cri-
teria at the factor, instead of item level. Weighting cri-
teria at both levels would result in distortion of the 
scores, and weighting the factor level is a vital key to an 
improved scoring system as will be shown later. Presently, 
the SSAC establishes the weighting criteria for items after 
the RFP has been written, distributed, and while the compa-
nies are preparing proposals for submittal (20, p. 43). The 
third recommendation by the RFP Study Team calls for re-
scoring proposals after evaluating the CI/DR responses. The 
scoring system could be designed to effectively accomplish 
this, and the gross uncertainty surrounding the effects of 
the CI/DR on scoring dictates that some significant changes 
are in order to resolve this problem area. 
The major findings of the source selection question-
naire revealed strong support for modifying the present 
scoring system so that: 
(1) More definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
is accomplished at the factor level. 
(2) Emphasis be placed upon factor and item 
evaluators to rank proposals against each 
other as well as against standards. 
(J) Scoring and weighting can be accomplished at 
the factor and item level consistent with 
the primary objectives/requirements of the 
weapon system. 
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All of these suggestions for modifying the present scoring 
system would requir·e changes that are contrary to existing 
source selection policy. Policy prohibiting scoring at the 
factor level was discussed previously, as was the policy 
limiting the application of weighting criteria to item 
levels as strictly an SSAC function. Policy also prohibits 
that proposals be evaluated against one another (15, p. 10). 
Thus, suggestion number 2 above also conflicts with present 
policy. 
The suggestions for modifying the present scoring sys-
tem resulting from the Source Selection Questionnaire are 
consistent with the RFP Study recommendations and are con-
sidered to be essential to allow development and effective 
implementation of an improved scoring system. In order to 
achieve more definitive scoring at the factor level, where 
the most detailed evaluation occurs, the scoring system must 
focus on that functional level. The key to focusing the 
scoring system at the factor level is to establish weighting 
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criteria for that level. Having established the weighting 
criteria at the factor level, and specifying in the RFP the 
matters of major significance in order of relative impor-
tance, the framework would exist for applying the weighting 
criteria at the factor or item level. In addition, basing a 
more definitive SSEB scoring system at the factor level 
would facilitate the integration of technical risk scoring 
into the over-all process where the technical expertise is 
greatest. 'Ihe item evaluators could be used to validate the 
basic scores, assess the probability estimates associated 
with areas of risk, assess the impact of interaction between 
factors, eliminate redundancies, and consolidate the pro-
posal score. 'Ihe area Co-Chairman could provide the same 
overview and consolidation as they presently do, and be 
responsible for rescoring the proposal based upon the CI/DR 
responses. Ranking of proposals per se would essentially be 
accomplished by a more definitive scoring system at the fac-
tor level. 
Conclusions 
Implementation of the Air Force RFP Study Team recom-
mendations discussed in this chapter are considered essen-
tial to improved contractor proposals and more effective 
source selection evaluation and scoring. Of equal impor-
tance is the need to develop and implement an improved 
capability within the Source Selection process to quantita-
tively assess the adequacy of contractor proposals. The key 
to developing and successfully implementing a more effective 
scoring system is the establishment of weighting criteria at 
the factor level. 'Ibis would permit a definitive scoring 
process at the functional level where the detailed technical 
evaluation occurs. If standards and the relative importance 
of significant matters at the factor level are included in 
the RFP, it would be logical to have the weighting criteria 
applied at the factor or item level. Basing the definitive 
scoring system at the factor level would better facilitate 
the integration of risk consideration into the scoring proc-
ess. 'Ibese conclusions are the basis for the integrated 
risk assessment and scoring model and procedural methodology 
developed in Chapter VIII. 
CHAPTER VIII 
INTEGRATED RISK ASSESSMENT/SCORING MODEL 
Introduction 
1be purpose of this chapter is to present a model and 
procedural methodology to quantitatively integrate the risk 
assessment and scoring processes in the SSEB. 1be model and 
methodology are tailored to source selection actions for 
major weapon systems within ASD. 1be over-all process de-
veloped here is generally tailored to the single-phase 
source selection activity associated with the current DoD 
management concepts of minimum documentation and parallel 
prototype development. However, the process is designed to 
be compatible with the three-phase Contract Definition ap-
proach to programming through the Program Decision/ 
Validation Phase of the R & D cycle. 1be writer attempted 
to develop the model and methodology to be consistent with 
the current Air Force emphasis to improve Conceptual Phase 
planning and documentation up through and including the RFP. 
In addition, every effort was made to design a process 
adaptable to the approaches which this writer considers to 
be the most promising for risk assessment in the Conceptual 
Phase. Two very promising approaches for risk assessment in 
the Conceptual Phase are the works of Rogers (23) and 
Tillman (24). 
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Any evaluation and scoring system used in the SSEB must 
be flexible enough to al.low close tailoring to the specific 
requirements and primary objectives of the weapon system 
described in the RFP. On the other hand, the evaluation and 
scoring system must be somewhat standardized to insure that 
evaluators can maintain a basic familiarity with the process 
used so as to assure timely, equitable, and accurate assess-
ments of proposals. '!be activity which attempts to comple-
ment both the flexibility and familiarity conditions is the 
establishment of.the Evaluation and Weighting Criteria. 
'Ibese criteria serve as a mechanism to link the RFP to the 
SSEB evaluation and scoring system and allow evaluators to 
synthesize the various aspects of a program into a narrative 
and quantitative basis to assist the Source Selection deci-
sion makers. 
In addition to being flexible and familiar, the SSEB 
evaluation and scoring system should be designed to obtain 
maximum utilization and benefit from the detailed evaluation 
effort at the factor level. '!bat is, the narrative and 
quantitative assessments at the factor level should be such 
that the maximum amount of definitive information relative 
to the proposals is presented in a clear and concise manner. 
To the extent possible and practical, the scoring system 
should provide an integrated quantitative assessment of a 
proposal's strengths, weaknesses, and risks. It is in this 
particular area that the present SSEB scoring "!system is 
inadequate. 
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The basic philosophy of an integrated risk assessment 
and scoring model is that uncertainty is inherent in devel-
opmental programs and that proposal scores should reflect, 
to the degree possible, an assessment of that uncertainty. 
Tiie SSEB detailed evaluation of a proposal may identify 
many strengths and weaknesses that vary, in terms of impact 
on the program, from minor to major importance. Likewise, 
the probability of success or failure resulting from these 
particular strengths and weaknesses may vary from near 100% 
to near zero. Risk to the program associated with a pro-
posal must, therefore, be measured in terms of the actual 
or expected impact of both strengths and weaknesses, and the 
likelihood or probability of success or failure. In order 
to obtain a quantitative measure of the cumulative effects 
of the potential strengths and weaknesses of a proposal, it 
is essential that the risk analysis effort be integrated 
into the over-all scoring process. If this is not done, the 
factor and item evaluators cannot effectively synthesize the 
extremely large volwne of evaluation data. Moreover, unless 
the detailed evaluation and analysis work of the factor and 
item evaluators is reflected in a definitive and quantita-
tive presentation, the SSAC is not able to effectively bene-
fit from the work accomplished. The basic approach used in 
developing the model and methodology in this chapter is 
based upon the major findings and conclusions in the pre-
vious chapters of this study. 
Critique of Initial Risk Model 
The initial risk model developed in Chapter V proved to 
be a basically sound approach for assessing the technologi-
cal and operational weaknesses in a proposal that were con-
sidered to be risk elements. The approach insured that all 
risk elements, large and small, were considered in arriving 
at a total risk assessment. However, since the model was 
not integrated into the SSEB process, it was necessary for 
the writer to determine what was to be identified as a risk 
element and what was not. This obvious weakness in the 
model was overcome by including as risk elements essentially 
all the "weaknesses" and "risks" identified in factor narra-
tives. The output of the model tended to support the propo-
sition that such an approach will result in a definitive 
quantitative assessment of the proposal's relative techno-
logical merits. Since the assessment of proposal strengths 
was not included in the initial risk model, it may appear 
that assessing proposal weaknesses alone will adequately 
identify the most satisfactory proposal(s). Such a conclu-
sion is considered to be invalid, but it does appear that 
the weaknesses of a proposal will tend to have a greater 
impact on the over-all score than will the strengths of a 
proposal. 
A significant weakness of the initial risk model was 
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the fact that for each risk element, the characteristics A 
and B (the "nature" and "corrective actions required" for 
the risk element) were assessed by one person, the writer. 
While this undoubtedly tended to weaken the credibility of 
the assessment for this program, the results of the effort 
should support the credibility of the approach taken in the 
initial risk model. The assessments of characteristics A 
and B were accomplished by reading the complete factor nar-
ratives, which indicates that the basic information is there 
if some system were employed to extract and quantitatively 
synthesize it. 
The method used to relate the impact of the risk ele-
ments (weaknesses and risks) to the primary operational ob-
jectives of the weapon system was effective but far from 
optimum. This was, in effect, a form of weighting the im-
portance of factors to the over-all program or system 
objectives. The only thing wrong with this approach is that 
it should be integrated into the total process. That is, 
the SSAC should actually accomplish this in the form of 
weighting criteria at the factor level. The important thing 
to recognize is that the approach used in the initial risk 
model proved that it is both feasible and effective to 
relate risk elements, identified at the factor level, to the 
primary system objectives by weighting criteria at the fac-
tor level. 
The method used to determine redundant risk elements in 
the initial risk model is considered to be unsatisfactory, 
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since again this was accomplished by only one person, the 
writer. This simply points out that to insure knowledgeable 
and accurate assessments, the effort must be integrated into 
the over-all SSEB evaluation process. This particular func-
tion could perhaps be accomplished most effectively by the 
item level evaluators. The basic approach used in the ini-
tial risk model to insure that redundant risk elements are 
not assessed at double or triple their actual impact is con-
sidered sound and essential to accurate and equitable 
evaluations. 
The initial risk model did not attempt to assess the 
probability of failure of each risk element, nor did it 
attempt to assess the impact of risk elements on the sched-
ule and cost considerations. While these aspects were in-
feasible to attempt in the initial risk model, they are 
important considerations in any risk analysis effort in 
source selection actions. Still another aspect that the 
initial risk model did not consider is the particular 
strengths of a proposal. It is quite possible that while a 
proposal may have numerous weaknesses that create a signifi-
cant degree of unfavorable risk, it may also have strong 
points that would tend to significantly off-set the weak 
points. A comprehensive risk analysis and scoring model 
should consider both strengths and weaknesses. 
The integrated risk assessment and scoring model devel-
oped in this chapter will incorporate the basic approach of 
the initial risk model, but will modify and expand it to 
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attempt to eliminate its shortcomings and broaden its scope 
and effectiveness. 
Ground Rules for Model 
In order to develop a methodology and model for scoring 
that is capable of providing improved quantitative measures 
of the detailed SSEB evaluation effort, including risks, it 
is necessary to construct a foundation of underlying ground 
rules upon which to build the model. This section presents 
the ground rules for the integrated risk assessment and 
scoring model, along with a discussion of the rationale for 
each ground rule. The model and procedural methodology 
developed to implement it are designed to replace the pres-
ent source selection scoring system and process. It is 
important to note, however, that the basic approach and 
methods used by evaluators to actually perform the detailed 
analysis and evaluation of proposal data remains essentially 
the same. The changes to the SSEB and SSAC scoring process 
required by the model are designed primarily to facilitate 
more definitive risk assessment and scoring of the detailed 
evaluation at the factor level. 
Ground Rule 1: The integrated risk assessment and scoring 
model, hereafter referred to as the scoring model, will be 
initially designed to score only' the technical and opera-
tions areas. 
The technological and operational aspect$ of a proposal 
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provide the vast majority of identifiable strengths and 
weaknesses that are of major importance to the source selec-
tion action. The scoring model will, therefore, be ini-
tially limited to scoring the technical and operational 
areas. After the model and procedural methodology is fully 
described, the model will be modified to provide the capa-
bility for scoring the logistics and management areas in a 
manner that will allow consolidation of all area scores into 
a total proposal score, if desired. Until otherwide noted, 
the scoring model described and developed will pertain only 
to the technical and operations areas. 
Ground Rule 2: The SSEB process of detailed evaluation and 
narrative analysis and assessment of proposal data at the 
factor level will remain the same except that risks, per se, 
will not be itemized in the summary. 
The factor level evaluators will continue to perform a 
detailed evaluation of proposal data relative to established 
standards. The data requested in the RFP and the standards 
should be consistent with the level of relative importance 
of that factor and the depth of technical evaluation desired 
and required. The narrative analysis and assessment at the 
factor level will stress the proposal strengths and weak-
nesses as in the past, but the risks will not be itemized 
separately. Instead, a risk analysis at the 1'actor level 
will be incorporated into the evaluation of various 
strengths and weaknesses of the proposal. 
Ground Rule J: Weighting criteria will be established at 
the factor level. 
The SSAC will establish weighting criteria at the fac-
tor level based upon the direct or indirect impact that in-
dividual factors have on the primary operational objectives 
of the weapon system. Detailed discussions of the reasons 
for this are presented in Chapters VI and VII. The primary 
reason is to allow more definitive risk assessment and 
scoring at the factor level. While it may be feasible to 
establish weighting criteria at both the factor and item 
level, such an approach would appear to be impractical since 
it would tend to cause a double weighting of each factor. 
For this reason, weighting at the item level will be elimi-
nated in this model. 
Ground Rule 4: Definitive risk assessment and scoring will 
be accomplished at the factor level. 
The SSEB scoring activity will be focused at the factor 
level for reasons which are discussed in detail in Chapters 
~I and VII of this study. The primary reason is to achieve 
maximum utilization and sy~theses of detailed evaluation in-
formation in quantitative terms. The risk analysis and 
assessment performed by factor evaluators will be accom-
plished progressively during the course of the detailed 
analysis and evaluation of the proposal data. This effort 
will result in an initial factor score. 
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Ground Rule 5: The scoring model has one basic parameter, 
which will be called an attribute. An attribute is any par-
ticular identifiable feature of a proposal that has the 
potential for causing a factor to exceed and/or fail to sat-
isfy the established standard. Each attribute of a proposal 
will be scored separately at the factor level based upon the 
scoring model criteria. The sum of the scores for each 
attribute in a factor will determine the initial factor 
score. 
An attribute is what in the past has been termed a 
strength, weakness, or risk in factor narratives. It is 
possible, even probable that some attributes of a proposal 
will have the potential to benefit the system if it is 
successful, but also the potential to detrimentally affect 
the program if it fails. It is also probable that an attri-
bute could potentially benefit the system if it is success-
ful, but would not adversely affect the system if it fails. 
Likewise, an attribute could have detrimental effects if it 
fails but no particular benefits if it does not fail. The 
scoring model must be designed to account for the various 
characteristics of an attribute relative to its potential 
strength and/or weakness, and also the probability of suc-
cess and failure. Summing the individual scores for each 
attribute will insure that the cumulative effect of all of a 
proposals strengths and weaknesses of varying importance 
will be incorporated into the initial factor score. 
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Ground Rule 6: Item Captains will insure that redundant 
attributes are eliminated and the initial factor scores are 
adjusted accordingly. This is necessary to insure that cer-
tain attributes are not scored at double or triple their 
actual impact on the system. 
Ground Rule 7: Item captains will apply the established 
weighting criteria to the initial factor scores. Applying 
weighting criteria to the factor scores is necessary to in-
sure that the factor scores, and the resultant proposal 
scores reflect the impact of proposal strengths, weaknesses, 
and risk analyses on the primary objectives of the weapon 
system. Item and area scores will be derived by the cumula-
tive totals of factor scores. 
Ground Rule 8: The factor evaluators will incorporate 
responses to Cl's into the scoring of individual attributes, 
but will not incorporate DR responses into the scoring model 
in any way. The factor evaluators should not be made privy 
to DR responses until after the initial factor score is com-
pleted and submitted to the Item Captain. 
It is essential that the process of issuing and obtain-
ing contractor responses to Cl's be streamlined and 
expedited to enable the factor evaluator to incorporate the 
CI response into the score. If this is not considered fea-
sible or satisfactory to the program management, the CI 
should be discontinued and only DR 1 s written. 
Ground Rule 9: Area Co-Chairmen will incorporate the 
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responses to DR 1 s into the scoring model and rescore the 
proposal as appropriate. The SSEB Evaluation Report will 
include the original factor, item, and area scores and also 
the results of rescoring as a result of the DR responses. 
Ground Rule 10: Weaknesses in a technical factor that are 
determined to involve a "substantial" degree of risk will be 
coordinated with the cost and management areas to determine 
the impact on cost and schedule estimates. 
The criteria for a "substantial" degree of risk will be 
developed and described later. This activity will take 
place at the item level to avoid the possibility of 
redundancy. 
Figure 18 presents a flow diagram of the general scor-
ing process described by the ground rules. 
Criteria for the Scoring Model 
It was necessary to establish specific criteria to pro-
vide the framework for the scoring model. The basic parame-
ter of the scoring model will be called an attribute. As 
discussed earlier, an attribute is any particular identifi-
able feature of a proposal that has the potential for 
causing a factor to exceed and/or fail to satisfy the estab-
lished standard. The key to identifying attributes of a 
proposal is for factor evaluators to simply continue using 
the present procedures for identifying notable strengths and 
weaknesses in the course of their detailed analysis and 
evaluation of p~oposal data. Since an attribute may have 
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the potential for both beneficial and detrimental affects, 
three independent characteristics of each attribute will be 
evaluated. These three characteristics are the nature, the 
strength, and the weakness of the attribute. The separate 
criteria developed for each of these characteristics will 
provide the primary framework for the scoring model. 
Weighting criteria established by the SSAC for the factors 
will complete the framework for the scoring model. 
Figure 19 presents an over-all sketch of how an attri-
bute is scored by a factor evaluator by determining the 
category and numerical value for each of the three charac-
teristics of an attribute. Notice that when the nature of 
the attribute has been determined, the value associated with 
the nature is applied to both the strength and weakness 
characteristics of the attribute. Notice also that the 
strength and weakness characteristics each have two major 
properties. The two major properties of the strength of an 
attribute are the "benefits of success" and the "probability 
of success". Similarly, the two major properties of the 
weakness of an attribute are the "impact of failure" and the 
"probability of failure". While the three characteristics of 
an attribute are independent, there are two distinct inter-
relationships between them which permits an assessment of 
the over-all importance~ or degree of risk for the attri-
bute. The first is that the nature of the attribute is 
common to both the strength and weakness characteristics. 
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is always equal to 10, and the sum of the probability of 
success, P(S), and the probability of failure, P(F), is 
always equal to the P(A). 
The example of the attribute shown in Figure 19 
resulted in a degree of risk value of +24. It is quite 
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obvious, however, that any particular attribute could result 
in a value for the degree of risk which is either zero, 
positive, or negative. The degree of risk value for each 
individual attribute will be algebraically summed to derive 
the initial factor score. 
A detailed discussion of the specific criteria estab-
lished for the three characteristics of an attribute, and 
the weighting criteria for factors is presented in the fol-
lowing paragraphs. 
Nature of Attribute 
In order to develop a manageable approach to integrat-
ing risk assessment into the scoring process, it is essen-
tial to select a common basis upon which to establish the 
risk and scoring criteria. In both the technical and opera-
tions areas, the primary concern is with the technological 
and operational aspects of the air vehicle hardware. There-
fore, the air vehicle hardware provides an excellent basis 
upon which to establish the risk and scoring criteria. 
The nature of an attribute is the characteristic which 
describes the attribute in terms of the s,cope, type, func-
tion, and/or complexity of the air vehicle hardware, or 
182 
hardware design directly involved and/or affected by the 
attribute. The nature of an attribute is basically a meas-
ure of its importance in terms of the extent to which the 
air vehicle hardware or hardware design is involved or 
affected. In other words, an attribute of a proposal may 
have the potential for being an important strength and/or 
weakness. The nature of the attribute defines the air vehi-
cle hardware or hardware design that is directly involved 
and/or affected by this attribute. The nature is independ-
ent of the degree or difficulty of the corrective action 
required if the attribute fails, or the degree of benefits 
accrued if the attribute succeeds. 
An example of the nature of an attribute is as follows. 
If the particular attribute is that the gun exhaust gases 
may be injected into the engine which could cause a flame-
out, the nature of the attribute could be the gun and the 
engine. The nature says nothing about the corrective action 
alternatives. The corrective action required may be to move 
the gun, move the engine intake, or to simply deflect the 
gun gases away from the engine intake. 
Evaluators must use a large measure of common sense in 
determining the nature of an attribute. For example, a fac-
tor such as "Aircraft Performance" in the technical area may 
not specifically relate to any particular air vehicle hard-
ware, but practically any attribute identified in this fac-
tor may involve major portions of the aircraft hardware. An 
attribute in this factor might be that the single engine 
183 
rate of climb seriously fails to meet the standard. Such an 
attribute is obviously relatable to various aspects of the 
hardware such as airframe, propulsion syst.em, etc. Evalua-
tors must keep in mind that the nature of the attribute is a 
measure of its importance in terms of the extent to which 
the air vehicle hardware or hardware design is involved. If 
the attribute has the potential for both beneficial and 
detrimental affects, the nature should reflect a "hardware 
basis" that is relatable to both the strength and the weak-
ness of the attribute. 
Specific criteria were developed to categorize the 
nature of an attribute. The evaluator will determine the 
nature of a particular attribute by selecting from these 
criteria the category that best fits the attribute. Tile 
categories and scoring criteria for the nature of an attri-
















Tile description of each category for the nature of an 
attribute is as follows: 
(1) Subsystem. A major assembly of parts joined 
together or interdependently related so as to 
perform a specific key function necessary and 
essential to the performance of the over-all 
weapon system. A subsystem would normally 
involve hardware associated with two or more 
factors, and may even involve multiple items. 
An example of the nature of an attribute that 
could be categorized under "subsystem" would 
be a complete hydraulic system if the hydraulic 
system is extremely complex, poorly designed, 
and underpowered. Another example which could 
be greater in importance would be the propul-
sion and airframe if there was a problem asso-
ciated with the engine/airframe compatibility. 
Still another would be the entire propulsion 
system when there is a problem of insufficient 
power of the aircraft engine(s) to meet opera-
tional specifications and accessory drive 
requirements. 
(2) Major Component. A part or particular group of 
parts within a subsystem which, by nature of 
its materials, design, and/or fabrication, is 
absolutely essential to the performance of the 
subsystem of which it is a part. A major 
component would normally involve hardware in 
one factor, but may involve hardware in two or 
more factors. A major component will involve 
hardware in a single item only. An example of 
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the nature of an attribute could be the ejec-
tion seat, where the attribute was some 
strength or weakness of the in-flight egress 
system. Another example could be the design 
approach to the fuel system piping, tankage, 
single point refueling, defueling, etc., 
where the attribute is some notable strength 
or weakness in design. Depending on the scope 
of the hardware affected by this attribute in 
the last example, its nature might be cate-
gorized as II subsystem". 
(J) Minor Component. A part or particular group 
of parts within a subsystem which, by nature 
of its design and fabrication, play a support-
ive role to the primary function of the sub-
system of which it is a part. A minor 
component does not involve extensive hardware, 
hardware design, complexity, or functional 
aspects. An example of an attribute whose 
nature would be categorized as "minor component" 
could be the type or amount of protective armor 
to be used. Another example could be an attri-
bute involving an important but relatively 
small portion of the hydraulic system or flight 
control system hardware or hardware design. 
Another example could b.e an attribute involving 
some portion of the aircraft brakes or 
braking system. 
Strength of Attribute 
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The fundamentaL basis of the specific criteria for both 
the strength and weakness of an attribute is derived from 
the definition of an attribute. An attribute is any partic-
ular identifiable feature of a proposal that has the poten-
tial for causing a factor to exceed and/or fail to satisfy 
the established standard. 1berefore, if success of the 
attribute would result in just satisfying (not exceeding) 
the standard, the attribute would be considered to have no 
strengths. 1bis could occur when an attribute has the po-
tential for detrimental affects if it fails, but offers no 
benefits other than just meeting the standard if it does not 
fail. 
It is important to keep in mind that the strength of an 
attribute is an independent characteristic. That is, the 
strength of the attribute is not dependent upon the nature 
or the weakness of the attribute. The strength is a measure 
of how much better the proposed weapon system has the poten-
tial for being as a result of the success of the attribute. 
If the success of the attribute has the potential for simply 
satisfying the minimum requirements of the standard, its 
value, in terms of strength, would be zero. On the other 
hand, if success of the attribute has the potential for sig-
nificantly improving some aspect of the weapon system, its 
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value in terms of strengths would be some value greater than 
zero. 
In developing specific criteria for the strength of an 
attribute, it was necessary to create some means whereby the 
uncertainty associated with the potential benefits of the 
attribute could be evaluated and integrated into the model. 
This was accomplished by dividing the strength of an attri-
bute into two properties. The first property is the 
"benefits of success" of the attribute, and the second is 
the "probability of success" of the attribute. Separate 
criteria was established for these independent properties, 
and the factor evaluator will determine the strength of an 
attribute by selecting from these criteria the categories 
that best fit the attribute. The property categories and 
scoring criteria for the strength of an attribute are shown 
in Figure 20. 
The description of each category for the benefits of 
success of an attribute is as follows: 
(1) Exceptional Solution. The attribute shows 
evidence of an exceptional solution to a 
technical and/or operational requirement. 
The evidence may be a rare technical ap-
proach, an unusually effective trade-off 
alternative, or an extraordinary or un-
common innovation which has the potential 
for significantly improving the suitability, 
utility and/or performance of the hardware 










































Figure 20. Properties of Attribute Strength 
Characteristic 
involved. This category should be used when 
the company's proposal clearly demonstrates 
unusual initiative in seeking new and effec-
tive ways to satisfy technical or operational 
requirements. 
(2) Major Improvement. The attribute offers some 
unique device, process, or approach which has 
the potential for important savings of time 
and material, or which may notably improve the 
suitability and utility of the hardware 
involved. 
(.3) Substantially Exceeds. The attribute offers a 
technical approach, design, and or combination 
of hardware that has the potential for sub-
stantially exceeding the standard. 'nlis cate-
gory should be used when some aspect of the 
proposal is particularly noteworthy and con-
tributes to exceeding the minimum standard; 
f'or example, some "stimulative" requirement 
has been satisfied in a manner that is consid-
ered to be worthy of' mention by the evaluator. 
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(4) No Benefits. The attribute offers no particular 
benefits other than meeting the minimum require-
ments of the standard. 
The probability of success' of an attribute is simply 
an estimate of the likelihood that it will succeed in accom-
plishing that which is proposed. Tbe probability of success 
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must be determined by the factor evaluator by evaluating 
the attribute relative to the proposal data, his knowledge 
of the state-of-art, historical information, and his over-
all experience and technical expertise. 'Ibis will obviously 
require an element of judgment and decision-making that the 
factor evaluator is not accustomed to quantifying. This 
would be the case, however, with whomever was required to 
estimate the probability of success and express it quanti-
tatively. 'Ihe factor evaluator is, by the nature of his 
experience, education, and functional responsibility, con-
sidered to be best qualified to estimate the probability of 
success and the probability of failure of an attribute. 
Tiiis statement is supported by Helmer in his discussion of 
the role of expertise in prediction. He states that 
••• the expert has at his ready disposal a large 
store of (mostly inarticulated) background knowl-
edge and a refined sensitivity to its relevance, 
through the intuitive application of which he is 
often able to produce trustworthy personal prob-
abilities regarding hypotheses in his area of 
expertness (24, p. J8). 
'Ihe sum of the probability of success and the probabil-
ity of failure of an attribute always equals 10 (the prob-
ability of the attribute). Tiierefore, a reasonable approach 
for the factor evaluator would be to first estimate the 
probability of that characteristic about which the most can 
be determined. '!hat is, if the attribute is basically a 
weakness, it might be more suitable to first estimate the 
probability of failure, from which the probability of success 
is automatically determined -- and vice versa. 
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The categories of the probability of success of an 
attribute are described below. The factor evaluator will 
select from these criteria the category which best fits the 
particular attribute: 
(1) High. Essentially no uncertainty involved and 
success in accomplishing the benefits of the 
attribute are reasonably assured based upon 
the proposal approach. 
(2) Substantial. The probability of successfully 
accomplishing the benefits of the attribute 
is exceptionally good. This category should 
include situations where the evaluator is rea-
s9nably confident that the attribute will be 
successful in providing or accomplishing the 
benefits it offers. 
(3) Moderate. The probability of successfully 
providing or accomplishing the benefits of the 
attribute as proposed may be equal to or con-
siderable less than the probability of failure. 
This category should be used when the evalua-
tor is reasonably confident that the attribute 
does not stand a good chance of succeeding to 
provide or accomplish the benefits it offers, 
or at best offers a 50-50 chance. 
(4) Low. There is very little to no chance that 
the attribute as proposed will successfully 
provide or accomplish the benefits that it 
offers. This category should be used when the 
evaluator is reasonably confident that prob-
ability 6f success is extremely low. 
Weakness of Attribute 
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The weakness of an attribute is a characteristic that 
is independent of the nature and strength characteristics. 
The weakness is a measure of the impact that failure of the 
attribute would have on the proposed weapon system in terms 
of the corrective action that would be required. If the 
attribute were such that no corrective action would be re-
quired if the attribute failed its value, in terms of weak~ 
ness, would be zero. This could occur when an attribute had 
the potential for some strength if it were successful, but 
would still result in the proposal meeting the minimum 
standard even if it were not successful. That is, failure 
of the attribute would create no adverse affects. On the 
other hand, if failure of the attribute has the potential 
for requiring corrective action in order to meet the minimum 
requirements of the standard, its value in terms of weakness 
would be greater than zero. 
As was the case for strengths, developing specific cri-
teria for the weakness of an attribute required the estab-
lishment of two independent properties. The first property 
is the "impact of failure" of the attribute, and the second 
is the "probability of failure" of the attribute. Separate 
criteria was established for these independent properties, 
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and the factor evaluator will determine the weakness of an 
attribute by selecting from these criteria the categories 
that best fit the attribute. The property categories and 
scoring criteria for the weakness of an attribute are shown 
in Figure 21. 








































The description of each category for the impact of 
failure of an attribute is as follows: 
(1) Developmental Activity. This category should 
be used when failure of the attribute as 
proposed could result in the requirement for 
developmental activity for new hardware to 
replace all or an important portion of the 
hardware associated with the attribute. This 
category should also be used when failure of 
the attribute could result in extensive pro-
gram delays and/or cost increases for addi-
tional development and testing of the 
associated hardware to prove technical fea-
sibility or performance validation and 
qualification. 
(2) Major Redesign. This category should be 
used when failure of the attribute as proposed 
could result in extensive modification of the 
associated hardware or hardware design con-
figuration. This category applies to techno-
logical or operational problems involving 
hardware design, compatability, suitability, 
and utility that would be difficult to correct 
if the attribute fails. The correction action 
required by failure of an attribute may result 
in relatively short program delays and small 
cost increases but alternative solutions, 
though difficult, are possible without ini-
tiating new development activity or major 
developmental retesting. 
(J Minor Redesign. This category should be used 
when failure of the attribute as proposed could 
result in relatively minor, but important modi-
fication of the associated hardware or hardware 
design configuration. This category applies to 
technological or operational problems involving 
hardware design, compatibility, suitability, 
and utility that would be necessary, but 
relatively easy to correct. 
(4) No Detrimental Affect. This category would be 
used when a particular attribute has a strength 
that offers potential benefits if the attribute 
succeeds, but requires no corrective action, 
even if the attribute fails. In other words, 
if the attribute fails, the proposal, relative 
to this attribute, would still meet the mini-
mum requirements of the standard. 
Weighting Criteria 
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A very important assumption and ground rule made for 
the development of this scoring model is that the SSAC will 
establish weighting criteria for the factor level, and that 
this weighting criteria will be applied by the Item 
Captains. The purpose of the weighting is to insure that an 
appropriate measure of the relative importance of the pri-
mary operational objectives of the weapon system is incorpo-
rated into each proposal score. The Item Captain will first 
use the weighting criteria to assist in determining which 
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attributes are to be eliminated due to redundancy. Then, 
the Item Captain will use the weighting criteria to deter-
mine the factor and item scores. 
There are obviously many ways to establish weights for 
factors based upon the primary objectives of the weapon 
system. A simplified version of the method used in the ini-
tial risk model (developed in Chapter V of this study) is 
presented as an adequate and effective approach to estab-
lishing the weighting criteria for this scoring model. The 
weighting criteria is designed to permit a measure of the 
degree of impact that a particular attribute may have of the 
primary objectives of the weapon system. This is accom-
plished by first determining the weight for each factor, and 
then applying the factor weight to each attribute in a fac-
tor. The process used by the SSAC to.establish.the weight-
ing criteria is presented below. 
The primary operational objectives will be reviewed and 
listed in the order of relative importance. If there are n 
primary objectives of the weapon system, X1 would represent 
the ith objective, where 
i = 1, 2, 3, ... , n-1, n. 
The most important objective would be X1, the second most 
important objective would be Xa, etc. 
primary objective would be Xn. 
The least important 
The Factors identified in the Evaluation Criteria will 
be evaluated and a determination made as to direct impact or 
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influence that each factor has on the primary objectives of 
the weapon system. Tilis would be accomplished by reviewing 
each factor separately and determining the most important 
primary objective that a particular factor directly affects 
or influences. A factor may influence more than one primary 
objective, but only the highest, or most important primary 
objective influenced will be assigned to that factor. It is 
recognized that some Factors may not directly affect or in-
fluence any of the primary objectives of the weapon system. 
In order to account for this, an n + 1 objective of the 
weapon system called "other" is added. Tilerefore, if there 
were five primary operational objectives of the weapon sys-
tem, a sixth (Xs) objective called "other" would be added. 
Tilose Factors which do not affect or influence any of the 
primary operational objectives would be assigned the Xs 
objective called "other", which would be the least important 
objective listed. lbe Delphi method would be an excellent 
technique for the SSAC to use in determining a consensus on 
the most important primary objective affected or influenced 
by each individual Factor., An excellent overview of how to 
conduct a Delphi study is presented by Gordon (26). 
Regardless of the method or technique used to accom-
plish this, the result would be similar to the example shown 
in Figure 22. In this example, there are five primary oper-
ational objectives and one "other" objective. lbe weighting 
for each factor is determined by simply assigning "impor-
tance values" to each primary objective in the inverse order 
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Most Important Factor 
Factor Primary ObJective Affected Weight 
T.1.1 X2 5 
T.1. 2 X4 J 
T.1. J X1 6 
T.1. 4 x6 1 
T.2.1 X3 4 
T.2.2 X5 2 
T.J.1 X1 6 
T.J.2 X2 5 
T.J.J x6 1 
0 .1.1 X3 4 
0.1. 2 X1 6 
0.2.1 X4 J 
0.2.2 X2 5 
O.J.1 x6 1 
Figure 22. Primary Objectives Affected by Factors 

















This simply means that in the example in Figure 22, X1 would 
have an importance value of 6, Xa would have 5, etc., and 
Xs(OTHER) would have an importance value of 1. The impor-
tance value of the most important objective affected by a 
factor would become the factor weight. 
Procedural Methodology 
1he scoring model and the procedural methodology devel-
oped to implement it may at first appear to be too compli-
cated and involved to use in the Source Selection process. 
It must be recognized that any process or system used to 
equitably and accurately score proposals is both complicated 
and involved, regardless of how informative or useful the 
output. Before discussing the details of implementing the 
scoring model, it is important to review some of the advan-
tages provided by the integrated risk assessment/scoring 
model and methodology. These advantages are listed below: 
(1) Provides more definitive scoring at the 
Factor level where the detailed evaluation 
is accomplished. 
(2) Allows the initial proposal score to be deter-
mined incrementally while the factor and item 
evaluators are in the process of accomplishing 
the detailed evaluation and while the informa-
tion is fresh on their minds. 
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(J) Provides the capability to quantitatively 
assess proposals in terms of the cumulative 
impact of its strengths and weaknesses on the 
program, including relatively "small" but 
cumulatively important strengths and weaknesses. 
(4) Integrates the probabilities of success and 
failure of notable strengths and weaknesses of 
a proposal into the scoring process. 
(5) Provides the capability to insure that particu-
lar strengths and weaknesses of a proposal are 
not assessed at double or triple their actual 
impact on the program. 
(6) Provides the capability of incorporating into 
the over-all proposal score the individual and 
cumulative impact of proposal strengths and 
weaknesses relative to the primary objectives 
of the weapon system. 
(7) Provides the capability for rescoring the pro-
posals in the SSEB based upon the response to 
DR' s. 
(8) Provides the capability of identifying a partic-
ular weakness of a proposal that results in a 
degree of risk which warrants an investiga-
tion of its impact on program schedules and 
cost estimates. 
(9) Provides the SSAC a definitive quantitative 
score for each proposal which is based upon 
a standardized process. The definitive 
scores, which incorporate an assessment of 
risks, should provide the SSAC excellent back-
up information for its analysis and evaluation. 
The SSAC will receive the results of the orig-
inal proposal scores and the results of 
rescoring based upon DR responses. 
(10) The model and methodology can be accomplished 
by the same manpower resources that would be 
assigned to the SSEB using the present scoring 
system. 
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The methodology developed for implementing the scoring 
model uses a "building block" concept. That is, the score 
for a proposal is incrementally developed at the factor 
level by scoring each attribute individually as it is iden-
tified, analyzed, and evaluated by the factor evaluator. 
The resultant of the attribute scores determines the initial 
factor score. When the factor evaluator determines the 
initial factor score, the responsibility for scoring then 
shifts to the Item Captain. The Item Captain applies the 
factor weight to each attribute and then reviews the attri-
butes in each factor of his item for redundancy. The Item 
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Captain will then coordinate with other Item Captains to 
review the attributes for redundancy. The factor weight 
applied to the attributes will assist Item Captains in de-
termining which attributes are redundant and should be 
eliminated. When redundant attributes have been eliminated, 
the Item Captain will determine the adjusted factor scores 
and compute the item score. The responsibility for scoring 
then shifts to the Area Co-Chairman. The Co-Chairmen will 
compute the area scores and the over-all proposal score. In 
addition, the Co-Chairmen are responsible for rescoring the 
proposals based upon the responses to the DR's. Because the 
scoring process involves different functional levels, the 
details of the methodology will be discussed by functional 
level. 
Factor Level 
The factor evaluator will analyze and evaluate the 
proposal data against the established standard. Those 
aspects of the proposal identified as attributes will be 
evaluated and individually scored using the scoring model 
criteria "Scoring Guide" shown in Figure 23, and the 
"Factor Scoring Worksheet" shown in Figure 24. The proce-
dural steps for evaluating and scoring the factor are as 
follows: 
(1) Analyze and evaluate proposal data against the 
established standard. The CI responses should 
be incorporated into the factor evaluation and 
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FACTOR SCORING WORKSHEET 
CONTRACTOR _A_ 
STRENGTH WEAKNESS 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION D.R. 
OF ATTRIBUTE WRITTEN 
NATURE BENEFITS PROB. IMPACT PROB. 
OF OF OF OF 
NO. SUCCESS. SUCCESS FAILURE FAILURE 
I. SAMPLE ATIRIBUTE 6 3 8 4 2 
2. SAMPLE ATTRIBUTE 3 I 9 5 I 
.. 
3. SAMPLE ATTRIBUTE 201 8 0 5 7 5 
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Figure 24. Factor Scoring Worksheet 
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scoring, but this is contingent upon stream-
lining the CI process to allow timely responses 
and evaluation. 'Ihe factor evaluator will in-
dicate whether the Cl's written are or are not 
incorporated into the score. 
(2) Identify and briefly describe proposal attri-
butes and score them individually. Scoring in 
this manner will allow the evaluator to evalu-
ate and score the particular strengths and 
weaknesses of a proposal on an incremental 
basis, thereby "building" the factor score as 
he actually accomplishes the detailed analysis 
and evaluation process. When a DR is written 
that is related to an attribute, place the DR 
number in the 11 DR Written" column. 
(J) For each attribute, first determine the appro-
priate category and scoring criteria for the 
nature of the attribute and record the value 
selected. 
(4) If the attribute is primarily a strength, next 
determine and record the category and scoring 
criteria for both properties of the strength 
of the attribute, i.e., the benefits of success 
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and the probability of success. The probability 
of failure is then determined by 
Prob.(Failure) = 10-Prob.(Success). 
If the attribute is primarily a weakness, the 
evaluator would determine the category and 
scoring criteria for both properties of the 
weakness of the attribute in this step. 
(5) Determine the category and scoring criteria 
for both properties of the characteristic 
that was not accomplished in step 4. The 
factor evaluator must remember that some 
attributes may have the potential for both 
beneficial and detrimental affects on the sys-
tem and score accordingly. 
(6) Repeat steps 3 through 5 until all attributes 
have been evaluated and the scoring criteria 
selected and recorded. 
(7) Determine the expected positive risk of each 
attribute by multiplying the values selected 
for the scoring criteria of the nature, bene-
fits of success, and probability of success of 
the attribute. 
(8) Determine the expected negative risk of each 
a~tribute by multiplying the values selected 
for the scoring criteria of the nature, impact 
of failure, and probability of failure of the 
attribute. 
(9) Determine the degree of risk for each attribute 
by subtracting the value of the expected nega-
tive risk from the value of the expected posi-
tive risk. 
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(Expected Positive Risk) 
(Expected Negative Risk) = 
Degree of Risk. 
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Notice that the degree of risk may be a positive 
or negative value; therefore, a+ or - sign 
should be placed in front of the degree of risk 
value for each attribute as appropriate. 
(10) Repeat steps 7 through 10 until the degree of 
risk value is determined for all attributes in 
the factor. 
(11) Algebraically, sum the degree of risk values 
for each attribute to obtain the initial fac-
tor score. This completes the scoring activity 
for the factor evaluator. 
(12) Complete the factor narrative. 
Figure 24 (page 204) provides an example of the scoring 
process. Four attributes are identified and scored using 
the scoring guide. Two Cl's, numbers 001 and 002, were in-
corporated into the factor score. The third attribute is 
related to a DR number 201. The algebraic sum of the attri-
bute degree of risk values is -284. This completes the fac-
tor level scoring for this example. The item level scoring 
for this example will be covered in the paragraphs below. 
Item Level 
The Item Captain is primarily responsible for the 
scoring process after the factor evaluator provides him the 
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factor narrative and the Factor Scoring Worksheet with the 
initial factor score entered. The Item Captain will use the 
Factor Scoring Worksheet to complete the scoring process 
using the following procedural steps: 
(1) Review the factor narrative and Factor Scoring 
Worksheet. If a related CI is not incorporated 
into the score, determine if any adjustment of 
the initial factor score is required as a 
result of the CI response. 
(2) Apply the appropriate factor weight (which is 
established by the SSAC Weighting Criteria) to 
each attribute degree of risk value. This is 
accomplished by multiplying the factor weight 
value times the degree of risk value for each 
attribute and recording the product in the 
"Attribute Score" column of the Factor Scoring 
Worksheet. 
(3) Review the attributes and attribute scores in 
all factors of the item to ident~fy and elimi-
nate redundant attributes. It is possible that 
a particular attribute could be written up in 
several different factors and the effect or 
impact of the attribute could be very similar. 
Special care should be taken to review the 
attributes within an item and also compare them 
with attributes of other items to insure that a 
particular attribute is not assessed at double 
or triple its actual impact on the weapon 
system. If the same attribute is written up 
in two or more factors such that redundancy 
is judged to exist, the attribute will be 
retained in the factor in which the attribute 
score is lowest. The redundant attribute(s) 
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would be lined out (eliminated) in the factor(s) 
where it appears. It should be noted that an 
attribute could appear in several different 
factors without being redundant. For example, 
if an attribute that appears to be redundant is 
written up in two different factors, but the 
degree of risk is significantly different in 
each factor, one should be very careful in 
declaring either write-up of the attribute 
redundant. 
(4) The Item Captain will determine the Adjusted 
Factor Score by algebraically summing the non-
redundant values of the attribute scores. 
(5) When the Adjusted Factor Score for each factor 
is determined, the Item Captain will sum the 
Adjusted Factor Scores to derive the Item 
Score. 
(6) The item summary will be prepared in the same 
manner that it is presently being prepared. 
Attributes judged to constitute substantial 
technological and operational risks will be 
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itemized and discussed for subsequent correc-
tive action. The scoring model criteria and 
Factor Scoring Worksheets can be used to deter-
mine what is to be considered substantial risks 
in a program. The writer has established the 
criteria that any attribute with a degree of 
risk value of -224 or less will be considered 
a substantial and reportable risk. 
An attribute degree of risk value of -224 
or less can result from many different combina-
tions of the scoring model criteria, but the 
upper limit for a "substantial" degree of risk 
(-224) is basically established by an attribute 
with the following characteristics: 
Scoring 
Characteristic Category Criteria 
Degree of 
Risk 




































0 - 224 = -224 
7 (4) (J) (7) = 224 
(7) The Item Captain will insure that each attri-
bute with a "substantial" degree of risk is 
brought to the attention of the management and 
cost areas and assist in determining the impact 
on the cost and schedule estimates. The spe-
cific activities of the Item Captain in this 
regard are discussed later when the model is 
expanded to cover scoring for the management 
and logistics areas. 
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Figure 25 continues with the example for Contractor A, 
Factor T.1.1 shown in Figure 24. It is assumed that the 
weight established for factor T.1.1 is 2· Notice that the 
values in the "Attribute Score" column are the product of 
the Factor Weight (J) times the value of the attribute de-
gree of risk. In this example, attribute number 4 was 
determined to be redundant and was, therefore, eliminated. 
The Adjusted Factor Score (-540) is the algebraic sum of the 
non-redundant values in the "Attribute Score" column. 
Attribute number 3 has a degree of risk value of -280, which 
is less than that necessary to make it a "substantial" risk 
(-224 is the upper limit). Therefore, this attribute would 
be coordinated to evaluate its potential impact on schedule 
and cost estimates. 
Notice also that the attribute number 3 is shown to be 
rescored based upon the DR response. Tb.is activity does not 
occur at the item level, but is shown here for convenience. 
Rescoring, based upon DR responses, is an area level 





OF ATTRIBUTE WRITTEN BENEFITS PRO a IMPACT PROB. OF OF OF OF 
NO. SUCCESS SUCCESS FAILURE FAILURE 
I. SAMPLE ATTRIBUTE 6 3 8 4 2 
2. SAMPLE ATTRIBUTE 3 I 9 5 I 
3. SAMPLE ATTRIBUTE 201 8 0 5 7 5 
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responsibility and is discussed in the paragraphs below. 
Area Level 
The area Co-Chairman is primarily responsible for the 
scoring process after the Item Captain has completed and 
submitted the Adjusted Factor Scores, the Item Score, and 
the item narrative summary. The procedural steps necessary 
to complete the scoring process are as follows: 
(1) The Co-Chairman will derive the area score 
by summing the item scores. The proposal 
score will be derived by summing the area 
scores. 
(2) The Co-Chairman will then review the DR 
responses and rescore the proposals as 
appropriate. This will be accomplished by 
referring back to the Factor Scoring Work-
sheets to evaluate the attribute or attri-
butes related to a particular DR response. 
In Figure 25, attribute number 3 was related 
to DR number 201 and was rescored to a value 
of -504. In this hypothetical case, the 
score was improved, due to reducing the prob-
ability of failure from 5 to 3 (not shown). 
The results of rescoring the factor is the 
algebraic sum of the "Attribute Rescored" 
column (-204). Notice that this attribute 
was also one which, because it constituted a 
"substantial" degree o:f risk, was coordinated 
with the cost and management areas to assess 
the impact on cost and schedule estimates. 
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The area Co-Chairman will, therefore, need to 
re-assess this attribute with the cost and 
management areas based upon the rescoring activ-
ity. It should be noted that an attribute with 
a "substantial" degree of' risk will not neces-
sarily be associated with a DR. When each DR 
response has been reviewed and rescoring accom-
plished, the item, area, and proposal scores 
resulting :from rescoring will be recorded. 
(J) The area narrative summary will then be prepared, 
and the results of' the original scoring and 
rescoring will be included in the SSEB report 
to the SSAC. This completes the scoring 
process. 
Figure 26 presents a f'low chart o:f the scoring model 
process at each :functional level in the SSEB. 
Figure 27 presents. a pictorial view of' the building 
block approach provided by the scoring model. The result or 
output of the scoring model could be similar to the :ficti-
tious numbers in Figures ·28, 29, and JO. 
The Adjusted Factor scores are derived in a manner 
shown by the example in Figure 25, and the factor total :for 
Contractor A in Figure 28 shows the score :from that example. 
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SCORE BY CONTRACTOR I BY FACTOR 
CONTRACTOR 
ITEM FACTOR A B c D F 
T. I. . I -540 +175 +315 -214 0 
2 +68 0 -28 -185 +212 
3 -319 -38 -133 0 +65 
T.2. I -89 0 -216 0 -137 
2 -t341 -49 +191 -416 +31 
3 -740 -177 +542 -322 0 
4 0 +238 0 ·ti 79 -76 
T.3. I t56 0 -374 +142 +381 
-·--
2 -t-172 0 -18 +56 0 
T.4. I -256 +460 ,..79 0 +153 
2 -27 ..-222 0 -133 -271 
3 -350 -139 0 ..-18 -716 
0.1. I -292 ,.77 -42 -210 -347 
2 t6~ -86 -373 -t-147 -t-96 
0.2. I -402 -107 -211 -230 -217 
2 -184 +92 +271 +10 1-132 
-· 
3 -t-35 +12 1-93 -123 -222 
PROPOSAL SCORE -2462 +680 +96 -1281 -916 
Figure 28. Score By Contractor/By Factor 
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SCORE BY CONTRACTOR I BY ITEM 
CONTRACTOR 
ITEM A B c D E 
T.I -791 +137 +154 ~399 +277 
T.2 -488 +12 · ... 517 -559 -182 
T.3 +228 0 -392 +198 +381 
. 
T.4 -633 ... 543 +79 -115 -834 
·'· 
0.1 -227 -9 -415 -63 -251 
0.2 -551 -3 +153 -343 -307 
PROPOSAL SCORE -2462 +680 +96 -1281 -916 
.. 
Figure 2:9· . Score ~y Contractor/By Item 
SCORE BY CONTRACTOR I BY AREA 
.... CONTRACTOR 
AREA A B c D E 
TECHNICAL -1684 +692 +358 ··-875 -358 
OPERATIONS -778 -12 -262 -406 -558 
PROPOSAL SCORE -2462 +680 . +96 -1281 -916 .. 
Figure JO. Score By Contractor/By Area 
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Notice that several of the factors in Figure 28 have 
zero for an Adjusted Factor Score. This could result from a 
situation where there were either !!.Q. attributes identified, 
or where the attributes that were identified had positive 
and negative degree of risk values which exactly cancelled 
each other. 
Notice also that in Figure 29, Contractor B had an item 
score of zero for item T.J. This occurred because both fac-
tors in the item had a zero Adjusted Factor Score, but an 
item could have a zero score resulting from Adjusted Factor 
scores which cancel each other. It is possible that a pro-
posal could have a zero score. Although highly unlikely, it 
is possible that this could occur as a result of an entire 
proposal being evaluated without having any notable attri-
butes identified. It is much more likely that a zero score 
for a proposal would result from positive and negative item 
scores that exactly cancel each other. The proposal score 
for Contractor C is relatively close to zero (+96) as a 
result of the cancelling effect of the factor/item/area 
scores. 
The scoring model results provide a relative measure of 
the acceptability of each proposal in terms of its ability 
to satisfy the technological and operational requirements, 
and the primary objectives of the weapon system. Each pro-
pqsal score is completely traceable, which enables higher 
level source selection officials to conveniently and effec-
tively analyze, evaluate, and compare the proposals. Those 
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proposals which are clearly superior or inferior can be 
quickly identified and the supporting evidence easily assim-
ilated. Those proposals which appear to be close contenders 
can be reviewed in detail using the scoring model results. 
For example, suppose the two leading proposals have rela-
tively close scores, both of which are near zero. The first 
proposal with a score near zero could result from very few 
attributes, all of which are relatively minor in importance. 
The second proposal with a near zero score could result from 
many attributes, some of which have large positive degree of 
risk values, and others with large negative degree of risk 
values. The scoring model will permit a detailed review of 
how each score was derived, thereby providing the SSAC more 
definitive and supportable evidence upon which to make 
recommendations. 
Management and Logistics Scoring 
Up to this point, the scoring model and methodology 
have been limited to scoring only the technical and opera-
tions areas. The purpose of this section is to expand the 
scoring model to facilitate scoring the management and 
logistics areas. In addition, the interaction between the 
technical and cost areas relative to attributes with a 
"substantial" degree of risk will be described in this 
section. 
It is important at this point to emphasize that the 
scoring model and methodology developed in the previous 
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sections will continue to be applicable to the technical 
and operations areas. It will be shown later that although 
the output of the scoring model for the technical and oper-
ations areas is based upon different criteria than that of 
the management and logistics areas, there is no conflict in 
combining the two outputs to derive the over-all proposal 
score. 
The management and logistics areas will be scored using 
criteria very similar to that used in the present scoring 
system. However, the scoring will be accomplished at the 
factor and item levels in a manner very similar to that used 
in the technical and operations areas. Figure Ji presents a 
flow diagram of the process to be used for scoring the lo-
gistics and management areas. The reader will find it 
helpful to refer to Figure 31 while reading the following 
procedural steps which describe the process by functional 
level. 
Factor Level 
The factor evaluators will perform the following proce-
dural steps: 
(1) Evaluate the proposal data against the established 
standard in the same manner used in the present 
SSEB evaluation process. 
(2) Identify notable attributes of the proposal and 
record same on the Factor Scoring Worksheet. 
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attributes relative to the degree in which 
they tend to exceed or fail to satisfy the 
standard. The CI response will be incorpo-
rated into the evaluation of the attributes 
in a manner consistent with the program 
management policy. The evaluation of attri-
butes will be accomplished in the same manner 
that strengths and weaknesses are presently 
assessed in the current SSEB evaluation 
process. 
(4) Determine the Factor Rating by assessing the 
over-all and combined impact of the attri-
butes and selecting the appropriate category 
for the over-all factor assessment and the 
numerical factor rating from the following 
criteria: 
Over-all Factor Assessment Factor Rating 
Superior Proposal 100 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Substantially Exceeds 90 
S~andard Bo 
- - - - - - .. - - - - - - - - - - - -
Comfortably Exceeds 70 
Standard 60 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Meets Minimum Standard 50 
- - - - - ,.. - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Below Standard 40 
JO 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Seriously Fails to Meet 20 
Standard 10 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Unacceptable 0 
A "superior" rating should be used when 
the proposal approach is excellent in every 
respect and has the potential for significantly 
improving the effectiveness of that portion of 
the system to which it applies. 
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A "substantially exceeds standard" rating 
should be when it is evident that the contrac-
tor has used noteworthy initiative in develop-
ing some innovative approach, technique, device, 
or process which has the potential for saving 
time, material, and/or improving the effective-
ness of that portion of the system to which it 
applies. 'lbe keynote here is that the standard 
is substantially exceeded. 
A "comfortably exceeds standard" rating 
should be used when the proposal is better 
than the required minimum standard. 'Ibis rating 
can be used when the evaluator considers the 
proposal to be particularly responsive to the 
RFP and comfortably meets all the minimum re-
quirements of the standard. 
A "meets minimum standard" rating should be 
used when the proposal just barely meets the 
minimum requirements of the standard. 
A "below standard" rating should be used 
when the proposal fails to meet some or all of 
the minimum requirements of the standard, but 
the corrective actions required are relatively 
minor and the impact on the rest of the system 
is considered slight. 
A "seriously fails to meet standard" 
rating should be used when the proposal fails 
to meet some or all of the minimum require-
ments of the standard, where the corrective 
action required is difficult and the impact 
on the rest of the system could be severe. 
An "unacceptable" rating should be used 
when the proposal approach is clearly and 
totally unacceptable. 
(5) Prepare the factor narrative report and itemize 
the notable attributes of the proposal. The 
narrative discussion of the attributes will 
include a clear but concise explanation of the 
strengths and weaknesses, the degree of impact, 




When the factor evaluator has determined the factor 
rating and completed the factor narrative report, the Item 
Captain will be primarily responsible for the scoring proc-
ess. The Item Captain will accomplish the following proce-
dural steps: 
(1) Review the factor narrative and rating. In the 
management area, the Item Captain w~ll coordi-
nate with the technical area to determine the 
specific impact on the program schedule result-
ing from attributes with a "substantial" degree 
of risk. This activity will actually be ini-
tiated by an Item Captain in the technical area 
who has identified an attribute with a degree 
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of risk value of -224 or less. When the manage-
ment area Item Captain has assessed the impact 
of the attribute on the program schedule, he 
will rescore the Factor rating as appropriate. 
(2) Apply factor weight to the factor ratings by 
multiplying the weight value times the value of 
the factor rating. The product of the weight 
and the factor rating will be the factor 
score. 
(3) When each factor score is determined, sum the 
factor scores to derive the item score. 
(4) Prepare the item narrative summary report. 
The narrative report should include a clear 
and concise discussion of the notable attri-
bute strengths and weaknesses. The management 
item summary should include an assessment of 
the schedule impact of each attribute reporte~ 
by the technical area as having a "substantial" 
degree of risk. 
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Area Level 
When the Item Captain completes the item score and item 
narrative report has been submitted, the primary responsi-
bility for scoring shifts to the area co-chairman. The co-
chairman will accomplish the following procedural steps: 
(1) Sum the item scores to derive the area score. 
(2) Review the DR responses applicable to his 
area and rescore the area as appropriate. 
(J) Prepare area narrative summary. 
(4) Submit area summary report, area score and 
the results of rescoring for inclusion in 
the SSEB report to the SSAC. 
The scoring process for the logistics and management 
areas will utilize the slightly revised Factor Scoring Work-
sheet shown in Figure J2. The factor evaluator will list 
and briefly describe the attributes on the scoring work-
sheet. If a DR is written that is applicable to an attri-
bute, the number of the DR will be recorded in the "DR 
Written" column. The related Cl's will be noted at the 
bottom of the form. Since the attributes will not be scored 
individually in the logistics and management areas, the 
remaining columns of the scoring worksheet will be left 
blank. After evaluating the over-all and combined impact of 
•::; 
the attributes and selecting the appropriate Factor Rating, 
the evaluator will enter the numerical value of the Factor 
Rating in the appropriate blank at the bottom of the scoring 
worksheet. 
FACTOR SCORING WORKSHEET 
CONTRACTOR · FACTOR 
BRIEF DESCRIPTION 
STRENGTH WEAKNESS DEGREE ATTRIBUTE ATTRIBU1E D.R. NATURE OF OF ATTRIBUTE WRITTEN BENEFITS PROB. IMPACT PROB SCORE RES CORED OF OF OF OF RISK 
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When the Item Captain has applied the factor weight to 
the factor rating, he will enter the Factor Score in the 
appropriate blank at the bottom of the scoring worksheet. 
The area co-chairman will enter the results of rescoring, 
based upon DR responses, in the space entitled "Rescore" at 
the bottom of the scoring worksheet. If the rescoring did 
not result in changing a particular Factor Score, the origi-
nal Factor Score value should be entered in the 11 Rescore" 
space. The output of the scoring model for the management 
and logistics areas will be presented in the same format as 
that for the technical and operational areas (as shown in 
Figures 28, 29, and JO, pages 217 and 218). 
Technical/Operations and Logistics/ 
Management Scoring 
The resultant scores for the technical and operations 
areas are based upon criteria related to technological and 
operational requirements of the air vehicle hardware. The 
process used in deriving the scores is based upon an inte-
grated risk assessment of the potential strengths and weak-
nesses of each individual attribute. The importance of the 
attributes in terms of impact on the primary objectives of 
the weapon system is integrated into the proposal score by 
applying factor weights to the individual attributes. 
The resultant scores for the logistics and management 
areas are based on criteria very similar to the present SSEB 
scoring system. The criteria requires that an evaluator 
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assess the over-all and combined impact of all the attri-
butes identified in a factor, and select a single factor 
rating value. The importance of the factor rating in terms 
of the impact on the primary objectives of the weapon system 
is integrated into the proposal score by applying factor 
weights to the factor ratings. 
It is seen that the fundamental differences in the two 
scoring processes are the criteria upon which to base the 
score, and the approaches used to establish the Initial 
Factor Score (technical and operations) and the Factor 
Rating (logistics and management). The feature common to 
both processes is the application of factor weights to in-
corporate a measure of the relative importance of proposal 
strengths and weaknesses in terms of the primary objectives 
of the weapon system. The reader may at first consider it 
an inaccurate procedure to combine the resultant scores of 
these two processes to obtain an over-all proposal score. 
If it were necessary that 10 points of the technical/opera-
tions area score be equivalent to 10 points of the 
logistics/management area score it would be an inaccurate 
procedure to attempt to combine the scores. The two scores 
are not equivalent for the following reasons. First, in the 
technical/operations area a factor with no attributes iden-
tified would meet the minimum requirements of the standard 
but the Initial Factor Score and Adjusted Factor Score would 
be zero, regardless of the weight of the factor. In the 
logistics/management area, a factor with no attributes 
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identified would meet the minimum requirements of the stand-
ard but the factor rating would be 50. The factor rating 
would be multiplied by the appropriate factor weight (say it 
was J) to derive a Factor Score of 150. The second reason 
is that in the technical and operations areas, the Initial 
Factor Score is determined by summing the individual attri-
bute degree of risk values; whereas, in the logistics and 
management areas, the Factor Rating is determined by a qual-
ified assessment of the over-all and combined impact of all 
the attributes which is expressed in a single numerical 
value. 
The differences in the criteria and scoring processes 
for the technical/operations and logistics/management areas 
do not preclude combining the two sets of scores to derive 
an over-all proposal score, if one is necessary. The alge-
braic sum of the two scoring process resultants will provide 
a relative measure of the degree to which the proposals 
satisfy the program requirements and the primary objectives 
of the weapon system. As long as each proposal is scored 
using the same scoring model and methodology, the system 
will be equitable and accurate. The SSAC may choose to 
weigh the importance of the individual area scores based 
upon the type of system hardware, the procurement approach, 
and the particular phase of the source selection action. 
Technical and Cost Area Interaction 
The major findings from the Source Selection 
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Questionnaire reveal that the communication and interaction 
between technical and cost area personnel should be in-
creased for the following reasons: 
(1) Cost data should reflect technical and other 
risks. 
(2) Technical design people could assist in 
improving cost models and programs. 
(J) Cost data does not adequately reflect design, 
materials, and manufacturing processes. 
No attempt will be made here to discuss the methods or 
processes involved to establish contractor prices or inde-
pendent cost estimates by the government. It is important 
to recognize, however, that in any discussion of costs one 
must first specify what kind of costs, whose cost estimates, 
and what type of contract are under study. For example, is 
the discussion focused upon the stated contractor price or 
the independent cost estimate by the Government, or both? 
Also, is the cost under investigation related to a firm 
fixed price contract, an incentive contract, or both? 
Further, is the cost under investigation the relatively 
short-term developmental cost, or does it include the pro-
duction and/or total program costs? While the writer is far 
from knowledgeable in the area of Cost to the Government, 
the following remarks are considered to be consistent with 
major findings of this study. 
Within the cost area, the Independent Cost Estimate 
(ICE) performed by ASD is an innovation which appears to the 
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writer to offer the greatest opportunity for identifying and 
assessing cost risk, regardless of what kind of costs or 
type of contract is under study. Where wide variances exist 
between the ICE and the contractor proposed price a panel or 
team comprised of technical, management, logistics and cost 
personnel, as appropriate, should attempt to identify the 
reasons for the variances. Although the writer has no spe-
cific method to suggest, an acceptable range of costs (in 
terms of realism) should be established to "flag" price 
quotations that appear to constitute a wide variance from a 
realistic estimate. 
Within the technical area, those attributes identified 
as having a substantial degree of risk should be referred to 
the above mentioned cost panel. The cost panel would at-
tempt to assess the risk in terms of impact on the ICE, and 
the realism of the price quotation by the contractor. 
The results of the findings by the cost panel relative 
to variances from the range of realism and the attributes 
with substantial degrees of risk would be included in SSEB 
report to the SSAC. 
CHAPTER IX 
CONCLUSIONS. 
The purpose of this chapter is not to summarize the 
entire study, but rather to stress the more significant con-
clusions and make some recommendations. In addition, to 
point out some areas which are worthy of further study. 
The integrated risk assessment and scoring model devel-
oped in this study provides a system of scoring which is 
adaptable to any particular procurement or management ap-
proach selected for a program. While the study is tailored 
to the Aeronautical Systems Division of AFSC, the basic ap-
proach is applicable to any div~sion of the AFSC, and could 
be adapted to other branches of the Armed Forces. 
There will undoubtedly be those who feel that the model 
and methodology developed in Chapter VIII is too complicated 
and detailed; that the present scoring system should be 
simplified; and that this model is more complex rather than 
simple. The writer suggests that the major findings of the 
Source Selection Questionnaire (see Chapter VI), and the 
recommendations of the Air Force RFP Study Team (22) support 
the conclusions that: 
(1) The output of the present SSEB scoring system 
is inadequate and does not justify the 
resources expended to achieve it. 
(2) Current DoD management concepts for increased 
prototype hardware development and testing, 
and minimum documentation will require more 
selective but increased emphasis on technical 
evaluations, risk assessment and cost 
effectiveness. 
(J) The present SSEB scoring system should be 
changed so as to provide more definitive 
scoring, weighting, and risk assessment at the 
factor and item levels to more accurately 
reflect and synthesize the detailed evaluation 
effort. 
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The scoring system developed in this study is entirely 
consistent with the recommendations of the Air Force RFP 
Study Team, and incorporates the major findings of the 
Source Selection Questionnaire. In reality, the scoring 
system is straightforward and expedient to use. It focuses 
the risk assessment and scoring activity at the factor level 
and permits an evaluator to score individual attributes 
while the detailed evaluation is fresh on his mind. The 
proposal score is, therefore, established incrementally and 
the final output is definitive, comprehensive, incorporates 
an assessment of risks, and is easily traceable by the SSAC. 
Moreover, the system provides the capability to avoid 
scoring redundancies and to rescore proposals based upon DR 
responses. The specific advantages of the model are 
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itemized earlier in the study (seep. 199). 
The technical and operations areas appear to be most 
significant areas (in terms of technological risk) to con-
sider in the Source Selection for a "Competitive Prototype 
Phase" option in the Validation Phase of a developmental 
program. The scoring system developed in this study concen-
trated on these areas in terms of risk assessment, and is, 
therefore, substantially tailored to the current DoD manage-
ment philosophy. If risk assessment of the logistics and 
management areas is desired, the model must be slightly 
expanded to develop more specific and relatable criteria 
upon which to establish quantitative measures of the degree 
of risk in these areas. It is entirely possible that the 
SSAC will prefer to keep the area scores separate rather 
than combining the area scores into a total proposal score. 
The scoring model developed in this study is perfectly 
suited for this option by the SSAC. 
The scoring system developed in this study requires 
that attributes identified in the technical and operations 
areas as having a substantial degree of risk, be reviewed to 
determine their impact on program schedules and cost esti-
mates. While this is considered to be a necessary first 
step toward improved risk assessment, it is recognized that 
much more emphasis and study is needed in these areas. It 
is recommended that follow-on studies be accomplished to 
seek ways to improve the interaction and communication ex-
change between technical and cost personnel. 
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The integrated risk assessment and scoring model devel-
oped in this study is considered by the writer to be a sub-
stantial improvement over the present scoring system. It 
provides the capability of a more accurate and comprehensive 
quantitative measure of the detailed technical evaluation 
performed in accordance with the evaluation criteria and 
plan. The new system could be implemented using the same 
number of personnel required for a given level of effort 
with the present scoring system. 
It is recommended that ASD investigate the possibili-
ties for implementing the new scoring system. Although 
numerous policy changes would be necessary in order to im-
plement the new system, this does not appear to be a major 
problem in view of the current DoD emphasis to update and 
improve existing policy and supporting documents. The major 
policy changes required by the new scoring system are dis-
cussed in Chapter VII of this study. 
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APPENDIX A 
SOURCE SELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
This appendix includes the letter requesting ASD to 
distribute and retrieve the Source Selection Questionnaire, 




Lt Colonel Thomas 
Source Selection Questionnaire 
ASD/SD 
1. The undersigned is presently working to complete a PhD 
in Operations Research under the AFIT program at Oklahoma 
State University. My dissertation will attempt to develop 
an improved methodology for assessing risk in the Source 
Selection Evaluation Board (SSEB) process. 
2. In order to obtain useful and needed information rela-
tive to the SSEB, I have prepared the attached questionnaire. 
The specific purposes of the questionnaire are: 
a. To investigate the existing SSEB process to assist 
in developing an improved and integrated methodology for 
risk assessment. 
b. Obtain a better understanding of the influence that 
the Parallel Undocumented Development (PUD) concept for min-
imum documentation and hardware (prototype) development has 
on current SEB process. 
J. If you approve of the questionnaire and its intended 
use, I propose the following: 
a. I will prepare an adequate number of copies of the 
attached cover letter and questionnaire for widest possible 
dissemination among those personnel who have experience with 
the SSEB process (including PUD concepts). 
b. Request your office distribute and retrieve the 
questionnaires to avoid detailed and time consuming adminis-
trative procedures. 
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c. Upon notification by your office I will pick up the 
questionnaires (or copies of same). 
EVERETT L. THOMAS, JR, Lt Colonel, USAF 
443-30-4127 
1101 N. Jefferson 
Stillwater, Oklahoma 74074 
Telephone: AC 405 377-2880 
2 Atchs 
1. ASD Cover Letter 
2. Questionnaire 
""'I.Y TO 
DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE 
HEADQUARTERS AERONAUTICAL SYSTEMS DIVISION C Al"SC I 
WRIGHT-l"ATTERSON AIR l"ORCE BASE. OHIO ,s,:u1 
ATTN or, SD 13 October 1970 
au..,EcT, Source Selection Questionnaire 
TO, 
l. ASD is exploring ways and means of improving the Source Selection 
·Process. Some of .the actions underway include: 
a •. Hore realistic definition of data requirements including 
specific limitations. 
b •. Risk assessment beyond that previously performed. 
c. Risk avoidance trade-offs. 
2. Preliminary plans are underway to conduct a symposium on this 
·subject to permit obj~ctive discussion of the more important consider-
ations. Additionally, we are fortunate in that AFIT has approved work 
in this area for a dissertation leading to a Ph.D. Support of this 
effort is strongly endorsed in that we can benefit from the analysis 
to be performed, as well as the identification of ideas for the forth-
coming symposium. 
3. It is requested that you provide support by completing the 
attached questionnaire and returning it to the undersigned within 
five work days after receipt. · 
4, The followi_ng is I'equested I'elative to the questionnaire: 
a. In responding to any of the questions attached, be especially 
careful not to divulge sensitive source selection information. Be 
guided by the requirements of PaI'agI'aphs 7 and 8, AFR 70-15. 
b. Answer questions objectively and candidly, 
c, Carefully read the notes prec.edi_ng each question. 
d. Do not hesitate to include constructive conments or remarks 
which you feel are appropriate to the area in question. 
e. Your response need not be typed. 
f. Use additional paper as required, but be sure to carefully 
reference the question you are address~ng. 
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5. Responses to this questionnaire will be used to evaluate some 
ways in which the SoQ1'ce Selection process may be improved, particu-
larly in the area of risk identification and assessment. It ia 
impOZ"tant that you give us the benefit of your candid thoughts, ideas, 
and experience. 
c:·ks-: ... .._, ... ;.;:;;{. ·:·:· -<:..~ l .. 
/ )1. ARTHUR BOYKINf J~ ' . 
l/" Technical Director/Weapons Systems 




NOTE: For Qu0~tion 1, fill in th~ bl&n.k~ a§ ~ppr~priAt@. 
Be sure to ~tate th~ area, item or f&ctor de~oription (not 
code) for the level in the SSEB. 
1. My participation in the Scrqri:,Hri S~lection prtHHHili! ha.Ii 
been: 
a. Approximate yl11!at'liJ Ell'.x:ptl)rienc ~ j_ !!l y@Artt. 
h. L~vel and frequency (appro~im&teJ of p~rticip~tion. 
L~vel. No. of PrOJ5.f'MU!_ 
SSAC 
SSEB 
. . . . ' . . ~ ' . " . . ~ ' 
Chairman ••••••.••• 
Co-Chairman (Area ) .••• 
Item Captain (Item ) •.•• 
Factor Member (Factor_) •.• 
Contract Definition. • ... 
Cost to Govt •••.•••• 
NOTE: Question 2 is designed to get your views on how the 
minimum documentation concept has affected the difficulty 
level of technical evaluation, as compared to your experi-
ence with other programs where more specific data require-
ments existed. If this is your first SSEB, answer the 
question based upon comparing the available data with what 
you consider minimum acceptable data. Circle the word in 
brackets which you feel most accurately completes the state-
ment and put a check mark in the blanks by the statement or 
statements which are reasons for your answer. Do not hesi-
tate to check the last blank and provide other reasons you 
feel are applicable. 
2. As currently applied, the PUD concept for minimum docu-
mentation has made the SSEB technical evaluation (more/ 
equally/less) difficult because: 
Too much latitude allowed in technical data 
requirements. 
Technical data generally better in all respects. 
Technical data not significantly influenced by PUU 
Variance in data submittal formats between 
proposals. 
Variance in the depth of technical data between 
proposals. 
Standards too general and hard to apply. 
Standards too detailed and restrictive. 
Standards satisfactory. 
Technical risks easier to identify and assess. 
Technical risks harder to identify and assess. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
NOTE: Question 3 is designed to get your views on the dif-
ferences, if any, between evaluating proposals for prototype 
hardware and proposals for paper study output; i.e., what is 
difference in data requirements to adequately evaluate? 
Also, is the job of evaluating proposals for hardware 
basically more difficult? If your experience is limited, 
answer to best of your ability. Do not hesitate to identify 
other reasons. 
J. Compared to evaluating proposals for "paper" studies, 
the technical evaluation in the SSEB process is (more/ 
equally/less) difficult when proposals are responsive to RFP 
for prototype hardware development because: 
It is necessary to obtain and review more data. 
Data requirements and review are the same. 
Less data review is required for hardware 
proposals. 
Level of evaluation effort always greater with 
hardware. 
Level of evaluation effort less with hardware. 
Level of evaluation effort the same. 
More emphasis on technical risk with hardware 
proposals. 
Emphasis on technical risks the same. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
NOTE: Question 4 is designed to get your views on the SSEB 
scoring process in general. Answer question candidly and to 
best of your ability regardless of your experience level. 
Do not hesitate to identify other reasons. 
4. The SSEB scoring process at the factor and item level 
(should/should not) be modified because: 
Present system is adequate and preferred. 
Present system is absolutely superior. 
Present system tends to force scores toward 
average. 
Upward flow of evaluation information is 
constrained. 
More definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level. 
Less definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level. 
Technical risk too difficult to integrate into 
score. 
Present scoring system tends to compromise the 
motivation for professional excellence in the 
evaluator. 
Emphasis should be placed upon factor and item 
evaluators to rank proposals against each other 
as well as against standards. 
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Scoring and weighting should be accomplished at 
the factor and item level consistent with the pri-
mary objectives/requirements of the weapon system. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
NOTE: Question 5 is designed to get your views on ways to 
which technical considerations should be integrated into the 
cost estimates and cost risks. Answer the question to the 
best of your ability. Do not hesitate to provide other rea-
sons you feel are applicable. 
5. The communication and interaction between cost and tech-
nical design personnel should be (increased/no change/ 
decreased) because: 
---
Current system is adequate and preferred. 
Cost data should be divorced from technical 
design. 
Cost data does not adequately reflect design, 
material, and manufacturing processes. 
Cost data should in some way reflect technical and 
other risks. 
Technical design people could assist in improving 
cost models and programs. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
NOTE: Question 6 should be answered in your own words based 
on the following assumptions: 
Assumption 1: A prototype aircraft is a system which 
is expected to demonstrate the operational flight char-
acteristics and performance requirements specified in 
the RFP. Emphasis here is on flying qualities. 
Assumption 2: You will be responsible for an adequate 
technical evaluation of contractor proposals for the 
prototype A/C in your particular area. 
Assumption J: Minimum data required for evaluation of 
the proposal in your area is that data which you will 
need to adequately evaluate a prototype aircraft as 
defined in Assumption 1. That is, minimum data is data 
you need and will use now. 
Assumption 4: Deferred data is that data which will, 
or may, be needed later on in the program but is not 
minimum data. That is, deferred data is data you do 
not need now to specifically evaluate a prototype air-
craft as defined in Assumption 1. 
6. In your specific area, what do you consider to be mini-
mum data? (Be as specific as you can. What is the minimum 
amount of information you can give the contractor in terms 
of data requirements and expect a qualified bidder to 
respond with adequate data for evaluation in your area.) 
NOTE: Answer Question 7 in your own words. 
7. What influence and impact on the SSEB evaluation process 
does the Contractor Inquiry and Deficiency Report have on: 
a. Technical Evaluation? 
b. Risk Assessment? 
c. Scoring? 
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SOURCE SELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE distributed 20 October 70 to 
following: 
SD (Systems Management) 
Col. E. M. Stringer SD-3 
E. L. Gentit SD-3 
P. B. McKee SD-3 
O. z. Brenning SD-10 
J. S. McCollom SDU 
R. C. Murrin SD-65 
C. W. Kuehne SDQ 
D. M. Young SDQP 
Col. J. E. Hildebrandt SDX 
G. W. Altherr SDX 
J. D. Pierson SDMC 
S. A. Tremaine SDMC 
T. J. Cox SDMC 
Col. G. E. Brunsman SDQH 
PP (Procurement & Production) 
E. J. Trusela PP 
Col. C. K. Dunlap PP 
Mr. R. E. Wallace PP 
XR (Development Planning) 
G. w. Estepp 
E. A. Langleban 
R. c. Lenz, Jr. 
K. P. Schlosser 
H. P. Stachowski 
R. R. Stalder 
SM (Subsystems Management) 
R. A. Bittner 
Col. J.M. DuBois 
YA (C-5A) 
M. C. Chase 
Col. K. N. Beckman 
YF (F-15) 
Paul Staadt 
R. E. Maloney 
F. T. Rall 
Col. H. L. Orthman 
Col. L. M. N. Wenzel 
YG (AGM-69) 




A. L. Sea 
Paul Hockman 
R. M. Reinhardt 
P.R. Doty 
Col. R. L. Miner 
Col. Roccaforte (AFLC) 
EN (Engineering) 
Col. R. P. Daly 
L. J. Charnock 
W. L. Sullivan 
J. H. Hausmann 
B. Levine 
H. w. Sprague 
w. M. Roberts 
B. B. Kingman 
w. D. Wall 
J. w. Carlson 
T. s. Liu 
H. s. Brown 
A. Puslat 
D. c. Norman 
P. A. Simmons 
w. M. Stowe 
R. c. Perdzock 
A. M. Friedman 
W. M. Stowe 
B. L. Paris 
H. w. Schmidt 
B. B. Mishkind 
D. J. Wallick 
Comptroller (AC) 
H.F. Weiler 
C. W. Adams 
Col. M. Collier 
Air Force Aeropropulsion 
Laboratory 
E. C. Simpson AFAPL/TB 
APPENDIX B 
ANALYSIS OF THE SOURCE SELECTION QUESTIONNAIRE 
Introduction 
Forty-four respondents completed and returned the 
Source Selection questionnaire in Appendix A. Question 
number one was designed to obtain information relative to 
the experience level of the respondents. This objective and 
quantifiable information was necessary to validate the qual-
ifications of the respondents so as to establish the. 
credibility of using the questionnaire answers to derive 
meaningful conclusions. Questions 2 and 3 address the prob-
lem of assessing the difficulty level of technical evalua-
tion in the SSEB process using the "minimum documentation" 
and "prototype hardware development" concepts of the current 
DoD management philosophy. Questions 4, 5, and 7 address 
the problem of assessing the adequacy of the current SSEB 
rating/scoring system presently in use by ASD. Question 6 
was designed to obtain information which would permit an 
evaluation of what constitutes minimum documentation on a 
prototype hardware developmental program. 
The problem areas addressed in this questionnaire are, 
by nature, very difficult to express in quantitative terms. 
For this reason, the writer attempted to design the 
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questions 2 through 5 such that key alternative answers 
could be selected by a respondent, based upon his experience 
and judgment. While this approach did not permit a sophis-
ticated quantitative analysis of the answers, it did make a 
credible analysis and evaluation feasible. 
The approach used for questions 2 through 5 was to ask 
the respondent to select a condition which best fit the sit-
uation posed in the question. For example, in question 2 
the respondent was asked to select one of the following 
conditions: more difficult, equally difficult, or less dif-
ficult. Next, the respondents were asked to check alterna-
tive answers which they felt best supported their selection 
of a particular condition. The analysis consisted of 
determining the percentage of respondents which selected 
each condition and alternative answer. In this analysis, 
the respondent answers were evaluated as a total group, and 
by several different categories according to experience 
levels. 
The approach used for question 6 was to ask each 
respondent to narratively describe "minimum data" required 
to satisfy the assumptions given. The answers given by the 
respondents were excellent, but could not be analyzed or 
evaluated in any meaningful way. The most frequent and best 
substantiated answers given by the respondents are summa~ 
rized in this analysis. 
The approach used for question 7 was to ask each 
respondent to narratively describe the impact of the 
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Contractor Inquiry (CI) and Deficiency Report (DR) on tech-
nical evaluation, risk assessment, and scoring in the Source 
Selection process. lbe answers by respondents were similar 
enough to allow a meaningful analysis. The answers were 
divided into several categories and the percentage of 
respondent answers in each category determined. 
Analysis of Question Number 1: 
Experience Level 
Question number 1. My participation in the Source Selection 
process has been: 
a. Approximate years experience is years. 





Chairman. • ••.••••. 
. . . 
Co-Chairman (Area 
Item Captain (Item 
Factor Member (Factor 
Contract Definition 
Cost to Govt. 
) . . . . . . --- ) . . ---__ ). 
1. General 
No. of Programs 
The questionnaire was designed to obtain answers which 
would permit analysis of the respondents by total years 
experience within the Source Selection process, and by fre-
quency of participation in Source Selection actions at dif-
ferent functional levels. The following paragraphs show 
various analyses of the respondents' experience by time and 
functional level. 
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2. Respondents Experience by Years 
(a) Average Years Experience 
All 44 respondents represented 472 years experience. 
This averages 10.72 years per respondent. 
(b) Years Experience Versus Number of Respondents 
The total years Source Selection Experience of respond-
ents ranged from less than one year to 31 years. Table 
XXXII shows approximately one-third of the respondents had 
0-5 years experience, one-third had 6-10 years experience, 
and one-third had 11-31 years experience. 
TABLE XXXII 


















The average experience level (10.72 years) falls in the 
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upper extreme of the 6-10 year group which makes up the 
middle third of the population of respondents. The cause 
for this was the wide spread of years experience in the 
upper third of the population of respondents. For example, 
11 of the 15 respondents in the upper third had 16-31 years 
experience. 
(c) Civil Service Versus Military 
Of the 44 total respondents, 36 were Civil Service and 











(d) Years Experience by Functional Level 
Table XXXIII categorizes respondents by the highest 
functional level of the SSAC/SSEB in which they have served, 
and shows the average years experience level for each 
category. 
The single respondent whose highest functional level 
was as a member of a cost team is hardly a representative 
sample. For this reason, the cost area will not be consid-
ered a significant part of this analysis effort. The most 
likely reason for the relatively low average experience of 
SSEB Chairmen is that the Chairman is usually the SPO 
Director. The SPO Director of major weapon system programs 
is almost always an experienced, high-ranking, and 
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relatively-transient Air Force Officer. The 10 to 14 years 
average experience level for the SSAC, Co-Chairman, Item 
Captains, and Factor Member respondents tends to strengthen 
the validity of any analysis made using these categories. 
TABLE XXXIII 
YEARS EXPERIENCE BY FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Highest Functional Level Number Total Average Yrs. 
Respondents Years Experience 
SSAC 13 141 10.85 
SSEB Chairman 8 36 4.o 
SSEB Co-Chairman 12 161 13.41 
SSEB Item Captain 6 86 14.32 
SSEJ3 Factor Member 4 43 10.75 
Cost to Govt. Team 1 6 6.0 
3. Respondents Experience in Source 
Selection Activities 
(a) Total Source Selection Activities 
by Functional Level 
This analysis shows the total number of different 
Source Selection activities participated in by all respond-
ents according to functional area served in. 
This total of 235 does not represent 235 separate 
Source Selection programs. It is the total number of 
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separate Source Selection functions performed in Source 
Selection programs. In this analysis, only respondents 
which have served on the SSAC could perform the 50 SSAC 
activities, but these respondents could also have performed 
some of the subordinate functions. SSAC and SSEB Chairmen 
are the only respondents who could have performed the 20 
Chairman Activities, etc., etc. 
TABLE XXXIV 








Cost to Government 
Total 
Total Number of 









Table XXXIV shows that the collective experience of the 
44 respondents in specific Source Selection activities is 
substantial. This is particularly true for the SSAC, Co-
Chairman, Item Captain, and Factor Member Activities. 
(b) Source Selection Activities by 
Highest Functional Level 
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This analysis, shown in Table XXXV, gives the number of 
specific Source Selection activities performed by functional 
level, by the highest functional level in which respondents 
served. For example, it shows above the diagonal, a break-
out of how many different activities, by functional level, 
were performed by the 13 respondents who had served as mem-
bers of the SSAC. The number below the diagonal is the 
average number of these specific activities that were per-
formed by each of these 13 SSAC members. 
In the right-hand column, the total number of activi-
ties (at all functional levels) accomplished by that func-
tional level group is given above the diagonal. For 
example, the 13 SSAC members performed a total of 100 
separate Source Selection Activities at various functional 
levels. The number below the diagonal in the right-hand 
column is the average number of activities (at various 
levels) performed by the respondents in that "highest 
functional level" group. For example, the average number of 
combined activities performed by the SSAC members is 7.7. 
The bottom "Total" row is simply the same analysis as 
in paragraph 3(a) above. The percentages at the bottom of 
Table XXXV are the percentages of this total performed by 
"highest functional level" groups. 
This analysis clearly shows that the 13 SSAC respond-
ents are far more experienced in Source Selection 
TABLE XXXV 
SOURCE SELECTION ACTIONS PERFORMED BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
EXPERIENCE OF RESPONDENTS 




CO- ITEM FACTOR CONTRACT COST TO 
CHAIRMAN CHAIRMAN CAPTAIN MEMBER DEFINITION GCNERNMENT 
L 
s A~ A~~·~~~A~ AVG. AVG. AVG. AVG. AVG. AVG. AVG. 
SSAC ~ ~ y.; ~ ~ ~ ~ . . 5 
SSEB ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ CHAIRMAN 5 
SSEB Xo ~ ~ ~ ~ CO-CHAIRMAN 0 4 
SSEB ~ ~ ~ ~ ITEM CAPTAIN 5 5 
SSEB ~ Yo y; FACTOR MEMBER 5 
SSEB COST ~ 
TOTAL 50 20 47 43 53 10 12 
SSAC 100% 30% 15% 35% 28.3% 50% 16.5% 
PERCENTAGES 
OF 
CHAIRMAN 70% 8.5% 9.7% 3.7% 0% 0% 
ACTIVITIES co- 76.5% 20.3% 5.6% 20% 67% 
PERFORMED . CHAIRMAN 
BY HIGHEST ITEM 35% 19% 10% 0% 
FUNCTIONAL CAPTAIN" 
LEVEL FACTOR 43.4% 20% 0% MEMBER 
COST 16.5% 
100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 
*ACT. • ACTUAL NUMBER OF ACTIVITIES PERFORMED BY RESPONDANTS 




















activities than all other respondents, accomplishing 42.5% 
of the total (235) activities and averaging 7.7 activities 
per respondent. In every functional level below SSAC, the 
SSAC respondents were second best qualified in terms of 
average number of activities per respondent, except for the 
"Cost to Government" function. In every case, the best 
qualified in a particular functional level, in terms of 
activities per respondent, was the group of respondents 
whose highest functional level was that particular func-
tional level. That is to say, the "best qualified" as 
Chairman was the group of 8 respondents whose highest func-
tional level was SSEB Chairman. The "best qualified" as 
Item Captain was the group of six respondents whose highest 
functional level was SSEB Item Captain, etc. While the four 
factor members had not worked above that level, they had the 
second highest average of activities per respondent (6.2), 
but only accounted for 10.6% of the total (235) activities. 
Next to the SSAC members, the SSEB Co-Chairman (12 respond-
ents) were most widely experienced, accounting for 25% of 
the total (235) activities performed and averaging 4.9 ac-
tivities per respondent. 
The eight respondents making up the SSEB Chairman group 
I 
were the. 11 least qualified" in every functional level except 
their own (Chairman) level. "Least qualified" refers only 
to the average number of Source Selection activities per 
respondent. This should come as no surprise, for it is 
very consistent with the years experience analysis 
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(paragraph 2(d) above) and the type of individuals (Military 
SPO Directors) used as SSEB Chairmen. 
Analysis of Question Number 2: 
Minimum Documentation 
Question Number 2. As currently applied, the PUD concept 
for minimum documentation has made the SSEB technical eval-




Too much latitude allowed in technical data 
requirements. 
Technical data generally better in all respects. 
Technical data not significantly influenced by 
PUD. 
Variance in data submittal formats between 
proposals. 
Variance in the depth of technical data between 
proposals. 
Standards too general and hard to apply. 
Standards too detailed and restrictive. 
Standards satisfactory. 
Technical risks easier to identify and assess. 
Technical risks harder to identify and assess. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
1. General 
This question was designed to obtain answers relative 
to the difficulty of technical evaluation in the SSEB evalu-
ation process as a result of the minimum documentation con-
cept within the current DoD management philosophy. Several 
respondents were not familiar with the term 11 PUD 11 • Others 
were familiar with PUD, but had not been associated with a 
program to which the minimum documentation concept, per se, 
was applied. The following analysis will present the an-
swers of respondents as a total group, and by several dif-
ferent aspects of experience level. The "other reasons" 
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provided by respondents will be summarized at the end of 
each section. The same analysis approach used for question 
2 will also be used in the sections for questions 3, 4, and 
5. 
2. Answers by Highest Functional Level 
Table XXXVI shows respondent answers as a total group 
and also by the highest functional level in which each re-
spondent has served. The highest functional level of 13 of 
the 44 respondents was the SSAC. The highest functional 
level of 8 of 44 respondents was SSEB Chairman, etc. The 
questionnaire alternative answers are abbreviated here for 
convenience only. 
These data are presented by percentage of respondents 
in the next paragraph. 
(a) Percentage of Respondents by Answer Given 
This analysis, summarized in Table XXXVII, shows the 
percentage of total respondents that marked each alternative 
answer to question 2. In addition, it shows the percentage 
of respondents, by highest functional level, that marked 
each alternative answer to question 2. These data are 
essentially the same as that presented in Table XXXVI. The 
difference is that the data are expressed as a percentage 
of the total respondents in a category that marked each 
alternative answer. For example, 29.5% of the 44 respond-
ents gave no response to question 2. Of the 13 SSAC 
TABLE XXXVI 
ANSWERS TO QUESTION 2 BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Respondent Answers Total Highest Functional Level of ResEondents 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Chairman 
( 44) (13) (8) (12) ( 6) ( 4) ( 1) 
No response 13 3 3 4 3 0 0 
More difficult 17 5 2 3 2 4 1 
Equally difficult 8 3 1 4 0 0 0 
Less difficult 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Too much latitude 8 3 2 0 1 2 0 
Tech Data better 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Tech Data not influenced 3 2 0 1 0 0 0 
Variance in formats 7 2 2 0 1 2 0 
Variance in depth 16 5 3 3 1 4 0 
Standards too general 7 2 0 1 1 3 0 
Standards too detailed 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Standards satisfactory 4 2 0 0 1 1 0 
Technical risk easier 3 2 0 0 1 0 0 
Technical risk harder 11 5 0 0 2 4 0 





PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS BY ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 2 
Alternative Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item 
Answers Respondents Chairman Captain 
No response 29.5 2J.O 37.5 33.3 50.0 
More difficult 38.0 38.5 25.0 25.0 33.3 
Equally difficult 18.2 23.0 12.5 33.3 0 
Less difficult 6.8 15.4 0 0 16.7 
Too much latitude 18.2 23.0 25.0 0 16.7 
Tech data better 4.5 7.7 0 0 16.7 
Tech data not influenced 6.8 15.4 0 8.3 0 
Variance in formats 15.9 15.4 25.0 0 16.7 
Variance in depth 36.4 38.5 37.5 25.0 16.7 
Standards too general 15.9 15.4 0 8.3 16. 7 
Standards too detailed 2.3 7.7 0 0 0 
Standards satisfactory 9.1 15.4 0 0 16.7 
Technical risk easier 6.8 15.4 0 0 16.7 
Technical risk harder 25.0 38.5 0 0 33.3 





































respondents, 23% of them gave no response to question 2. 
3. Comparison of Answers by SSAC and SSEB 
This analysis compares the percentage of SSAC respond-
ents marking each alternative answer to question 2 with the 
percentage of SSEB respondents marking each alternative 
answer. Of the 44 respondents, 13 were members of the SSAC 
and 31 were members of the SSEB. This data is shown in 
Table XXXVIII. 
TABLE XXXVIII 
PERCENTAGE OF ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS (QUESTION 2) 
BY SSAC · AND .SSEB 





Too much latitude 
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Tech data not influenced 
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Standards too general 
Standards too detailed 
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4. Comparison of Answers by Years 
Experience of Respondents 
There were 13 respondents with 5 years or less Source 
Selection experience, 16 respondents with 6 to 10 years 
experience, and 15 respondents with 11 to 31 years experi-
ence. Table XXXIX shows how these three groups selected the 
alternative answers to question 2. The left column under 
each experience category shows the percentage of respondents 
in that category that selected that alternative answer. The 
right column under each experience category shows, for that 
particular category, the percentage of the total number of 
respondents selecting that answer. 
5. Summary of "Other Reaons" 
This section summarizes the other reasons given by 
respondents to support saying that the technical evaluation 
is more, equally, or less difficult due to minimum documen-
tation. The numbers in parentheses adjacent to the reasons 
refer to the numbered reasons in Table XXVII of Chapter VI. 
(a) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
More Difficult 
( 1) SSAC (2) Evaluator reluctant to 
draw conclusions from 
minimum data 
(2) State-of-art areas not 
addressed are scored down 
for lack of response 
(2) SSEB Chairman (1) Lack of specific guidance 
in RFP 
(2) Lack of Source Selection 
TABLE XXXIX 
RESPONDENT ANSWERS (QUESTION 2) BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Alternative Answers ExEerience Level 
5 yrs or less 6 to 10 yrs 
(13 respondents) (16 respondents) 
No response 30.8 30.8 37.5 46.2 
More difficult 38.5 29.5 31.2 29.5 
Equally difficult 7.7 12.5 12.5 25.0 
Less difficult 15.4 67.0 6.2 33.0 
Too much latitude 30.8 50.0 0 0 
Tech data better 15. 4 100.0 0 0 
Tech data not influenced 0 0 12.5 67.0 
Variance in formats 30.8 57.2 0 0 
Variance in depth 46.o 37-5 25.0 25.0 
Standards too general 15.4 28.6 12.5 28.6 
Standards too detailed 0 0 6.2 100.0 
Standards satisfactory 7.7 25.0 6.2 25.0 
Technical risk easier 15. 4 67.0 6.2 33.0 
Technical risk harder 23.0 27.3 12.5 18. 3 
Other reasons 53.8 36.8 43.7 J6.8 
11 to 31 yrs 
( 15 respondents) 
20.0 23.0 
















( J) SSEB Co-
Chairman 
(4) SSEB Item 
Captains 




addressing PUD concept 
(1) Lack of specific proce-
dures allows latitude in 
data which may result in 
reduced data submittal in 
areas where contractor is 
deficient -- but this is 
hard to determine 
(1) Benefits of PUD overshad-
owed by importance of 
RFP. Not felt that PUD 
will significantly influ-
ence data 
(1) Amount of data required is 
directly related to level 
of evaluation desired. 
Minimum documentation gets 
minimum evaluation 
(1) Even though minimum data 
is submitte~ higher level 
management requires de-
tailed evaluation and 
answers 
(2) Difficult to treat each 
contractor equally with 
minimum documentation 
(1) High quality evaluation 
requires high quality and 
sufficient quantity data. 
Lack of data and methods 
creates a risk in 
evaluation. 
(b) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
Equally Difficult 
( 1) SSAC Disengagement concept of 
PUD resulted in identifi-
cation of a minimum of 
design deficiencies, and 
their correctability 
could only be estimated. 
From a strictly technical 
viewpoint, technical eval:-
uation not influenced by 
PUD - but over-all evalua-. 
tion is. 
(2) SSEB Chairman (1) Specifying exact data 
needed would simplify 
evaluation but create big 
problem in RFP. Better 
to clearly define minimum 
data with latitude to 
expand. 
(J) SSEB Co-Chairman - Does not feel PUD will 
significantly influence 
data. 
(1) RFP data requirements 
must be consistent with 
level of evaluation 
desired 
(1) Factors that increase 
need for data are: (a) 
Requirements that are 
broad in scope, unclear, 
or complex in defining 
operational needs, (b) 
Extent of documentation 
required to fully struc-
ture definitive contract, 
(c) system technical 
complexity. 
(c) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
Less Difficult 
SSAC - PUD forced contractors to "think". 
(1) Technical evaluation under PUD allows 
concentration on important issues and 
to leave out trivia. 
(d) Other Remarks Where More/Equally/ 
Less Difficult Was Not Specified 
(1) SSEB Chairman - Not familiar with PUD - but 
B-1 approach was good. 
Suggested a data matrix in 
RFP to be specific on data 
requirements, plus allow ade-
quate time for CI/DR replies. 
Sees PUD simply delaying ma-
jor evaluation effort until 
after prototype phase. 
(2) SSEB Co- (1) Difficulty level related 
Chairman to how well RFP estab-
lishes data requirements 
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consistent with desired 
level of technical 
evaluation. 
Analysis of Question Number J: "Paper" 
Versus Hardware Studies 
Question Number J. Compared to evaluating proposals for 
"paper" studies, the technical evaluation in the SSEB proc-
ess is (more, equally, less) difficult when proposals are 
responsive to RFP for prototype hardware development 
because: 
It is necessary to obtain and review more data. 
Data requirements and review are the same. 
Less data review is required for hardware 
proposals. 
Level of evaluation effort always greater with 
hardware. 
Level of evaluation effort less with hardware. 
Level of evaluation effort the same. 
More emphasis on technical risk with hardware 
proposals. 
Emphasis on technical risks the same. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
1. General 
This question was designed to obtain data which would 
allow assessment of differences, if any, in the difficulty 
level of technical evaluation of "paper studies" versus 
prototype hardware. As used in this question, "paper 
studies" refer to competitive Source Selection for which the 
immediate objective and product of the winning contractor 
will be a complete engineering, design, and management pro-
posal which will be periodically reviewed and approved prior 
to development and production of hardware. Prototype hard-
ware development refers to Competitive Source Selection for 
which the immediate objective and product of the winning 
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contractor(s) will be the development and fabrication of 
prototype hardware in accordance with detailed engineering 
and design approaches evaluated and approved in the Source 
Selection process. 
This analysis follows the same pattern established in 
the analysis of question number 2 of the questionnaire. 
2. Answers by Highest Functional Level 
Table XL shows respondents' answers as a total group 
and also by the highest functional level in which each re-
spondent served. 
(a) Percentage of Respondents by 
Answer Given 
This analysis is the same type as that performed in 
Table XXXVII and is shown in Table XLI. 
(b) Comparison of Answers by SSAC and SSEB 
This analysis was performed in the same manner as 
described in previous sections. 
Table XLII. 
The results are shown in 
(c) Comparison of Answers by Years 
Experience of Respondents 
Tilis analysis was performed in the same manner as 
described in previous sections. 
Table XLIII. 
The results are shown in 
TABLE XL 
ANSWERS TO QUESTION J BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Respondent Answers Total Highest Functional Level of ResEondent 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor 
Chairman 
(44) (13) (8) (12) (6) (4) 
No response 5 1 0 2 1 0 
More difficult 25 9 5 6 3 2 
Equally difficult 7 1 1 2 2 1 
Less difficult 7 2 2 2 0 1 
Obtain and review more 14 7 1 1 4 1 
Data requirements same 4 1 1 0 1 1 
Less review required 3 1 2 0 0 0 
Level greater 19 8 2 4 3 2 
Level less 2 0 2 0 0 0 
Level same 4 0 1 2 1 0 
More emphasis on risk 20 7 2 5 4 2 
Emphasis on risk same 2 1 0 0 1 0 




















PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS BY ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 3 
Alternative Answers Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item 
Respondents Chairman Captain 
No response 11.4 7.7 0 16.7 16.7 
More difficult 56.8 69.2 62.5 50.0 50.0 
Equally difficult 15.9 7.7 12.5 16.7 33.3 
Less difficult 15.9 15.4 25.0 16.7 0 
Obtain and review more 31.8 53.8 12.5 8.4 66.6 
Data requirements same 9.1 7.7 12.5 0 16.7 
Less review required 6.8 7.7 25.0 0 0 
Level greater 43.2 61.5 25.0 33.3 50.0 
Level less 4.5 0 25.0 0 0 
Level same 9.1 0 12.5 16.7 16.7 
More emphasis on risk 45.5 53.8 25.0 41.6 66.6 
Emphasis on risk same 4.5 7.7 0 0 16.7 
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5. Summary of "Other Reasons" 
This analysis summarizes the "other reasons" given by 
respondents to support saying that the technical evaluation 
was more, equally, or less difficult with prototype hardware 
development. 
(a) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
More Difficult 
( 1) SSAC (1) Greater visibility with 
hardware; therefore, a 
closer look at risk. 
Dollar risks greater and 
schedule risks more 
important. 
(2) Proposals for hardware 
concentrate on perform-
ance promises. 
(2) Greater depth of detailed 
review required 
(2) SSEB Chairman Hardware requires more defin-




(2) Easier to set standards 
but more rigorous 
evaluation 
(2) Effort increased because 
both prototype and pro-
duction configurations, 
as well as relationships 
between them, must be 
considered. Effort re-
duced because some con-
siderations can be 
deferred until after 
prototype, and are not 
essential to initial 
selection. 
(2) Effort increased since 
committed to a configu-
ration sooner. 
(1) Consequences of hardware 
greater 
- End product more precise, 
judgment of adequacy more 
difficult, and RFP does 
(4) SSEB Item 
Captain 
(5) SSEB Factor 
·Captain 
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not adequately establish 
requirements. 
(2) More rigorous evaluation/ 
defense at highest 
management levels. 
(2) Increased order of diffi-
culty if RFP considers 
production hardware 
compared to prototype. 
(1) Cost of failure greater 
with hardware. 
(b) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
Equally Difficult 
(1) SSEB Chairman - Level of effort is essen-
(2) SSEB Co-
Chairman 
(J) SSEB Item 
Captain 
tially dependent upon type 
of contract. 
Cannot compare since looking 
at different things 
Paper studies require less 
data but both equally 
difficult 
(c) Reasons Technical Evaluation 
Less Difficult 
(1) SSAC 
(2) SSEB Chairman 
( J) SSEB Co-
Chairman 
(4) SSEB Factor 
Member 
Hardware easier due to quan-
tifiable measures. 
If RFP is structured to 
clearly limit response of 
technical team, addressing 
only high risk areas of tech-
nical concern, evaluation 
would require less total 
volume of data and be less 
difficult. 
In prototype hardware more 
data required but evaluation 
easier since standards can be 
more precise. 
Less difficult by nature of 
more definitive data. 
- Level of respoftsibility for 
prototype hardware is criti-
cal in cost area and, there-
fore, requires more accurate 
technical evaluation and 
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accuracy in contractor 
response. 
Analysis of Question Number 4: SSEB 
Scoring Process 
Question Number 4. The SSEB scoring process at the factor 
and item level (should/should not) be modified because: 
Present system is adequate and preferred. 
Present system is absolutely superior. 
Present system tends to force scores toward 
average. 
Upward flow of evaluation information is 
constrained. 
More definitive ran.king/scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level. 
Less definitive ranking/scoring of proposals 
needed at factor level. 
Technical risk too difficult to integrate into 
score. 
Present scoring system tends to compromise the 
motivation for professional excellence in the 
evaluator. 
~~~ Emphasis should be placed upon factor and item 
evaluators to rank proposals against each other 
as well as against standards. 
Scoring and weighting should be accomplished at 
the factor and item level consistent with the 
primary objectives/requirements of the weapon 
system. 
1. General 
This question was designed to obtain data which would 
allow an evaluation of the adequacy of the present SSEB 
rating/scoring process which is applied to all developmental 
programs. The question was not intended to compare the ade-
quacy of the scoring system applied to different management/ 
contract approaches. This analysis follows the same pattern 
established in previous sections. 
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2. Answers by Highest Functional Level 
Table XLIV shows respondent answers as a total group 
and also by the highest functional level in which each re-
spondent has served. See paragraph (2) under the section 
for analysis of' question number 2 for further explanation. 
(a) Percentage of' Respondents by 
Answer Given 
This analysis was performed in a manner described in 
previous sections. The results are shown in Table XLV. 
(b) Comparison of' Answers by SSAC 
and SSEB 
This analysis used the approach established in previous 
sections. The results are shown in Table XLVI. 
(c) Comparison of' Answers by Years 
Experience of' Respondents 
This analysis used the approach described in previous 
sections. The results are shown in Table XLVII. 
J. Summary of' "Other Reasons" 
This section summarizes the other reasons given by 
respondents to support saying that the rating/scoring sys-
tem should or should not be modified. The numbers in 
parenthesis refer to the numbered order of' reasons in Table 
XI of' Chapter VI. 
TABLE XLIV 
ANSWERS TO QUESTION 4 BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Respondent Answers Total Highest Functional Level of ResEondents 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Chairman 
(44) ( 1.3) (8) ( 12) (6) ( 4) { 1) 
No response 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Should be modified 28 10 6 .3 5 4: 0 
Should not be modified 1.3 .3 1 8 1 0 0 
Present system adequate 12 .3 1 8 0 0 0 
Present system superior 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
System forces to average 16 5 5 J 2 1 0 
Upward flow constrained 5 2 1 1 1 0 0 
More definitization needed 9 .3 2 0 .3 1 0 
Less definitization required 2 1 0 1 0 0 0 
Technical risk too difficult 9 .3 2 2 1 1 0 
Present system compromises 6 1 1 0 1 .3 0 
Emphasis on ranking 10 .3 1 2 .3 1 0 
Scores/weighting by factor 9 4 1 0 2 2 0 





PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS BY ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 4 
Alternative Answers Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item 
Respondents Chairman 
No response 2.3 0 0 8.4 0 
Should be modified 63.7 77.0 75.0 25.0 83.4 
Should not be modified 29.5 23.0 12.5 66.6 16.6 
Present system adequate 27.3 23.0 12.5 66.6 0 
Present system superior 0 0 0 0 0 
System forces to average 36.4 38.5 62.5 25.0 33.3 
Upward flow constrained 11. 4 15.4 12.5 8.4 16.6 
More definitization needed 20.4 23.0 25.0 0 50.0 
Less definitization required 4.5 7.7 0 8.4 0 
Technical risk too difficult 20.4 23.0 25.0 16.7 16.6 
Pr~sent system compromises 13.6 7.7 12.5 0 16.6 
Emphasis on ranking 22.7 23.0 12.5 16. 7 50.0 
Scoring/weighting by factor 20.4 33.3 12.5 0 33.3 




































PERCENTAGE OF ALTERNATIVE ANSWERS (QUESTION 4) BY 
SSAC AND SSEB 
Alternative Answers 
No response 
Should be modified 
Should not be modified 
Present system adequate 
Present system superior 
System forces to average 
Upward flow constrained 
More definitization needed 
Less definitization required 
Technical risk too difficult 
Present system compromises 
Emphasis on ranking 

































RESPONDENT ANSWERS (QUESTION 4) BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Alternative Answers 
No response 
Should be modified 
Should not be modified 
Present system adequate 
Present system superior 
System forces to average 
Upward flow constrained 
More definitization needed 
Less definitization required 
Technical risk too difficult 
Present system compromises 
Emphasis on ranking 
Scoring/weighting by factor 
Other 































































































(a) Reasons for Modifying Scoring System 
(1) SSAC (9) Present system fails to 
provide for corrected 
deficiencies. 
(8) Should be simplified --
now have a bunch of mean-
ingless, unrelatable 
numbers. 
(J) After scoring first pro-
posal there is a tendency 
to use it as the standard. 
(2) Need larger point spread. 
Scores should be matched 
to system objectives (use 
weighted scores). Risk 
scores should be presentei 
separately but comparable/ 
relatable. 
(2) Should eliminate multiple 
considerations of same 
problem. 
(~) Need method to put tech-
nical, schedule, cost 
risks into persp~ctive. 
(2) SSEB Chairman (7) Present system can mask 




(2) Need greater point spread. 
(J) Should distinguish be~ 
tween how well a proposal 
"meets standard" compared 
to others. 
(2) Oppose the+, v;' - system 
strongly. 
(9) Present system scores on 
original submittals. 
Final selection is based 
upon proposals modified 
by CI's and DR 1 s. 1bere-
fore, original weaknesses 
may be irrelevant in 
final selection. Scoring 
process needs to recog-
nize and account for this. 
(10) Difficult to define prop-
erly inclusive but 
mutually exclusive areas 
for evaluation and 
scoring. 
(10) Difficult to establish 
meaningful evaluation 
(4) SSEB Item 
Captain 
(5) SSEB Factor 
Member 
( 6) SSEB Cost 
Member 
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criteria to identify 
really important areas. 
(2) Present system evaluates 
technical compromises and 
alternatives based upon 
individuai merit instead 
of effect on total system. 
(J) Present system designed 
to divorce scoring or 
ranking between contrac-
tors but this is too dif-
ficult to do. 
(9) Little or no penalty 
given to contractor who 
is not responsive. 
(4) Precise definition of 
point score should be 
defined and explained 
prior to evaluation. 
(2) This respondent proposed 
a modified scoring 
system. 
Cost System does not have 
scoring system, and properly 
so. 
Analysis of Question Number 5: 
Technical Interaction 
Question Number 5. The communication and interaction be-
tween cost and technical design personnel should be 
(increased/no change/decreased) because: 
Current system is adequate and preferred. 
Cost data should be divorced from technical 
design. 
Cost data does not adequately reflect design, 
material, and manufacturing processes. 
Cost data should in some way reflect technical 
and other risks. 
Technical design people could assist in improving 
cost models and programs. 
Other reasons (provide comments below). 
1. General 
This question was designed to obtain answers relative 
to the adequacy of present interactions between personnel in 
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the cost and technical areas during Source Selection evalua-
tions. Like question number 4, this question relates to the 
Source Selection evaluation process in general, and not to a 
particular management/contract approach, such as prototype 
hardware, "paper studies", etc. The analysis used for this 
question will follow the same approach developed in previous 
sections. 
2. Answers by Highest Functional Level 
Table XLVIII shows respondent answers as a total group 
and also by the highest functional level in which each re-
spondent has served. 
(a) Percentage of Respondents by 
Answer Given 
The approach for this analysis is described in previous 
section. The results are shown in Table XLIX. 
J. Comparison of Answers by SSAC and SSEB 
The approach for this analysis is described in previous 
sections. The results are shown in Table L. 
4. Comparison of Answers by Years Experience 
of Respondents 
The approach for this analysis is described in previous 
sections. The results are shown in Table LI. 
TABLE XLVIII 
ANSWERS TO QUESTION 5 BY HIGHEST FUNCTIONAL LEVEL 
Respondent Answers Total Highest Functional Level of ResEondents 
Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Cost 
Chairman 
( 44) (13) (8) (12) (6) ( 4) ( 1) 
No response 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Increase communication 35 10 8 9. 4 J 1 
No change 8 2 0 J 2 1 0 
Decrease communication 1 1 0 0 0 0 0 
Current system adequate 6 2 0 J 1 0 0 
Divorce cost data 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 
Does not adequately reflect 12 4 4 2 0 1 1 
Should reflect risk JO 11 5 6 4 J 1 
Technical could assist 21 4 5 6 1 4 1 





PERCENTAGE OF RESPONDENTS BY ALTERNATE ANSWERS TO QUESTION 5 
Alternative Answers Total SSAC Chairman Co- Item 
Respondents Chairman 
No response 0 0 0 0 0 
Increase communications 79.5 77.0 100.0 75.0 66.6 
No change 18. 2 15.4 0 25.0 JJ.4 
Decrease communication 2.J 7.6 0 0 0 
Current system adequate 1J.6 15.4 0 25.0 16.7 
Divorce cost data 2.J 0 0 8.J 0 
Does not adequately reflect 27.3 JO. 7 50.0 16.7 0 
Should reflect risk 68.2 84.7 62.6 50.0 66.6 
Technical could assist 47.8 JO. 7 62.6 50.0 16.7 
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RESPONDENT ANSWERS (QUESTION 5) BY YEARS EXPERIENCE 
Alternative Answers E~erience Level 
5 yrs or less 6 to 10 yrs 
(tj respondents) (No respondents) 
No response 0 0 0 0 
Increase communication 91.5 .34 • .3 87.5 40.0 
No change 7.5 12.5 12.5 25.0 
Decrease communication 0 0 0 0 
Current system adequate 7.5 16.7 12.5 .3 .3 • .3 
Divorce cost data 0 0 6.2 100.0 
Does not adequately reflect .38.5 41.6 25.0 JJ.4 
Should reflect risk 77.0 .3 .3 • .3 69.0 .36.7 
Technical could assist 5.3.8 33.3 50.0 38.0 
Other 38.5 25.0 56.2 45.0 















5. Summary o:f "Other Reasons" 
This section summarizes the other reasons given by 
respondents to support saying that communication and inter-
action between cost and technical personnel should be in-
creased, not changed, or decreased. The numbers in 
parenthesis in paragraph (a) below re:fer to the numbered 
reasons listed in Table XXII of Chapter VI. 
(a) Reasons Communication Should Increase 
( 1) SSAC (3) Cost data should be made 
available to technical 
people and assistance 
given in both directions. 
Earlier interaction 
needed for trade-off 
concepts. 
(3) Cost people live in world 
of own -- rarely make 
cost information avail-
able. Must insure cost 
and performance is 
balanced. Must be 
cautious -- too much cost 
data can bias technical 
evaluation. 
(3) Necessary between cost 
and all areas, not just 
technical. 
(2) SSEB Chairman (3) Would yield more realism 
in cost estimates. 
(3) SSEB Co-
Chairman 
(3) Cost evaluation suffers 
from oversensitive treat-
ment and lack of tech-
nical input. 
(1) Need to coordinate im-
pa.cts on cost as changes 
occur and weaknesses/ 
risks identified. 
(3) Cost panels should pre-
pare cost spread sheet 
and look for variations 
beyond spread limits and 
refer those to technical 
teams for explanations. 
( 4) SSEB Item 
Captain 
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-1be suggestions by two 
respondents were consid-
ered excellent and are 
discussed briefly in 
Chapter VIII. 
(3) Particularly needed in 
areas of stringent 
requirements. 
(3) Cost data submitted with 
proposal generally does 
not coincide with the 
technical design sub-
mitted in the technical 
proposal. 
(b) Reasons for Making No Change 
(1) SSAC - Adequate interaction 
(2) SSEB Item Captain - Must score cost data to 
obtain realism 
(3) SSEB Factor Member - Technical evaluation 
should be made independent of 
cost data, but cost data 
should include technical 
considerations. 
(c) Reason Communication Should 
Decrease 
SSAC - Cost models are often either non-existent 
or not credible; thereforej cost data is 
for most part useless exercise. 
Question Number 6: Minimum Data Defined 
Question Number 6. In your specific area, what do you con-
sider to be minimum data: (Be as specific as you can. What 
is the minimum amount of information you can give the con-
tractor in terms of data requirements and expect a qualified 
bidder to respond with adequate data for evaluation in your 
area.) 
1. General 
The purpose of this question was to obtain answers 
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which would provide a better understanding of the nature, 
scope, and depth of data required to satisfy: 
(1) The minimum documentation concept of current 
DoD management philosophy and 
(2) The Source Selection evaluation of prototype 
hardware development. 
Respondent answers to the question were generally good, but 
the question itself was too broad in scope. As a result, 
the respondent answers varied from broad management concepts 
to detailed data specifications for particular factors. The 
writer was not able to perform a meaningful analysis, nor 
reach any specific conclusions from the respondent answers. 
A more comprehensive and multidisciplined study would be 
required to determine whether or not specific guidance and 
procedures could be established relative to minimum documen-
tation on prototype hardware developmental programs. 
2. Summary of Respondent Answers 
This section provides a summary of some of the most 
significant and frequent answers given by respondents. 
(a) Minimum data varies with the following: 
(1) Complexity of the weapon system 
(2) Amount of knowledge and data available 
to evaluator before proposals are 
submitted. 
(3) Type of bidders -- if all are United 
States manufacturers, data required by 
evaluator to make rapid and accurate 
assessment of performance, handling 
qualities, weight, structural design, 
electrical power distribution and 
loading, etc., are well known. 
(b) The data required is dependent upon the depth of 
evaluation desired and time available. 
(c) Do not ask for detailed data in areas that are not 
critical to the evaluation criteria. Tailor the 
data to evaluate the operational characteristics 
which are most critical to the weapon systems 
over-all effectiveness. 
(d) Should restrict the areas of data requested to 
those that are of significant technical risk. 
(e) Data requested for management, logistics, and 
operational areas could be drastically reduced 
in prototype hardware developmental programs. 
(f) Before it can be determined what data is needed 
there must be a clear understanding of what the 
requirements of the prototype system really are, 
relative to the operational system. Next, these 
requirements must be stated in the RFP. The 
evaluation criteria is then established and the 
data requirements determined from all the above. 
(g) It is necessary that differences between proto-
type and final production configuration be 
clearly identified and adequately described. 
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(h) Minimum data can be obtained by using the 11 ASB 
Guide for Advanced Systems Planning Study 
Requirements" document, which is an abstract of 
the AFSC Work Statement Preparation Manual. 
(i) Data should be requested in specified format to 
facilitate rapid and equitable evaluation of 
proposals. 
Analysis of Question Number 7: CI's and DR's 
Question number 7. What influence and impact on the SSEB 
evaluation process does the Contractor inquiry and Deficien-
cy Report have on: 
a. Technical Evaluation? 
b. Risk Assessment? 
c. Scoring? 
1. General 
This question was designed to obtain data which could 
be used to assess the usefulness of CI's and DR's to the 
Source Selection evaluation process. The poor design of the 
question resulted in wide variance in the answers, making it 
difficult to achieve a systematic analysis and evaluation. 
All of the respondents answers were recorded by highest 
functional level and compared. For the majority of answers, 
it was possible to group them into several major categories. 
When the respondent did not specify CI or DR, it was assumed 
that his comments applied to both. Tables LII through LVII 
provide the results of an analysis of the answers by highest 
functional level for technical evaluation, risk assessment, 
and scoring, for both contractor inquiries and deficiency 
reports. 
2. Impact on Technical Evaluation 
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This analysis compares the respondents'answers relative 
to the impact of the Contractor Inquiry (CI) and Deficiency 
Report (DR) by highest functional level of the respondents. 
Table LII shows the most significant effects of the 
Deficiency Report on the technical evaluation. The numbers 
in the body of these tables reflect the actual number of re-
spondents providing that particular answer. 
J. Impact on Risk Assessment 
This analysis compares the respondents' answers rela-
tive to the impact of the CI and DR by highest functional 
level of the respondents. Table LIV shows the most signifi-
cant effects of the CI on risk assessment, and Table LV 
shows the most significant effects of the DR on risk 
assessment. 
4. Impact on Scoring 
This analysis compares the respondents' answers rela-
tive to the impact of the CI and DR by the highest func-
tional level of respondents. Table LVI shows the most 
significant effects of the CI on the Source Selection 
Scoring process. Table LVII shows the most significant 
effects of the DR on the Source Selection Scoring process. 
TABLE LII 
CI IMPACT ON TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
Answers by Respondents 
Better evaluation possible through 
clarification 
Essential to evaluation process 
Create inequities in favor of 
contractor in question 
Creats excessive delays, process 
should be improved 
No effect on evaluation process 
CI 1 s should be sharply reduced or 
eliminated 
Highest Functional Level 











































DR IMPACT ON TECHNICAL EVALUATION 
Answers by Respondents SSAC Chairman Co-
Chairman 
Essential for contract definition 2 2 1 
Essential to evaluation 2 0 2 
No effect on evaluation 1 4 3 
Create inequities in favor of 
contractor in question 0 2 3 
Creates excessive delays 1 1 0 
Should reduce and/or restrict use 





















CI IMPACT ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
Answers by Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Total 
Chairman Respondents 
Assists in identifying and 
assessing risk 7 5 5 3 3 23 
Tends to reduce risk 1 0 0 3 1 5 
No effect on risk assessment 1 1 2 0 0 4 
TABI,,E LV 
DR IMPACT ON RISK ASSESSMENT 
Answers by Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Total 
Chairman Respondents 
Assists in identifying and 
assessing risk 7 3 5 0 3 18 
Tends to reduce risk 1 2 0 3 1 7 
No effect on risk assessment 1 3 2 0 0 6 




CI IMPACT ON SCORING PROCESS 
Answers by Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Total 
Chairman Respondents 
Improves accuracy of scores 4 3 1 1 1 10 
No effect on score~ 4 1 4 1 0 10 
Scores should reflect CI response 3 1 2 1 0 7 
Leads to inequities in favor of 
contractor in question 0 2 ·3 0 2 7 
TABLE LVII 
DR IMPACT ON SCORING PROCESS 
Answers by Respondents SSAC Chairman Co- Item Factor Total 
Chairman Respondents 
Improves accuracy of scores 3 1 2 0 1 7 
Cause higher probability of low score 0 1 2 1 0 4 
No effect on scores 6 J 6 1 0 16 
Scores should reflect DR response 2 1 2 1 0 6 
Leads to inequities in favor of con- \.,.) 
tractor.in question 0 J 1 0 2 6 0 0 
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